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Thanks to George Orwell's dystopian novel, the year 1984 became a cultural
reference point in Cold War America. When January of that iconic year finally
arrived, Apple rolled out the Macintosh personal computer with an arresting
Super Bowl advertisement, assuring viewers that "1984 won't be like Nineteen
Eighty-Four."' As the introduction of new technologies generated excitement and
apprehension in the mid-1980s, increasingly sophisticated organ transplantation
practices seemed to embody the promise and the perils of medicine's future.2
Orwell's novel remains a cultural touchstone in the twenty-first century, having
outlived its immediate political context,3 and the first Macintoshes, though today
considered technological dinosaurs, ushered in the era of personal computing.
The National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (NOTA) likewise left a cultural
imprint that would transcend its immediate historical context. The Act's motives,
its text, and even its name have largely receded from the public's consciousness,
to the extent that they ever were a part of that consciousness. The human organ
allocation system that it spawned, however, supplies the news and entertainment
media with a steady stream of inspirational stories, suspicious incidents, and
ethical conundrums.4
Amid a persistent scarcity of transplantable organs, salient aspects of organ
allocation in the United States-patients waiting for transplantable organs,
shocked next-of-kin being asked to consent to the donation of loved ones'
organs, institutional protocols for allocating available organs, and the ban on
organ purchases--continue to draw academic and public scrutiny. Policy-
oriented scholars are increasingly revisiting established features of the NOTA
system, especially the provision of NOTA that prohibits commerce in human
organs, and proposing various modifications. 5 But before this renewed critical
1. See Ted Friedman, Apple's 1984: The Introduction of the Macintosh in the Cultural History
of Personal Computers, http://www.duke.edu/-tlove/mac.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2007)
(discussing the memorable and oft-parodied Macintosh commercial that aired during the 1984
Super Bowl).
2. See Lindsey Gruson, Center for Transplants and Pittsburgh Ascent, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16,
1985, at A I0 (quoting William R. Berry, Executive Director of the American Council of Transplant
Physicians as saying "[w]hen you say medicine, I think transplant").
3. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FouR (1949).
4. See, e.g., Chris Roark, From One to Another, CAROLLTON LEADER (Tex.), Apr. 25, 2007,
available at http://www.courier-gazette.com/articles/2007/04/25/carrollton-leader/news/02front.txt
(discussing a wife's organ donation to her husband).
5. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and
Payment for Organs, 120 HARv. L. REv. 1813 (2007).
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interest can develop into an informed policy discussion, a more complete
understanding of what NOTA was intended to do, and what it actually ordained,
is needed.
A LexisNexis search of American and Canadian law journals for the phrase
"National Organ Transplant Act" yields 232 articles. Clearly, the Act has
generated substantial interest among legal scholars since its enactment in 1984.
Much of this attention has focused on a provision of NOTA prohibiting the
exchange of human organs for "valuable consideration."6 Of the 232 results from
the original LexisNexis search, 218 contained the word "market" or "sale." More
than 120 contained the phrase "valuable consideration," mirroring the language
of the Act itself 7 Beyond the extensive debate surrounding this one controversial
provision, the existing literature acknowledges the comprehensive nature of
NOTA but does not provide a clear image of the statute's details.
Scholarly accounts of NOTA vary so greatly that, depending on which
account one reads, one might absorb radically different understandings of the
law's scope, import, and underlying motivations. One major point of
disagreement concerns whether the organ allocation system established under the
Act reflected the intent of its congressional supporters. Frank A. Sloan, an
economist who has written extensively about health policy, suggests that
Congress sought to establish "a national procurement and distribution system"
and failed. 8 According to Sloan, "in spite of federal efforts to establish a uniform
system," organ allocation remained, post-NOTA, in the hands of local or regional
networks that were "decentralized, purely voluntary, lack[ing] criteria for sharing
organs, and lack[ing] procedures for cross-matching before transporting organs."9
Conversely, Vanderbilt Law Professor James F. Blumstein argues that the
resulting network was far more centralized and uniform than NOTA's drafters
envisioned. 10 In Blumstein's view, the original Act contained "distinct elements
of a market perfecting orientation ... compatible with a pluralistic, decentralized
voluntary system."'1 What emerged subsequently, far different from the support
structure envisioned by NOTA, was a tightly-coordinated, centralized network
that played a "nongovernmental or quasi-governmental regulatory role ... in
virtually every facet of organ transplantation."' 2 Sloan and Blumstein agree that
6. National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2000).
7. Search conducted April 3, 2007.
8. Frank A. Sloan et al., Is There a Rationale for Regionalizing Organ Transplantation
Services?, in ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION POLICY: ISSUES AND PROSPECTS 115, 128 (James F.
Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan eds., 1989).
9. Id.
10. James F. Blumstein, Government's Role in Organ Transplantation Policy, in ORGAN
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the network diverged from the legislative intent embodied in the Act, but their
characterizations of that intent, and how the resulting network diverged from it,
are diametrically opposed.
Accounts also differ about the concerns or desires that prompted NOTA.
Descriptions of the Act's motivations, like the stories of its impact, are
contradictory and, when taken together, opaque. According to Sloan, Congress's
rationale for establishing the allocation system was twofold: to address the
relatively low rate of organ procurement given the possibilities for
transplantation, and to develop a national matching system for heart and liver
transplants, since the existing computerized system matched only kidneys. 13 In
stark contrast, medical ethicist Arthur Caplan suggests that the root problems
were on the demand side of organ allocation, rather than the supply side.
According to Caplan, "Congress insisted a national system be created" around
notions of justice that would direct donated organs to "Americans... first,"
responding to a concern that American patients were being bypassed in favor of
international patients who paid more.14 Yet another theory, emphasizing the role
of organized professional interests rather than public policy concerns, is offered
by Jeffrey Prottas, a political scientist specializing in health policy who
participated in the events leading to NOTA's passage. 15 According to Prottas,
NOTA largely represented a response to lobbying by medical practitioners
seeking an expansion of reimbursement for transplant therapy following the
introduction of the powerful, but expensive, immunosuppressive drug
cyclosporine. Additionally, "[a] split in the renal transplant community regarding
organ sharing practices ... brought a section of that community to the
government for help.",16 Specifically, individual transplant programs' ability to
"set their own rules" led to a collective action problem of organ hoarding.'"
It is extremely difficult to reconcile all these interpretive accounts. Sloan and
Blumstein's assessments of what NOTA sought to accomplish, if pushed
sufficiently far, clearly conflict with each other: the legislation could not have
created an organ allocation network that was simultaneously centralized and
decentralized, voluntary and regulatory, top-down and bottom-up. However, if
different elements of the legislation (and the resulting organ sharing network)
embodied different tendencies, then depending on which provision of NOTA one
looks at, one might see coercion or voluntarism, competition or hostility toward
13. Sloan et. al, supra note 8, at 128.
14. ARTHUR CAPLAN, MORAL MATTERS: ETHICAL ISSUES IN MEDICINE AND THE LIFE SCIENCES
142 (1995).
15. Jeffrey M. Prottas, The Politics of Transplantation, in ORGAN AND TISSUE DONATION:
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competition. Likewise, the different accounts proffered for NOTA's underlying
motivation are mutually exclusive in the sense that they cannot all be the
paramount cause of the legislation. Nonetheless, because the legislation was
comprehensive, addressing the procurement and distribution of human kidneys,
hearts, livers, and other solid organs for transplantation, different elements of the
law may have been responses to the different pressures described by Sloan,
Caplan, and Prottas.
In this paper, I will attempt to elucidate the social and legislative history of
NOTA, drawing upon documentary sources such as newspaper articles,
congressional hearing transcripts, and law journal articles. Because there are
already so many competing accounts of the Act's origins and impact, I will not
test the validity of these theories one by one. Rather, I will present a narrative
account that focuses on the concerns, aspirations, and effects (intended or
unintended) that are most salient in the source materials. In addition, I will
attempt to explain why these issues figured so prominently in the public
discussion surrounding NOTA by considering how the legislation was the
product of a specific technological, economic, political, and cultural context.
The first Section of the paper discusses the history of human organ
allocation prior to the 1983-1984 congressional hearings that led to the passage
of NOTA. This background should help provide a sense of how the interaction
between technological change and social expectations created pressures to
develop an organ allocation system that was both feasible (in light of evolving
technical capabilities) and consistent with widely-shared American values
(including prevailing notions of fairness). During this period, when organ
procurement and allocation were governed by a heterogeneous matrix of legal
doctrines and professional norms, a fundamental, recurring problem was that of
"shortage." As more patients were able to benefit from transplant surgery, the
available supply of organs did not keep up with the demand, prompting questions
about who should receive transplants and how organ donation could be increased.
The second Section of the paper describes how Congress intervened to address
this perceived shortage and other issues raised by transplantation during the early
1980s. This Section argues that the major aims of NOTA were to increase
efficiency in the use of transplantable organs, to improve the recruitment of
organ donors, and to establish a task force process for resolving the ethical
challenges posed by organ allocation. The legislation did less to address directly
another concern frequently expressed in the media and in congressional hearings:
the desire to regularize funding and eligibility rules for transplant surgery.
Additionally, the legislative history suggests that the specific provision banning
commerce in human organs was animated by multiple motives, ranging from
beliefs about distributive justice, to repugnance over objectification of the body,
to concerns about America's global image. The third Section of this paper
examines NOTA's impact on organ procurement and allocation as the law's
VIII:l1 (2008)
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mandates were carried out. This Section will attempt to show that Congress gave
other institutional actors latitude in putting NOTA into practice, and that events
subsequent to the passage of NOTA shaped understandings of the bill itself and
how it was implemented. Finally, the concluding Section will bring the history up
to date, showing that the institutional features of the NOTA system, by failing to
alleviate the perceived shortage of transplantable organs, created pressures for
further innovations in organ allocation policy. The most dramatic proposals for
further reform would require amending or repealing NOTA, but many other
innovations are being implemented without revising the legislation. The
concluding Section will also survey the historical trajectory of organ allocation
policy to re-evaluate scholars' understandings and assumptions about NOTA.
I. SOCIAL AND TECHNICAL ENVIRONMENT
Viable options for allocating health care are profoundly shaped by the
technologies available to the individual, institution, or society responsible for
allocation. For example, the ability to determine the presence of A and B surface
antigens on red blood cells allows individuals with the same blood type to be
matched with each other for transfusions and organ transplants. Before ABO
blood-typing, doctors might have used any number of criteria in determining
whether to attempt a transfusion when a patient was in dire straits, but no
potential recipient would have been categorically ruled out in advance because of
blood type "incompatibility." By the time organs (and not merely blood) were
being transferred from donors to recipients, the known futility of ABO-
mismatched transplants functioned as a constraint on allocation: A patient with 0
blood could not assimilate an AB kidney without suffering an acute rejection
reaction, so such a patient must be ruled out as a recipient. Today, techniques are
being developed that may be used to desensitize transplant recipients, so an 0
patient might actually benefit from an "incompatible" AB organ; in the future,
such patients may eventually be considered as possible recipients for these
differently-typed organs.1 8 Likewise, if one has the technological means to
preserve a human liver for twelve hours, there are more potential recipients to
choose among than if one can only preserve the liver for six hours, because one
can transport the organ across a larger geographical area before it deteriorates.
Although the technological state of the art in any given era is a powerful
factor in the organ allocation calculus, technical limitations have never dictated
who shall be a donor for whom. In the earliest days of transplantation, when the
procedure was restricted to close genetic relatives, the question remained as to
18. See, e.g., Roberto Troisi et al., ABO-Mismatch Adult Living Donor Liver Transplantation
Using Antigen-Specific Immunoadsorption and Quadruple Immunosuppression Without
Splenectomy, 12 LIVER TRANSPLANTATION 1412 (2006).
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whether a transplant could be justified at all. For example, could the removal of
one kidney from a healthy, assenting minor for the benefit of a dying sibling,
with or without the consent of the parents, be morally and legally justified? The
answer to such a question turned not on technical capacity, but on value
judgments about tolerable medical risk, the rights of children, minors' need for
protection, bodily integrity, the role of the state in relation to the family, and the
slippery slope toward unethical experimentation. Further, as technologies of
organ transfer-in particular, immunosuppression-developed, the general trend
was to increase the number of potential recipients for any given organ, creating a
larger space in which these value judgments could operate. Additionally, the line
between social and therapeutic considerations is blurry, and a single criterion
used in organ allocation can reflect both kinds of consideration. For example,
hostility toward liver transplants for alcoholics probably reflects some
combination of a value judgment that there are worthier recipients of scarce
livers, a medical judgment (whether well-founded or not) that alcoholics who
receive a new liver are likely to destroy this liver as well, and a public health
judgment that this outcome would be wasteful when there is an organ shortage.
The decision to label a culturally or politically charged condition such as
alcoholism as a medical contraindication is a social process. Finally, on a more
basic level, political decisions about the allocation of funding-for example,
whether research and development capital is invested in antigen-matching or in
immunosuppressive drugs-influence the development of technologies that, in
turn, influence the allocation of organs.
The current organ allocation system in the United States, organized under
the auspices of NOTA, is the product of a series of decisions that would have
been difficult to predict in advance. While the American system relies on
volunteers who have expressed their affirmative intent to donate, some liberal
democracies obtain organs by presumed consent. Whereas American allocation
policies are national in scope, many Continental European countries participate
in a multinational Eurotransplant network. One cannot simply assume that such
fundamental design decisions reflect Americans' general policy preferences. In
1984, when Congress effectively established a single, national organ distribution
system, deregulation-not nationalization-was a watchword of the Ronald
Reagan Administration.' 9 As Richard Cook has noted, organ allocation is a
"socio-technical" process. 20 The legislative history of NOTA reflected this
19. See Blumstein, supra note 10, at 6 (noting this divergence from the "procompetitive"
orientation of contemporary politics).
20. See Richard I. Cook, Hobson's Choices: Matching and Mismatching in Transplantation
Work Processes, in A DEATH RETOLD: JESICA SANTILLAN, THE BUNGLED TRANSPLANT, AND
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interaction between social and technical considerations. These concerns,
however, did not emerge ex nihilo in the congressional hearings on NOTA.
Rather, the ongoing interplay between social and technical aspects of organ
allocation helped inspire NOTA's introduction and passage. This Section of the
essay will provide the important historical context of the Act by examining the
politics, economics, and technicalities of organ allocation prior to Congress's
intervention in the process during the early 1980s.
A. The Socio-Technical Organization of Organ Matching
In the early years of transplantation, there was no formal allocation "system"
to speak of, and public hope and confidence in the emerging, experimental
system were linked to the specifics of whose organs were matched with whom.
Solid organ transplants first became a viable clinical option in the 1950s, but
generally only between identical twins.21 Allocating organs according to genetic
identity left little room for value judgments. From the start, transplant surgeons
pushed the bounds of this narrow conception of the acceptable match.
Genetically-distinct skin and renal grafts occasionally worked as bridges until
patients regenerated their own skin or a faltering native kidney began functioning
again. Nonetheless, the element of luck or fate in finding a suitable match seized
the public imagination. Thus, a 1955 article in Time about a skin transplant
recounted this hospital conversation: "It was unfortunate," the chief surgeon
remarked, that patient Rodney Madeira "did not have an identical twin, since
only skin from the patient's own body or from such a twin would do for a
permanent graft. Replied Madeira, 'I have one."' Similarly, the previous year, an
airman had recovered from severe burns because "he chanced to spot his twin
brother wandering around the hospital corridor., 22 Surgeon Francis D. Moore
asserted that so "[mlany coincidences were necessary" for the successful first
twin transplant that it initially struck doctors as "a medical freak., 23
As immunosuppressive therapy and antigen matching technologies
developed in tandem, they synergistically expanded the number of patients who
could hope for long-term graft survival. Even so, technological constraints
necessitated a reliance on living donors in solid organ transplantation's early
years, and people invested in this project spoke of their hopes for it, rather than
their confidence in it. The introduction of mechanical ventilators in the late 1950s
21. Experimentation with animals suggested that transplants between fraternal twins would
also be acceptable in the rare event that they shared a single placenta, exposing the twins' nascent
immune systems to each other's tissue. See TONY STARK, KNIFE TO THE HEART: THE STORY OF
TRANSPLANT SURGERY 33-34 (1996).
22. Twins Under the Skin, TIME, Oct. 17, 1955, at 84 (emphasis added).
23. FRANCIS D. MOORE, GIVE AND TAKE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION 75
(1964).
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and the medical endorsement of brain death in the late 1960s meant that, for the
first time, organs could be temporarily maintained and oxygenated in a brain
dead donor's body until the moment of need.24 Until dialysis machines became
widely accessible, patients with end-stage renal disease could not wait long until
a cadaver kidney became available. Only with the development of effective
techniques for preserving organs outside the body in the late 1960s did cadaveric
kidney transplants become elective surgery rather than an emergency
procedure. 25 Thus, even as the genetic compatibility requirement began to loosen,
organ allocation remained contingent on coincidences of time and location in the
lives of donors and recipients.
In kidney transplantation's early experimental period, the use of "penal
volunteers, 26 and biologically-related living donors lessened pressures to enroll
the public at large in the transplant enterprise. Whether the kidneys came from
prisoners or relatives, medical professionals were selecting donors for kidney
patients, not selecting recipients for available organs. This assumption could be
seen in the published remarks of British transplant surgeon Roy Calne, who
warned that matches between living people could be a burden as well as a
blessing: "I fear that even if we do get a perfect method of tissue-typing we will
be faced with new problems of finding a good donor who happens not to want to
give his kidney., 27 Pioneering American surgeon Thomas Starzl abandoned the
use of (consenting) prison donors after encountering intense criticism at an
international symposium on transplant ethics. 28 While transplants between
patients bound by family ties were not ruled out as coercive per se, a series of
judicial opinions, largely stemming from predicaments involving potential
donors who were legally incompetent, cemented the informed consent
requirement for living donors. 29 "Public and Congressional outrage" over the
24. See MARGARET LOCK, TWICE DEAD: ORGAN TRANSPLANTS AND THE REINVENTION OF
DEATH 78 (2002).
25. See Folkert 0. Belzer, Organ Preservation: A Personal Perspective,
http://www.stanford.edu/dept/HPS/transplant/html/beIzer.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2007).
26. Paul I. Terasaki et al., Serotypingfor Homotransplantation, 129 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI.
500, 501 (1966).
27. Thomas E. Starzl et al., Survival After Human Renal Homotransplantation, 162 ANNALS
SURGERY 749, 787 (1965).
28. See THOMAS E. STARZL, THE PUZZLE PEOPLE 147 (1992); Robert Platt, Ethical Problems in
Medical Procedures, in CIBA FOUNDATION SYMPOSIUM, ETHICS IN MEDICAL PROGRESS: WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO TRANSPLANTATION 166 (G.E.W. Wolstenholme & Maeve O'Connor eds.,
1966).
29. The exceptions at least in theory affirmed the rule: Courts regularly authorized such
transplants between minor twins either on the theory that the transplant was in the donor's "best
interest" given the dreary alternatives or on the basis of "substituted judgment," by counterfactually
asking whether the person, if competent, would agree to donate. See Arthur Caplan et al.,
VIII:l1 (2008)
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excision of pituitary glands from cadavers, without permission, to treat dwarfism
in the 1960s revealed that the use of cadaveric organs was also contingent on
public support.3 ° Policymakers seeking to advance the transplant enterprise
would need to allay cultural, religious and psychological misgivings about
donation.
As a technical matter, some Americans questioned how well transplantation
would work. A California homemaker, responding to a 1968 Gallup poll on
public attitudes toward organ donation, remarked, "[t]hese transplants will
perhaps stall death a week or a month, but I don't believe they'll ever be able to
get a man back on his feet again., 31 Yet even here, the criterion for evaluating
therapeutic success was not purely technical. The problems transplantation posed
for the pre-existing cultural trope of "standing on one's own two feet" may help
explain why variations on this theme were frequently invoked in public
discussion of transplants-whether in reference to the sharing of body parts or
the postoperative challenges awaiting immunosuppressed transplant patients. A
relatively recent news article, focusing on attitudes toward donation among
ethnic minorities, quoted an African-American donor recalling, "I remember my
mother saying, 'I was born with two legs, let me die with two legs."'' 32 Another
possible source for this figurative language was the legend of the twin Saints
Cosmas and Damian, credited with replacing the gangrenous leg of a man
(traditionally depicted as European and Christian) with the leg of a recently
deceased North African.33 In either case, ample evidence indicates that
Americans did not evaluate transplantation as a matter of abstract logic; rather
they assessed the new type of surgery in light of personal experiences, cultural
traditions, and collective memories, which may or may not have been widely
shared in society at large. At a minimum, organ donation was inconsistent with
some conventional notions about respectful treatment of bodies. "Are kidney
donors weirdoes?" asked one publication (rhetorically) as late as 1974.34
Within the legal academy, cadaveric organ donation as a donative transfer
opened another line of discussion: It became the province of trusts and estates
law. Prior to 1968, novel or unusual dispositions of dead bodies necessitated the
Increasing Organ and Tissue Donation: What Are the Obstacles, What Are Our Options?, in THE
SURGEON GENERAL'S WORKSHOP ON INCREASING ORGAN DONATION: BACKGROUND PAPERS 199,
202 (1991).
30. Id.
31. George Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Majority Would Donate Organs, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17,
1968, at A5.
32. Christopher Heredia, The Ultimate Offering: An Example for the Many Minorities
Reluctant to Donate Organs, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 11, 1999, at A13.
33. See Leonard Barkan, Of Medicine, Miracles, and the Economies of the Body, in ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION: MEANINGS AND REALITIES 221,225 (Stuart J. Youngner et al. eds., 1996).
34. Arthur J. Snider, Are Kidney Donors Weirdoes?, Sc1. DIG., May 1974, at 54.
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navigation of perilous legal and cultural terrain. English common law, which
continued to exert a strong influence in some states, granted the decedent a right
to a decent burial that by default was inherited by the decedent's next-of-kin. 3" In
the United States, when the disposition of the body was disputed, courts balanced
such considerations as "the interests of the public, the wishes of the decedent,
and the rights and feelings of those entitled to be heard by reason of relationship
or association. 36 With the dawn of cadaveric organ transplantation, individual
states supplemented this common law approach with positive legislation-for
example, some statutes authorized anatomical gifts exclusively by will. 37 The
liability risk for transplant centers was sufficiently acute that a hospital
guidebook "caution[ed] against using organs from a body where there [we]re
objections, even though the decedent had authorized such use" in the absence of
specific enabling legislation.38
The limitations of this guarded approach-both public and personal-were
dramatized by the death and burial of Grace Metalious, author of the novel
Peyton Place, in 1964. 39 Metalious's will provided that her body should go to the
Dartmouth School of Medicine for research; Harvard Medical School was her
backup. 4' Neither school would accept the body after her survivors "reportedly"
warned the institutions that they would bring suit.4' As bodies came to be seen as
sources of organs for clinical procedures, medical urgency pressed against legal
complexity, uncertainty, and conservatism.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
responded to these pressures with the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) of
1968. UAGA, in its attempt to clarify and standardize procedures for donating
organs and tissue, enshrined the conception of organ donation as the bestowal of
a gift. The original UAGA's conception of an anatomical gift was detailed and
quite literal: Not only did the donee have a right to reject the gift, but the donee
could also "transfer his ownership to another person. 42 This model legislation
was quickly adopted in forty-one states, 43 and all fifty eventually enacted some
35. See E. Blythe Stason, Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 23 Bus. LAW. 919, 922 (1968).
36. Yome v. Gorman, 152 N.E. 126, 128 (N.Y. 1926).
37. Stason, supra note 35, at 924.
38. Gary C. Randall & Janet Randall, The Developing Field of Human Organ Transplantation,
5 GONZ. L. REv. 20, 28 (1969).
39. Id.
40. Holland v. Metalious, 198 A.2d 654,655 (N.H. 1964).
41. Randall & Randall, supra note 38, at 28.
42. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
191-92 (1968).








As "anatomical gifts," organ donations fit into a larger movement in which
trusts and estates scholars and practitioners expanded the field's professional
jurisdiction by claiming jurisdiction over the human body. Between roughly 1940
and 1970, attorneys, clients, judges, and scholars embraced new concepts
including "willed bodies" (i.e., cadavers donated for medical research) and
"living wills" (i.e., advance directives regarding medical treatment) that applied
trusts and estates law, with its equitable sensibility, to the care of the body in
periods of unconsciousness, as well as post-mortem.45
In allowing salvageable organs to be buried for want of authorization to
remove them, UAGA parted ways with the utilitarian, statist thrust of public
health law (the body of jurisprudence and scholarship governing such exigencies
as quarantines and compulsory vaccination). Intellectual strands within the legal
field-respect for individual donors' autonomy, and the inherent conservatism of
trusts and estates law-favored UAGA's gradualist, consensual approach to
organ procurement, but they were not the only consideration. The need to build
public support for transplantation in a majoritarian democracy also powerfully
cautioned against rushing to impose a more aggressive "opt-out" procurement
regime on an ambivalent public.46 By providing a standard legal basis for the
donation decision and recognizing the primacy of the decedent's wishes, UAGA
paved the way for organizations like the National Kidney Foundation to
distribute uniform organ donor cards on nationwide scale.47
B. Enlisting "The Public, " but Not the Public As a Whole
Early efforts to promote organ donation, which were oriented toward
building majority support for donation, emphasized rapidly expanding the scope
of transplantation over serving all members of American society equally well.
This majoritarian bias could be seen in tactical decisions made below the radar of
public policy debate.
The development of the human leukocyte antigen (HLA) system for
matching organs involved one such choice. As data on tissue compatibility
44. Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Validity and Application of Uniform Anatomical Gift Act,
6 A.L.R. 6th 365, 365 (2005).
45. See, e.g., Luis Kutner, Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, A Proposal, 44 IND.
L.J. 539 (1969).
46. See Platt, supra note 28, at 160 (quoting C.E. Wasmuth at panel discussion saying that
"[w]e realize [an individual rights approach] is not the end, but at least it does give to a person a
right which he does not now have .... We believe this is the correct approach in the United States,
simply because with this we can educate the people").
47. See Nancy Hicks, Kidney Fund Calls for Bequests of Organs for Transplant Uses, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 1970, at A22.
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accumulated unsystematically, transplant immunogeneticists recognized the need
for antigen-matching tools that "residents, surgeons, and technicians" could use
without confusion.48 At a 1968 World Health Organization conference,
immunologists Walter Bodmer and Jean Dausset cautioned that an ostensibly
"monospecific" serum-a test that could identify a single antigen in a given
population-might react to more than one antigen found in a different
population. Dutch immunologist Jon van Rood similarly questioned whether the
sera should be "studied in different races., 49 Duke University researcher Bernard
Amos, a pioneer in the use of tissue-typing to select organ donors among
siblings, countered that such exhaustive expectations would hinder the
development of a working system for identifying antigens: "[A]s soon as [a
serum]'s shown not to be monospecific in another population then we're forced
to take it out. ''5 ° Observing that three supposedly distinct antigens immunologists
were testing for-D1, Mac, and LA2-turned out to be "identical within
Caucasian populations," Amos emphasized the desirability of "some
uniformity., 51 In other words, focusing on Caucasians would simplify the
research and yield HLA characterizations that were, in Amos's view, good
enough to operationalize. Genetic diversity across populations was seen not as
something that needed to be taken into account at this stage in the research, but
rather as a threat to the rapid deployment of a working system for allocating
organs among white people.
To be sure, immunogenetic researchers sought to tissue type people of
diverse ethnic backgrounds for scientific reasons, such as identifying rare
antigens in far-flung places or studying isolated populations to simplify their
research.52 It is less clear to what extent the researchers' intellectual endeavors
improved clinical outcomes for ethnic minority patients. The tissue typers'
precise concern about different levels of antigen specificity across populations
never materialized, but in the United States, serological tests were on average
less effective at characterizing the immunogenetic makeup of racial minority
patients decades later.53
48. See Roy L. Walford, First Meeting WHO Leukocyte Nomenclature Committee, in HISTORY
OF HLA: TEN RECOLLECTIONS 123, 130 (Paul I. Terasaki ed., 1990) (quoting Jon van Rood).
49. Id. at 126.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 128 (quoting D. Bernard Amos).
52. See, e.g., Walter Bodmer & Julia Bodmer, History of HLA: Recollections of A Golden Age,
in HISTORY OF HLA: TEN RECOLLECTIONS, supra note 48, 95, at 99 ("Oh, the fun in the bush of
getting the Africans to help us by defibrinating [sic] the blood in the vacutainers by shaking them to
the rhythm of the drums!").
53. See, e.g., Howard Univ., Nat'l Human Genome Ctr., Milestones Leading to the NHGC,
http://www.genomecenter.howard.edu/milestones.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2007) (reporting that
circa 1982, "44% of the AfricanAmerican [sic] panel, compared to only 2% of Caucasians, could
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A similar, if less conscious, majoritarian bias played out in early donor
recruitment campaigns, disadvantaging religious, linguistic, and other cultural
minorities. As early as 1970, a Michigan Law Review article by a prominent
trusts and estates scholar identified several specific religious doctrines, associated
with diverse faiths, which could hamper donation: "A fundamentalist Christian
might consider organ removal inconsistent with the principle of bodily
resurrection. A Jehovah's Witness might object to the shedding of blood. Many
orthodox rabbis have opposed autopsies, invoking a principle of Judaism that the
body must not be violated. 54 In a predominantly Christian society, however,
public discussions of organ transplantation have frequently invoked (vaguely or
explicitly) mainstream Christian imagery. A majoritarian objective-securing the
support of mainstream Christians-was more easily achieved than the egalitarian
correlative-reconciling transplantation with America's myriad religious
traditions. This religious orientation was largely a result of individual
commentators' drawing on widely shared religious and cultural resources, rather
than conscious policy choices. To cite a few recent examples, the New York
Times described the transplant waitlist as "purgatory." 55 "What if one beloved
child could resurrect another?" asked Newsweek contributing editor Anna
Quindlen, employing the theme of bodily resurrection to promote donation.56
While such metaphors may help many Americans (including non-Christians) 57
make sense of the unknown, their appeal is not necessarily universal. The now
ubiquitous slogan, "[d]on't take your organs to heaven... Heaven knows we
need them here," speaks to a particular set of religious concerns, but
transplantation may raise a different set of concerns for a religious tradition
not be HLA-D typed with reference typing reagents obtained primarily from multiparous Caucasian
women"). While HLA polymorphism among African-Americans may have contributed to this
disparity, it was also the logical consequence of a utilitarian approach that focused on serving a
majority within society. See Patrick G. Beatty et I., Impact of Racial Genetic Polymorphism on the
Probability of Finding an HLA-matched Donor, 60 TRANSPLANTATION 778, 780-81 (1995)
(positing that "extensive heterogeneity in HLA among African Americans" has implications for
HLA matching in this population). See also Laura G. Dooley & Robert S. Gaston, Stumbling
Toward Equity: The Role of Government in Kidney Transplantation, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 703, 719
& n.90.
54. Dukeminier, supra note 43, at 836.
55. Jeff Stryker, 1.1. V. Patients Get Fresh Hopes for Donor Organs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11,
2001, at F6.
56. See Maureen Dowd, Op-Ed, A Lyrical Gift, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2003, at 413.
57. One review of a film depicting Jesus as an organ donor noted that the film resonated with
both Christian and Buddhist themes, and that "even to a viewer with no formal religious training,
the images call upon deeply submerged, widely shared, often inaccessible beliefs about
transplants." Wendy Doniger, Transplanting Myths of Organ Transplants, in ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION: MEANINGS AND REALITIES, supra note 33, at 194, 217.
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holding that "[k]arma is encoded in... the body.,5 8 Another barrier to achieving
a representative diversity of potential .donors was the tendency for donor
recruitment campaigns to be conducted only in English. Much as the availability
of transplantable organs in a predominantly Christian society depended on the
willingness of Christians to donate organs, the availability of organs in a
predominantly English-speaking society depended on the support of donors who
could comprehend English-language public service announcements.
In contrast to their efforts to sway the opinions of the majority, transplant
professionals' attempts to understand and address the concerns of minority
demographic groups got off to a clumsy start. As recently as 1996, a leading
heart transplant surgeon called Jewish law "mysterious" and "difficult to
understand," but elaborated upon the low donation rate among Orthodox Jews by
remarking that they "behave sociologically like lower-class Asians, Blacks, and
Hispanics. '59 Recognizing such a pattern, however, was still a step away from
understanding the beliefs, anxieties, and motivations that influence willingness to
donate among specific demographic groups with low donation rates. The moral
and therapeutic hazards of. these majoritarian biases included a possible
disadvantage to minority patients in the short run, as noted in the discussion of
approaches to antigen matching above, as well as the alienation of potential
minority donors in the long run.6°
C. Hearts, Minds, and Corneas in Geopolitical Context
The Uniform State Laws committee that drafted UAGA called
transplantation a "new frontier of modern medicine.",61 This language, echoing
the soaring rhetoric of President John F. Kennedy,62 situated organ transfer in the
political culture of Cold War America. Because organ transplantation
transgressed conventional boundaries-between persons, between life and
58. Id. at 212-13.
59. Judy Siegel-Itzkovich, Transplants: The Ultimate Act of Generosity, JERUSALEM POST, July
28, 1996, at 5.
60. Cf LOCK, supra note 24, 153-54 (noting that in Japan, where the concept of brain death
remained controversial, "[a]n association [was] being made between the Christian culture of
America and recognition of brain death" in a television presentation of the subject and that "[a]n
implicit contrast [was] being set up between America and Japan").
61. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
supra note 42, at 184 (quoting a prefatory note to the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act).
62. See Senator John F. Kennedy, Accepting the Democratic Party Nomination for the
Presidency of the United States (July 15, 1960), available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical
+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/ (evoking a pioneer ethos of freedom, earnestness, and
achievement that would enable Americans to conquer "the uncharted areas of science and space,
unsolved problems of peace and war").
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death-the new frontier was an apt metaphor, and one that easily came to mind
in the 1960s era.63 Yet it was not the only plausible way of understanding
transplantation. The instrumentalization of cadaver organs might alternatively
have been wrapped in Jeffersonian rhetoric of political revolution ("the earth
belongs to the living"). In a political culture that embraced American voluntarism
as an alternative to Communist coercion, however, rhetoric about radically
revising the social contract between the dead and the living likely would have left
64
many uneasy. To be sure, the romance of the frontier also had a violent and
destructive underside, but the ideal of a world "where no walls divide you' '65 was
consistent with the liberalism that reigned over the American political scene in
the mid-1960s. By 1970, discussion of transplant policy, as part of a larger
American political discourse, included a more self-consciously radical,
libertarian strand. One legal scholar suggested that allowing the sale of organs
might be consistent with the same philosophy "underl[ying] much of the current
trend to liberate 'sins,' such as private deviate sexual conduct and fornication by
the unmarried, from criminal sanction.'
66
Metaphors often work in two directions, and if the frontier provided an
accessible way of understanding organ transplantation, transplantation was also a
fitting emblem for a society-or at least its policy elites-intent on breaking
barriers imposed by nature, politics, and human history. Amid the geopolitical
antagonism of the Cold War, the operating theater became one of many theaters
in the "long, twilight struggle" between the superpowers.67 Thus, in 1968, the
New York Times envisioned "a Soviet-American race in the transplantation of...
organs" akin to "the international competition to send the first men on a round
trip to the moon. 68
The envisioned beneficiaries of this rivalry were not just American and
Soviet patients. The delivery of health care across national borders readily serves
63. See Doniger, supra note 57, at 215 ("The moment of death, like personhood, is a boundary
line that we must now newly construct.").
64. See JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME (1999) (presenting a Burkean critique of
Jeffersonian revolutionary presentism in American culture).
65. JOHN BARRY & DON BLACK, BORN FREE (1966). By 1961, the construction of the Berlin
Wall had given Winston Churchill's perception of an oppressive "iron curtain" a material
manifestation. See Modem History Sourcebook: Winston Churchill: The Iron Circuit,
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/churchill-iron.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2007).
66. Dukeminier, supra note 43, at 859.
67. See John F. Kennedy, President, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1961) [hereinafter Kennedy,
Inaugural Address], available at http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres56.html (announcing "a call to
bear the burden of a long twilight struggle.. . against the common enemies of man: tyranny,
poverty, disease, and war itself').
68. Harry Schwartz, The Neglected Battleground in Heart Transplants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18,
1968, at 46.
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as both a tangible expression of generosity and an awesome demonstration of
power over life and death, and introducing organ replacement techniques to
strategically important regions-specifically, East Asia-was consistent with
Cold War internationalism. 69 An early example was New York's Mount Sinai
Hospital's provision of plastic and reconstructive surgery, including skin
grafting, for female Japanese atomic bomb survivors hosted by Quaker families
during the mid-1950s. An opponent of this endeavor warned that "[it would be]
very difficult for Japanese to comprehend pure altruism, since [purportedly] so
very little of it existed in Japan among people who are not tied together by family
bonds."7 ° As described in American news coverage, the cultural exchange turned
out be a triumph of friendship and good will on the part of participants from both
nations, even while medical personnel cautioned that it was "too early" to
evaluate clinical outcomes.71 In 1961, American "eye specialists" planned a visit
to Hong Kong, financed by the pharmaceutical industry, to assist blind refugees
from mainland China. The reported purpose of the trip was not only to provide
medical care, but also to promote attitudes conducive to corneal transplantation:
"Team members will lecture on the whole field of eye surgery for Asian doctors,
leave sets of highly specialized surgical instruments for operations and training
by Chinese doctors, and set up an eye bank in hopes of overcoming Oriental
taboos barring removal of eyes after death., 72 A later donation of pacemakers
worth $7.6 million made by the American Friends Service Committee to Chinese
authorities gave new meaning to winning hearts and minds. A nursing instructor
from Minnesota "happily remarked, 'Can you imagine, 3,200 Chinese walking
around with their heartbeats regulated by American pacemakers? It boggles the
mind.' 7
3
Media coverage of such medical missions, by implicitly contrasting the
generosity of American volunteers with recipient nations' difficulties in
supplying organs for their citizens, probably reinforced a self-congratulatory
progressive narrative, in which the benefits of transplantation were encoded as
"ours," and the challenges encoded as foreign. In a letter to the editor critiquing
the tone of a news article as insufficiently supportive of transplantation, one
doctor wrote:
I am sure that the editors of the New York Times did not intend to portray these
hopeful advances in medical science as a savage gobbling up of one human
69. See generally CHRISTINA KLEIN, COLD WAR ORIENTALISM: ASIA IN THE IMAGINATION,
1945-1961 (2003).
70. Norman Cousins, Interim Report on the Maidens, SATURDAY REv., Oct. 15, 1955, at 22.
71. Id. at 23.
72. Doctors Set Hong Kong Mercy Trip, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1961, at C 19.
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being by another. In the worlds of commerce, politics and international
relations, where this is too often the case, the new surgery is actually promoting
a new altruism. But in doing this, there must be a reduction and weakening of
the Chinese shibboleth about the sanctity of tissue.
74
The original article, about transplantation in America, did not mention China,
traditional Chinese beliefs about the body, or Chinese attitudes toward organ
donation.
So long as scientific progress did not sever the connection between organ
substitution technology and the bodies of organ providers,75 the field would
remain haunted by a dualistic dance of life and death.76 While legal and
institutional developments could improve the coordination, regulation, and
execution of organ transfer, they did not dissolve the paradox of routinized
heroism; the limits of spontaneous generosity; the potential for exploitation on
medicine's frontier; the awkwardness of recognizing individual autonomy over
organs in order to promote their alienation; or tensions in the relationships of
trust, trustworthiness, and the antitrust impulse. With a rudimentary procurement
system in place and increased interest in transplant medicine, these concerns
would eventually surface close to home.
D. Building on Hope and Built-in Dilemmas
The refinement of tissue typing, which was federally supported by 1965, 77
and the widespread adoption of UAGA facilitated the development of organ
sharing networks, which institutionalized organ allocation and, by extension, the
need for public support. Seven West Coast transplant centers established a
74. Robert Seidenberg, Letter to the Editor, On 'Cannibalizing', N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1968, at
46.
75. For a general discussion of how the treatment of dying persons can be managed
respectfully through "structured ambivalence," see ROBERT A. BURT, DEATH Is THAT MAN TAKING
NAMES: INTERSECTIONS OF AMERICAN MEDICINE, LAW, AND CULTURE 159 (2004). For ruminations
on the dualism inherent in the transplant enterprise, see Ren~e C. Fox & Judith P. Swazey, Leaving
the Field, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 9-15 (juxtaposing somewhat stereotypically
transplant suregons' "adventurous, optimistic" outlook alongside their "bellicose, 'death is the
enemy' perspective" and their "relentless, hubris-ridden refusal to accept limits"). See also Ruth
Richardson, Fearful Symmetry: Corpses for Anatomy, Organs for Transplantation?, in ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION: MEANINGS AND REALITIES, supra note 33, at 66, 67-68 (noting that organ
transplantation involves a "fearful symmetry").
76. See Richardson, supra note 75, at 80 (observing that "[r]edefinitions of death ... seem
always to revise it nearer to life"); Id. at 60 (referencing "medieval woodcuts of the Dance of
Death").
77. See Paul I. Terasaki, History of HLA: A Personalized View, in HISTORY OF HLA: TEN
RECOLLECTIONS, supra note 48, at 213, 215.
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common computer-based system for matching organs and patients in 1968.78 In
1969, a transplant surgeon from the Medical College of Virginia and a Duke
University immunologist initiated the South-Eastern Regional Organ
Procurement Program (SEROPP). SEROPP, which quickly entered a contractual
agreement to link nine transplant centers between Baltimore and Atlanta, was
incorporated as American Foundation for Donation and Transplantation (AFDT)
in 1975.79 AFDT's board took the lead in creating a national network by
introducing the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), originally a
computerized matching system, in 1977, and establishing a "round-the-clock"
kidney placement support center in 1982.80
With the support of these new institutions, the 1970s were a decade of quiet,
steady technical refinement. A few determined individuals strived to expand
clinical transplantation to organs other than the kidney. Between 1963 and 1980,
American liver transplant surgeon Thomas Starzl "refined a bypass system that
allowed blood to be diverted to the lower half of the body during surgery," which
was vital to control bleeding, and "developed preservative- solutions that
extended the time the liver could survive outside the body from four to ten
hours."81 Yet despite Starzl's use of "10% of all the research dogs in the country"
one year, an immunosuppressive regime that would prevent rejection without
killing the patient remained elusive for organs other than kidneys.82 Meanwhile, a
few researchers persisted in their pursuit of cyclosporine, a fungal molecule
identified through Swiss pharmaceutical company Sandoz's novel soil screening
program. Although the molecule seemed promising as an immunosuppressant,
the market for such drugs was then miniscule and support for further research
and development could not be taken for granted.
83
In the face of institutional resistance, individuals committed to transplant
immunology had a shared stake in medical innovation: Transplantation required
better postoperative therapy, and immunological research programs needed
transplantation. In 1990, Paul Terasaki, the dean of American transplant
immunogeneticists, estimated that "[p]robably as much as 80% of meeting and
workshop expenses [in the field of human leukocyte antigen research were]
covered by transplant-related sources." Terasaki speculated that professional
78. Harry Nelson, For Organ Transplants: 7 Hospitals Here Plan Pool, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9,
1968, at 1.
79. South-Eastern Organ Procurement Found., Brief History, http://www.seopf.org/intro.htm
(last visited Nov. 30, 2007).
80. Id.; United Network for Organ Sharing, History, http://www.unos.org/whoweare/history
.asp (last visited Nov. 30, 2007).
81. BARRY WERTH, THE BILLION DOLLAR MOLECULE: ONE COMPANY'S QUEST FOR THE
PERFECT DRUG 47 (1994).
82. See id. at 47; STARK supra note 21, at 130-34.
83. See WERTH, supra note 81, at 48.
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organizations "would collapse if tissue typing were no longer considered
necessary for transplantation., 84 Such relationships of sponsorship and patronage
were maintained through a process of negotiation. Terasaki observed of the
immunogenetic research community: "[T]he name that we chose for ourselves,
'histocompatibility [as in the "American Society of Histocompatibility and
Immunogenetics] implied that the HLA antigens we were studying were part of a
compatibility system in transplantation."85 In 1964, the National Academy of
Sciences hosted the first "International Conference on Histcompatibility
Testing," and a year later, Congress authorized the establishment of a program
within the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) that
would fund tissue-typing research.86
Nimble cross-institutional marketing was likewise essential to the
development of cyclosporine. According to one journalistic account, when
Sandoz's management was disinclined to shoulder the costs of developing the
drug as an immunosuppressant, transplant surgeon Roy Calne and immunologist
David White flew from England to the company's headquarters in Switzerland at
the request of Jean Borel, a Sandoz researcher who was committed to the
project. 87 "We more or less had to sell them their own drug," White later
remarked.88 Although the drug might ultimately "create the very market...
needed to justify [its] development costs," its advocates emphasized a different
consideration: Even if the company never recouped these costs, transplantation's
"high profile" could propel "Sandoz's name.., to the forefront." 89 During this
period, transplant professionals' goals and interests were not perfectly aligned:
for example, there was a tension between tissue typers' desire to develop a
method for matching organs and transplant surgeons' eagerness to break new
boundaries. 90 However, a mutual interest in extending clinical transplantation to
more patients, a shared commitment to scientific rigor, and close personal
relationships kept these tensions in check. A series of events towards the end of
1970 powerfully demonstrated the potential for solidarity among transplant
professionals with respect to organ allocation. Following a push in Italy toward
legislatively requiring organ transplants to be tissue typed, immunogeneticist
Terasaki presented data at an international conference indicating that tissue
typing only improved patient survival among perfectly matched donors and
84. Terasaki, supra note 77, at 215.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 215, 221.
87. STARK, supra note 21, at 129-30.
88. Id. at 130 (quoting David White).
89. Id. at 131.
90. See id. at 112 (discussing a surgeon's evident delight in a study showing that antigen
matching only improved outcomes in limited circumstances; the surgeon "[wouldn't] have to worry
about that 'damn matching anymore').
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recipients, who were exceptionally rare. 9 1 Terasaki's UCLA laboratory's
retrospective analysis of Starzl's liver transplants, while consistent with kidney
transplant surgeon John Najarian's clinical observations, conflicted with the
prevailing theory of a predictive "sliding scale of success" animating tissue
typing.92 Shortly thereafter, NIH representatives, apparently convinced that
Terasaki's team "must [have been] doing something wrong," performed a site
visit. By the end of the calendar year, Terasaki was informed that the NIH
contract that supplied virtually all of the laboratory's funding would be
terminated. Further, NIH would take direct control over the tissue-typing tray and
reagent distribution program that Terasaki's lab had started. From 1970 through
1984, the UCLA lab, still under Terasaki's direction, stayed afloat by selling its
tray system in competition with the NIH's version. According to Terasaki, the
value proposition of the UCLA trays was their comparative "quality," but one
can appreciate how such adverse experiences could also give rise to intense
personal loyalties.93
In the area of renal transplantation, advances in tissue typing yielded
tangible clinical results by the 1970s. In 1973, NIAID reported that "more than
60 per cent of all transplants now utilize cadaver kidneys... and the proportion
is growing larger each year., 94 Another source reported that 50-70% of kidney
transplants in 1977 involved cadaveric kidneys.95 While transplant statistics were
imprecise, transplant outcomes were also apparently improving. In 1974, the
three-year survival rate for cadaveric kidney transplants reportedly surpassed
50%.96 By 1977, roughly half of cadaveric kidney grafts lasted five years, as
compared to 35% of cadaveric grafts in 1972, or 85% of living donations from
siblings in 1977. 97 The sheer number of kidney transplants performed in 1973
(over two thousand), however, would not be matched during the next three
years.98 Experts began to contemplate the number of donors who would have to
be enlisted to meet the need for transplants. These projections (kidneys for 8,000
to 10,000 patients per year if 70 to 100 million Americans carried donor cards) 99
91. Id. at 108-12.
92. Id. at 108-10.
93. Id. at 113 (quoting Paul Terasaki).
94. U.S. Plans 2-Year Study on Kidney Transplants, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1973, at 56.
95. Lawrence K. Altman, It's Not Unusual for Kidneys To Be Rushed from Country to
Country, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1977, at 124.
96. David Dempsey, Transplants Are Common; Now It's the Organs that Have Become Rare,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1974, at 332.
97. Altman, supra note 95.
98. Id.
99. See Dempsey, supra note 96 (quoting Dr. Ira Griefer, Medical Director, National Kidney
Foundation); Kidney Foundation Plans Drive To Get Funds and Organs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1972,
at II (quoting transplant surgeon Samuel L. Kountz).
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were extremely ambitious but theoretically not impossible. Professional
transplant coordinators, whose roles included locating kidneys and
"persuad[ing]" grieving relatives to authorize organ donation, represented an
"aggressive[]" new organized approach to the need for transplantable organs. l00
The ethical and political problem of allocating scarce human organs would
not capture the public imagination, however, until the 1980s. The earliest
transplant patients surely were unrepresentative of the general population facing
organ failure: The first people to receive transplants lived near pioneering
medical centers, were willing to risk undergoing an unproven procedure, and
impressed treating physicians as determined, perseverant candidates.'01
Everything about transplantation was so extraordinary that concerns about elitism
or impropriety in the recipient selection process typically did not figure into
discussions such as "man on the street" newspaper interviews. 10 2 Scholarly
articles on the legal questions posed by transplantation would mention that the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment potentially applied to
patient selection, but exactly what would constitute illegal discrimination was not
analyzed in depth. 10 3 Organ procurement, however, was becoming more
aggressive, raising new doubts about the system's trustworthiness, as American
institutions were becoming more responsive to demands for civil rights and
hearing new claims of entitlement. Suspicions of racial disparities in
transplantation were occasionally voiced in a letter to the editor or a comedian's
routine. These comments focused both on who was providing the organs and on
who was receiving them.' 
04
On the public policy level, in 1968 Senator Walter Mondale began
advocating the establishment of a National Advisory Commission on Health,
Science and Society that would examine "the ethical, social, and legal
implications of advances in biomedical science and technology."' 10 5 The financing
of transplant surgery and allocation of organs fit squarely within Mondale's
agenda. 10 6 When the Commission was finally convened in modified form in
1978, its charges were both broad (examining socioeconomic disparities in
access to health) and, in some cases, highly specific (considering the social
impact of voluntary genetic "testing, counseling and information and educational
100. Ideas and Trends: The Transplant Coordinators, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1977, at 124.
101. See, e.g., CHRISTIAAN BARNARD & CURTIS BILL PEPPER, ONE LIFE 255 (1969).
102. See, e.g., Snider, supra note 34, at 54.
103. See, e.g., Frank P. Grad, Legislative Responses to the New Biology: Limits and
Possibilities, 15 UCLA L. REv. 480,497 (1968).
104. See, e.g., Susan E. Lederer, Tucker's Heart: Racial Politics and Heart Transplantation in
America, in A DEATH RETOLD, supra note 20, at 142.
105. George J. Annas, All the President's Bioethicists, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1979, at 14,
14 (quoting Sen. Walter Mondale).
106. See Walter F. Mondale, The Issues Before Us, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1971, at 4.
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programs"). 07 Events had not brought the problems of transplanting organs to the
fore and-with the exception of defining death' 08-they got lost in the shuffle.
Though activity to coordinate the transfer of organs between strangers
focused primarily on enlarging the donor pool and improving immunological
matching techniques through the early 1980s, the ethical and political problems
of organ allocation were foreshadowed in the 1960s and 1970s, when artificial
kidneys-i.e., dialysis machines-provided a (costly) new way of extending the
lives of end-stage renal patients."°9 The allocation of access to dialysis machines,
at a time when the number of patients in need of dialysis dwarfed the number of
machine-hours available, quickly became a subject of scrutiny from journalists,
legal scholars, other policy-oriented professionals, and the general public. One
institutional approach was so widely criticized in the academic and professional
literature"0 that it effectively stood as a model of how not to allocate scarce
medical resources. The Seattle Artificial Kidney Center relied on a committee of
community members, which seemed to consist largely of locally prominent
figures (such as a minister and a labor leader), to select among candidates for
dialysis based on social and psychological criteria. The popular magazines Life
and Redbook reported on how the process worked: The Seattle committee
deliberated in roughly the manner of a trial jury, favoring candidates with "a
record of public service.""'1 To critics, the committee "spared" individuals whose
personal traits and forms of community involvement reflected committee
members' "own middle class suburban value system." The very objective of
selecting candidates based on putative "social worth" was highly controversial,"
12
and the way the committee measured such vague and abstract notions was ripe
for derision. In practice, "public service" was given highly specific meanings that
107. Annas, supra note 105, at 14.
108. Id. at 14.
109. The dialysis machine was invented in 1943, but kidney dialysis did not become a
practicable long-term therapy until the introduction of the arteriovenous Teflon shunt in 1960. See
David Sanders & Jesse Dukeminier, Jr., Medical Advance and Legal Lag: Hemodialysis and
Kidney Transplantation, 15 UCLA L. REV. 357, 360 (1968).
110. See, e.g., Christopher R. Blagg, The Early Years of Chronic Dialysis: The Seattle
Contribution, 19 Am. J. NEPHROLOGY 350, 353 (1999) (noting that the Seattle dialysis selection
committee "became notorious as a result of" national media attention). But, for an appreciative
discussion of the "Seattle God Committee" as emblematic of the "advantages and dangers" of using
"parajuries" to allocate scarce goods, see GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES
187-88 (1978).
111. Sanders & Dukeminier, supra note 109, at 377. See also, Shana Alexander, They Decide
Who Lives, Who Dies, LIFE, Nov. 9, 1962, at 102; John Robbins & June Robbins, The Rest Are
Simply Left To Die, REDBOOK, Nov. 1967, at 80.
112. See Laura J. McGough et al., Which Patients First? Setting Priorities for Antiretroviral
Therapy Where Resources Are Limited, 96 A. J. PUB. HEALTH 1173 (2005).
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represented the experiences of a particular subset of society and "scouts, Sunday
school, Red Cross" counted in one's favor. Going to jail in a political protest, or
devoting one's life to promoting atheism, seemed less likely to earn points.' 13 In
words that would often be quoted in subsequent law journal articles, psychiatrist
David Sanders and trusts and estates scholar Jesse Dukeminier, Jr., remarked,
"[t]he Pacific Northwest is no place for a Henry David Thoreau with bad
kidneys."'1 4 However, since problem consensus is not the same as solution
consensus, scholars who joined in this basic critique did not necessarily share a
preferred alternative." 5
In 1972, the scarcity necessitating a process for making such choices was
ameliorated after President Richard Nixon signed a set of amendments to the
Social Security Act that "extended Medicare coverage to [the vast majority of
Americans] with chronic kidney failure." ' 16 Indeed, obviating deathly allocation
dilemmas (in a society that prided itself on its abundance) was "the underlying
rationale" for the legislation."I7 At the time, there was also considerable interest
among policymakers, including Senate Finance Committee Chairman Russell
Long, in providing limited national health insurance for "catastrophic" medical
crises."18 The Medicare End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) program fit neatly into
this paradigm: It mustered collective resources to make a "life-saving therapy"
that was "beyond the [financial] means of practically all individuals" available to
the segment of the population that needed it." 9 At the congressional staff level,
the program was discussed "as a pilot for catastrophic health insurance."' 12 The
costs of the program, however, escalated more rapidly than anticipated, raising
questions about the approach's sustainability on a large scale.'
2
'
Media coverage of the kidney amendments highlighted similar tensions. On
the one hand, officials from the National Kidney Foundation characterized the
113. Sanders & Dukeminier, supra note 109, at 377-78 (quoting and paraphrasing a description
by Robbins & Robbins, supra note 11l, at 133).
114. Sanders & Dukeminier, supra note 109, at 378.
115. Dukeminier and Sanders advocated a policy of presumed consent for organ removal. See
id., supra note 109. See also Jesse Dukeminier, Jr. & David Sanders, A Proposal for Routine
Salvaging of Cadaver Organs, 279 NEW ENG. J. MED. 413 (1968).
116. Richard A. Rettig, Inst. Of Med., Origins of the Medicare Kidney Disease Entitlement: The
Social Security Amendments of 1972, in BIOMEDICAL POLITICS 176 (Kathi E. Hanna ed., 1991).
117. Roger W. Evans & Christopher R. Blagg, Lessons Learned from the End Stage Renal
Disease Experience: Their Implications for Heart Transplantation, in ORGAN SUBSTITUTION
TECHNOLOGY: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES 175, 176 (Deborah Mathieu ed., 1988).
118. Rettig, supra note 116, at 186, 191-93.
119. Evans & Blagg, supra note 117, at 176.
120. Rettig, supra note 116, at 186, 193.
121. Evans & Blagg, supra note 117, at 178-81.
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legislation as "a model" for funding the treatment of "other chronic diseases."'' 22
On the other hand, the disease-specific nature of the legislative approach stirred
unease about a system in which the availability of health care financing
"seem[ed] to depend on how well a special interest group gets its message across
to the public." 123 Ambivalence about the roles of individual initiative and
organized lobbying would dog the field of organ replacement therapy as the
scarcity of kidneys came to overshadow the scarcity of funds in public policy
discourse.
E. Making Tragic Choices: The Domestic Politics and Economics of Organ
Allocation
The development of cyclosporine therapy in the late 1970s and early 1980s
would change the nature and salience of the scarcity of transplantable organs. In
1978, British transplant surgeon Roy Calne demonstrated the drug's efficacy in
preventing kidney rejection. Although the drug has often been described as
potent,124 its advantages lie largely in its selectivity: It effectively targets the
"small proportion of white blood cells.., responsible for destroying transplanted
organs" without devastating the patient's entire immune system. 25 Starzl
achieved a similar effect in liver transplantation after taking the additional step of
combining the drug with steroids. 126 Following "the introduction of the drug,"
one year kidney transplant survival rates "climbed" from 55% to 85%.127 The
breakthrough was more profound in liver transplantation, where the
comparatively short time that livers could be kept viable outside the body had
limited the feasibility of immunological matching.12 8 "Prior to 1980, using
azathioprine-steroid therapy, the reported five-year survival rate for 170 [liver]
recipients was 18.2 percent. After 1980, using cyclosporine-steroid therapy, the
projected five-year survival rate, based on 244 patients, had risen to 68
percent."'29 Outcomes for heart transplant recipients evidently also improved,
despite the even shorter organ preservation time (four hours) for hearts.130
122. Lawrence K. Altman, Costs of Kidney Therapy: Two Fundamental Questions, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 23, 1973, at 13.
123. See, e.g., id.
124. See, e.g., STARK, supra note 21, at 128.
125. Id. at 131.
126. WERTH, supra note 81, at 49.
127. STARK, supra note 21, at 133.
128. TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Apr. 1986), 17-19.
129. Id. at 18.
130. Id. at 17-18. Although the preservation time for human hearts was reportedly only four
hours, short term outcomes for heart transplant recipients were substantially better (roughly 65%
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Like artificial kidneys, technological advances in immunosuppression
presented new practical challenges and policy dilemmas, fitting into a pattern that
policy analyst Theodore Marmor has dubbed the "paradox of progress."' 13' One
set of questions revolved around the costs and financing of transplant surgeries
and post-operative therapy that were now medically advisable. The ESRD
program, naturally, did not extend to "extrarenal" transplants; a spotty patchwork
of public and private coverage existed for liver transplantation. I1 2 Financial
pressures even bore on renal transplantation, because some who were eligible for
reimbursement of surgical costs could not afford cyclosporine post-transplant.
133
Faced with a "growing divergence between financial and clinical considerations,"
transplant surgeons became acutely aware of the political economy of health care
financing. 134 A similar problem confronted organ procurement agencies. These
organizations had developed to serve renal transplant programs, 135 and many
received all their funding from the Medicare kidney program, which "pa[id] only
for kidney acquisition." 136 Supplying hearts, livers, and pancreases on a large
scale would require funding for labor-intensive procurement and transport
activities under tight time pressures. By enlarging the number of patients who
stood to benefit from a given kidney, immunosuppression made the choice of
recipients of cadaver organs a real social problem. The assumption that some,
and perhaps many, patients would be an acceptable donee for virtually every
donated kidney was implicit in the calculation of "kidneys procured" per capita
to measure procurement agencies' "effectiveness" and in the use of kidney
"discard rates" to measure wastage. 137 Every patient waiting for a transplant was
plausibly a victim of the organ shortage, and not merely bad luck.'38
Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt's 1978 book Tragic Choices was a
timely contribution to the burgeoning scholarly literature on allocating scarce
survived one year or more) prior to the introduction of cyclosporine.
131. See THEODORE R. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE 4-5 (1973).
132. By 1986, this included both federal and state financing. See TASK FORCE ON ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 128, at 17-18.
133. Id. at 17. Note that the Task Force itself contended that there were "essentially no financial
barriers to kidney transplants" in the United States.
134. Richard A. Rettig, The Politics of Organ Transplantation: A Parable of Our Time, in
BLUMSTEIN & SLOAN, supra note 8, at 193.
135. TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 128, at 53.
136. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, BLOOD POLICY AND TECHNOLOGY 185 (1985).
137. See Prottas, supra note 15, at 48-49.
138. Thus, "[i]n contrast to 'statistical' low-visibility victims.., organ transplants benefit
identifiable victims whose plights are vivid, palpable, and can be dramatically represented in the
media." Peter H. Schuck, Government Funding for Organ Transplants, in BLUMSTEIN & SLOAN,
supra note 8, at 169, 175.
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resources.1 39 It examined how three societies, including the United States prior to
the Medicare amendments, allocated access to dialysis machines. Calabresi and
Bobbitt, two emerging legal scholars, perceptively recognized that scarcity
engenders not only competition for material resources, but also conflicts of
values. This thesis would hold true for organ allocation as well as the selection of
patients for dialysis. Americans have long professed commitments to a set of
values that can potentially conflict with each other: majority rule and equal
citizenship, personal autonomy and democratic governance, laissez-faire and
nationalism. 140 And plausible principles for allocating organs--equality of
opportunity, medical need, therapeutic efficacy, ability to pay, putative social
worth-can likewise conflict with each other. American society, however, has
developed (or stumbled upon) effective ways of managing the contradictory
impulses within our culture in ordinary circumstances. For example, a large
scholarly literature explores how cultural norms (e.g., individual economic
responsibility) and institutional structures (e.g., policies that modestly
redistribute wealth) have kept in check the latent tension between egalitarianism
and market capitalism. 141 Of course, these are not the only rivalrous ideals
American society has managed to reconcile, but their harmonization is
emblematic of the negotiated compromises that have been a persistent feature of
American political culture.
In contrast, the frontiers of transplantation were not only technologically
unstable, but presented some difficult and unusual social conditions. These
conditions included dire scarcity amid material abundance. (the primary problem
in organ allocation is clearly stimulating supply, rather than demand), 142 a
profound dependence on strangers (the transplant recipient "makes something of
oneself' with another person's parts), a lack of reliable legal rules (an organ
"futures market" presupposes its own future), and stubborn, seemingly innate
139. CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 110.
140. For a few intellectuals' assessments of tensions among Enlightenment values that resonate
in contemporary America, see, for example, DANIEL BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF
CAPITALISM (1976); JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY (R.J. White ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1967); Robert A. Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the
Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455, 455 (1984) ("[M]ajority rule is intrinsically at odds with the egalitarian
principle."); Amy L. Chua, The Paradox of Free Market Democracy: Rethinking Development
Policy, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 287 (2000); Richard A. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in
the Foundations of Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1, 3 (2005) (examining a "tension
between liberty and property within the natural law tradition of Locke"); Charles D. Gonthier,
Liberty, Equality, Fraternity: The Forgotten Leg of the Trilogy, or Fraternity: The Unspoken Third
Pillar of Democracy, 45 McGILL L.J. 567 (2000).
141. See FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 305, 342 (1958);
Chua, supra note 140, at 292.
142. See Prottas, supra note 15, at 44.
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inequalities (depending on one's blood group, one might be a "universal donor"
or a "universal recipient"). 143 Economist Lester Thurow put the predicament
poignantly: "Being egalitarians, we have to give the treatment to everyone or
deny it to everyone; being capitalists, we cannot deny it to those who can afford
it. But since resources are limited, we cannot afford to give it to everyone
either., 144 Organ allocation would involve "tragic choices" because, given the
scarcity of organs and the constraints imposed by technological limitations, no
allocation mechanism or criterion could fully satisfy the panoply of rivalrous
values at stake, including equality of opportunity, democratic governance,
individual choice, compassion for the least fortunate, nationalism and capitalistic
entrepreneurship. 145
Further, any allocation formula could be said to favor some transplant
candidates over others. A system developed through majoritarian political
processes is likely to disadvantage those without the political franchise, such as
non-citizens. A system based on genetic compatibility may result in longer wait
times for members of ethnic groups with lower donation rates and higher rates of
organ failure. A laissez-faire approach to organ allocation would likely result in
reduced access to transplants as one moved down the socioeconomic ladder.
Where cultural identities or socioeconomic inequalities are already politicized,
policies or techniques that tend to keep organs within identifiable groups (e.g.,
genetic matching) are vulnerable to allegations of clannishness, while approaches
that allow transplantation across societal cleavages (e.g., immunosuppression)
are vulnerable to allegations of conquest. Because the distribution of these scarce
resources implicates cherished values, the politics of organ allocation cannot be
reduced to material interests. But material considerations and high ideals would
often converge so as to give critiques of organ transfer policies a standard,
stylized form: Allegations that some group of patients is unfairly or improperly
receiving "privileged access" to the nation's organs. On a higher level of
abstraction, critics will contend that an allocation protocol violates some tenet of
"the American way"-without acknowledging the extraordinary difficulty of
reconciling these contradictory tenets in the transplant context. The next Sections
of this essay examine how Congress and the Executive Branch grappled with
143. Cf FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE 9 (2002) (basing political equality on
our common humanity and quoting Thomas Jefferson's observation that "the mass of mankind has
not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them
legitimately, by the grace of God").
144. See Timothy J. McNulty, Transplant Ethics a Matter of Life and Death, CHI. TRIB., May
12, 1985, at C1 (quoting Lester Thurow). Of course, Thurow's version of egalitarianism was not
the only equality-oriented approach. One might argue for a policy that maximizes the number of
lives saved on the theory that all lives have equal worth. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL:
OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE?, 276-79 (1997).
145. See CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 110.
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such concerns as various stakeholders and the general public became increasing
engaged with the problems of organ allocation.
F. Green Lights and Red Tape
One of Calabresi and Bobbit's claims in Tragic Choices was that, as
resource scarcity forced a society to make value-laden allocation choices (e.g.,
"sickest first" versus "most likely to benefit from a transplant"), policymakers
would often hide, deny, or smooth over the fact that a value-laden choice was
being made (e.g., "science tells us this person is the best match"), temporarily
helping the society to preserve its cherished values.1 46 Then, as citizens realized
that tragic choices were being made, pressure might build for increased social
expenditures (e.g., the Medicare dialysis amendments) to address the scarcity and
thereby alleviate the threat that such tradeoffs pose to their value system. The
history of transplantation partially conforms to this two-part dynamic and
partially complicates it.
Because the problem of organ allocation was an extension of the dialysis
access problem, the fact that organ allocation necessitated morally difficult
choices could hardly be papered over, although paper-pushing was not out of the
question. As soon as better immunosuppressive drugs substantially improved
outcomes in unrelated donor transplants, the politics and economics of organ
allocation were thrust vividly into the public consciousness. Further, there was no
straightforward way to relieve the underlying scarcity. Whereas Congress could
simply appropriate more money to purchase dialysis machines and fund dialysis,
the prospect of purchasing organs immediately raised a new set of anxieties.
Nonetheless, the strategies policymakers employed to manage the allocation
predicament-targeting inefficiencies and shifting decisional authority to more
politically insulated agencies-were consistent with the theory of Tragic
Choices.
Within the decentralized, loosely-coordinated institutional matrix of
transplant centers, various factors-including personal resourcefulness, regional
boosterism, and political patronage-facilitated the development of transplant
surgery and influenced the allocation of organs. Tissue typers' work in uniting
regional kidney transplant centers into expansive organ sharing networks was one
example of this sort of individual and institutional initiative. 147 Savvy elected
146. See CALABRESI & BOBBIrr, supra note 110, at 149-91.
147. See, e.g., Paul 1. Terasaki, Histocompatibility, in HISTORY OF TRANSPLANTATION: THIRTY-
FIVE RECOLLECTIONS 513, 520-21, 524 (Paul I. Terasaki ed., 1991); National Organ Transplant
Act: Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Enviroment of H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. 16-29 (1983) [hereinafter Energy and Commerce Hearing]
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officials quickly became involved in helping constituents obtain access to the
life-saving organs these networks could provide. In October 1983, North
Carolina Senator Jesse Helms carried a jaundiced eight-month-old into a
"packed" room during one of the Senate committee hearings that would
ultimately lead to the passage of NOTA. "Josh is now first on the organ waiting
list at the University of Minnesota Hospital," the Senator declared. Governor
James Hunt, Jr., who was running against Helms in the 1984 election, said that
"North Carolina had recently amended its insurance program to cover transplant
surgery, which in Josh's case would cost about $200,000. " 148
Perhaps nowhere was the role of ambitious local enterprise more vivid than
in the emergence of the University of Pittsburgh's Presbyterian Hospital as an
international transplant hub. Pioneering liver transplant surgeon Thomas Starzl,
reportedly "tired of chasing research grants" as surgery chair at the University of
Denver, in 1980 "agreed with a handshake to set up a liver transplant program"
in Pittsburgh. The city's location-within an hour's flight from 70% of the
American population-was ideal for time-sensitive organ procurement, and by
1984, "Presby" surgeons were performing half of all liver transplants in the
United States. 149 Multiple institutions and constituencies were part of the action
as the growth of the city's health care sector partially offset manufacturing job
losses. The Pittsburgh Press surveyed "thirty prominent Pittsburgh people" to
see how many held organ donor cards. 150 In 1985, the New York Times described
Pittsburgh as "a prime goal for surgeons, who compete for slots," noting that the
Presbyterian "name on a resume [could] make a big difference in fees and
status." 151 Transplant Recipients International Organization (TRIO) also made its
home in the City of Bridges, where so many of its members had gotten their new
lease on life.
152
As transplantation became a realistic clinical option for more patients,
transplant families and onlookers expressed frustration with one major aspect of
America's diffuse, variegated, and informal organ transfer system: Access to
transplant surgery depended on factors far removed from technical
considerations, and many of these factors seemed needlessly unfair to individual
patients. Public financing of extrarenal transplantation, particularly liver
transplantation, was precarious and subject to decisions that participants in the
process and close observers decried as inconsistent and arbitrary. The role of
148. Joey Ledford, Washington News, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Oct. 20, 1983.
149. See Gruson, supra note 2.
150. Andrew Schneider & Mary Pat Flaherty, Donor Organs a Fragile Link Between Grief and
Hope, PITTSBURGH PRESS, May 26, 1985, at B9.
151. See Gruson, supra note 2.
152. Steve Twedt & Gayle McCracken, U.S. Panel to Study Transplant Rules, PITTSBURGH
PRESS, May 13, 1985, at Al.
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politicians in pressuring state health insurance programs to pay for operations
"case-by-case,"'' 53 as well as the Reagan Administration's efforts to publicize
individual patients' need for organs, struck critics as partial fixes to systematic
and comprehensive gaps in organ procurement and allocation.1 54 Additionally,
less publicized at that time, the kidney shortage seemed to be getting worse
following the introduction of cyclosporine. 1
5
Some critics complained about the unpredictability and capriciousness of
decisions determining patients' access to transplants. "These things can't be left
to chance," said Charles Fiske, a hospital administrator whose own daughter
needed a liver transplant in 1982.156 Massachusetts Blue Cross had first agreed to
cover the transplant, then reversed its position, and finally restored coverage after
the state house speaker and the media took an interest in the case.157 Others saw
this mode of allocation as inherently biased. The Washington Post noted
legislators' frustration with a "system that provides new organs to those who are
savvy enough to go to the White House, resourceful enough to get themselves on
television or lucky enough to live in the right state. ' 58
For transplant centers, too, the lack of settled, consistent allocation rules
consumed time and energy. UCLA's medical director explained how his
institution haggled with out-of-state Medicaid programs over the cost of
transplants: "Someone will say they're not going to pay, and we'll say, 'Well, we
can't do it.' Then they'll come up with a little money and we'll lower our price a
bit.... The stress on the patient and our institution is very great."'' 59 One result
was that even relatively well-off transplant families-perhaps especially the
well-off-felt they could not clear the process's hurdles with their dignity intact.
Myron Teichholtz, described as an "affluent businessman," told a reporter that
153. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 98-575, at 19 (1983) ("While the Committee believes that the
decision to extend Medicaid coverage for one or more organ transplant procedures is appropriately
that of each individual State, the Committee does not believe that this decision can equitably be
made on a case-by-case basis .... Access to organ transplant coverage should not, in the
Committee's view, be dependent upon a family's ability to draw sympathetic media coverage and
favorable dispensation from elected officials.").
154. See, e.g., Energy and Commerce Hearing, supra note 147, at 3 (statement of Rep. Thomas
A. Luken) ("Air Force I isn't a national policy"); Howard Kurtz & James Schwartz, Organ
Transplants Turn into Form of Patronage, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 1984, at Al.
155. See Ronald Sullivan, New York's Shortage of Organ Donors Grows Acute, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 8, 1985, at E26 (noting that the number of patients nationwide in need of dialysis or a kidney
transplant was "growing, while the number of transplants has leveled off in recent years," despite a
better "likelihood of [surgical] success").
156. Kurtz & Schwartz, supra note 154. See also Rettig, supra note 134, at 199.
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his offer of more than $100,000 "in personal assets" couldn't get his daughter
into Presby. 160 Although Massachusetts Medicaid ultimately agreed to cover the
daughter's transplant, the agency had initially denied the coverage, following the
same pattern as in the Fiske case. "After working my whole life, they made a
panhandler out of me," said Teichholtz.161 "Here we were, a family draining
every resource, and these people were playing with us like chips on a chessboard.
Today yes, tomorrow no."'162 Put bluntly, patients, their loved ones, and
transplant centers needed access to organs and adequate financing. By framing
these pressures in terms of consistency and coordination, media coverage likely
played to widely shared, relatively uncontroversial notions of procedural fairness.
The first federal efforts to rationalize the mechanics of transplant policy-
specifically, financing-showed how desires to increase the availability of
transplant surgery or, conversely, cost considerations could shape the new order
being imposed. At the federal level, between 1979 and 1987, the availability of
Medicare reimbursements for heart transplantation reflected factors such as the
willingness of state Blue Cross intermediaries to pay for the procedure, the Social
Security Administration's administrative law jurisprudence, and eventually the
policy judgment of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).163 A
national study of heart transplant outcomes and costs, commissioned by HHS and
conducted by the Battelle Memorial Institute, led to HHS's "determination...
that heart transplants are medically reasonable and necessary" in certain
circumstances. 164 In a roughly parallel process, the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) in 1982 agreed to convene a conference on the state of liver
transplantation at the urging of Surgeon General C. Everett Koop. Although a
determination that liver transplants were no longer "experimental" would have
implications for Medicare coverage, there was little overlap between the
population experiencing liver failure and the population eligible for Medicare.
Nonetheless, if NIH gave liver transplantation its "imprimatur" and Medicare
agreed to finance the procedure, "state Medicaid agencies. . . Blue Cross and
Blue Shield plans, and.., commercial health insurance firms .... would have
little choice but to follow."'' 6
5
Richard A. Rettig, a social scientist commissioned by the Institute of




163. See Rettig, supra note 134, at 196-97. See also Criteria for Medicare Coverage of Heart
Transplants, 52 Fed. Reg. 10,935 (Apr. 6, 1987); Notice of HCFA Ruling To Discontinue Medicare
Coverage of Heart Transplantation Procedures, 45 Fed. Reg. 52,297 (Aug. 6, 1980).
164. Criteria for Medicare Coverage of Heart Transplants, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,164 (Oct. 17, 1986).
165. Rettig, supra note 134, at 202.
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controversy surrounding liver transplantation was unusually politicized when
compared to previous experiences concerning other organs. Rettig attributed this
politicization to "well-organized" advocacy by interested persons and to the
concentration of public attention on pediatric liver cases. 166 Several other factors
may have helped further explain liver cases' absorbing effects on policymakers
and the public at large. Once dialysis became broadly available, extrarenal
transplants provided a clearer example of transplant medicine's life-or-death
stakes than did the clinical choice of how to treat ESRD patients. Whereas human
heart transplantation was first attempted overseas and had begun to diffuse across
the United States by the mid-1980s, the routinization of liver transplantation was
occurring largely within a single American medical institution, Starzl's
Pittsburgh program.167 Then, the sudden, dramatic clinical impact of cyclosporine
on liver transplantation may have helped thrust the procedure into the public's
consciousness. Starzl's role may have contributed to White House interest in
pediatric liver transplantation, since Starzl's professional mentor, Dr. Loyal
Davis, was also the father of First Lady Nancy Reagan. 168 Finally, whereas
procuring beating hearts was a culturally freighted activity, candid discussion of
the need for human livers, and even aggressive pleading for them, may have been
more acceptable to the public.
II. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
A. Congressional Inquiry
As the bureaucratic gears began to turn, complaints about the existing
system of organ allocation took on a new sense of urgency when entrepreneurs
outside the system offered an alternative that many Americans found
unpalatable-the purchase of organs domestically or abroad for sale in America.
In September 1983, one such proposal caught the attention of the national media.
De-licensed Virginia physician H. Barry Jacobs contacted the Food and Drug
Administration to "inquir[e] whether he needed a license to import organs."
Jacobs claimed that hospitals had "expressed interest in removing kidneys" from
166. Id. at 199.
167. Compare id. at 196-97 (describing the expansion of heart transplantation beyond Dr.
Norman Shumway's pionnering program at Stanford), with id. at 199 (describing Starzl's program
and several others in Europe and North America).
168. See Thomas Starzl, 21 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD BIOGRAPHY SUPPLEMENT (2001)
(documenting Davis's great influence on Starzl's life); Anita Srikameswaran, Pioneer Without
Peer: Hard-Driving Surgeon Has Made Life-Saving Transplants Almost Common, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, June 11, 2000, at A16 (mentioning Starzl's "long friendship with professor and
neurosurgeon Dr. Loyal Davis, father of former first lady Nancy Reagan").
VIII: 1 (2008)
34
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 8 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol8/iss1/4
E PLURIBUS UNOS
paid donors whom he would "solicit., 169 Both the supply and demand sides of the
business plan provoked objections: The plan would advantage economically
privileged kidney patients over those who were not wealthy, and it would
potentially exploit or injure desperate organ sellers.
Practical objections to the proposal were based on scant evidence of an
adequate informed consent process and doubts that the living donors would
receive needed follow-up care. 70 Several ethical objections were leveled at the
proposal as well. A surgeon who had become active in private-sector transplant
policy efforts spoke of "honorable alternatives" for "increas[ing] the availability
of tissues and organs"--presumably excluding Jacobs's alternative as
dishonorable to those involved. 71 To the extent that organ sales would
exacerbate or enshrine economic inequalities in the allocation system, the
proposal contradicted the egalitarian ethics of many reformers. 172 From one
communitarian perspective, it represented "the expansion of unfettered
commercialism into dimensions of life which could just possibly provide us the
opportunity to achieve a greater sense of community and of national purpose than
we have previously known, except in the face of external threat."' 173 The high
stakes of transplantation, both existential and symbolic, evoked strong feelings
and passionate language.
Jacobs's nascent business, the International Kidney Exchange (IKE), was
not well-liked, and commenters frequently connected shortcomings of the present
system of organ allocation to the space left for commercial ventures. A resolution
condemning the sale of human organs, introduced by Massachusetts Senator Paul
Tsongas in October 1983, illustrated this point, beginning, "whereas the ...
169. Margaret Engel, Va. Doctor Plans Company To Arrange Sale of Human Kidneys, WASH.
POST, Sept. 19, 1983, at A9. As Jacobs's plan developed, it focused on purchasing organs from
living providers, as opposed to purchasing cadaveric organs. See MD Sets Up Kidney-Selling
Business, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Oct. 8 1983 (contemplating protections for living sellers).
170. See Procurement and Allocation of Human Organs for Transplantation: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th
Cong. 377 (1983) (statement of Samuel Gorovitz, Department of Philosophy, University of
Maryland, College Park) [hereinafter Science and Technology Hearing] (noting that "the scheme
makes a mockery of informed consent, as is evident to anyone familiar with Federal regulations
protecting human search subjects"). See also id. at 269 (statement of Oscar K. Salvatierra, M.D.,
President, American Society of Transplant Surgeons).
171. Energy and Commerce Hearing, supra note 147, at 257 (statement of Gary E. Friedlaender,
M.D., Interim President, American Council on Transportation).
172. See Science and Technology Hearing, supra note 170, at 340 (statement of Robert M.
Veatch, Ph.D., Professor of Medical Ethics, Georgetown University Kennedy Institute of Ethics)
("Any scheme that distributes lifesaving organs on a basis of ability to pay is discriminatory and,
therefore, in my mind unethical.").
173. Id. at 379 (statement of Samuel Gorovitz, Department of Philosophy, University of
Maryland, College Park).
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pressures caused by a lack of national policy have encouraged the practices of the
sale of human organs for profit."'174 In a country burdened by the historical
subordination of some human beings into the category of others' property, this
new kind of commodification was quickly condemned as akin to "slavery."1 75
Earlier that year, Representative Gore, Chair of the House Science and
Technology Committee's Oversight Subcommittee, had convened the first of a
series of hearings that would culminate in the enactment of NOTA. 176 Published
sources have attributed Gore's interest and growing involvement in transplant
policy to multiple origins. The Congressman had "learned that the most pressing
problem in caring for end-stage renal disease was availability of suitable organs
for transplant" during 1982 congressional hearings on dialysis and diet.1 7 7 The
Congressman's exposure to the problem also became more personal "when one
of his constituents sought Gore's help in securing an organ."'' 78 Around the same
time, a Yale pediatrics professor, Dr. Myron Genel, was "assigned" to Gore
through the Robert Wood Johnson Health Policy Fellows Program. This new
staff affiliate reportedly "press[ed] Gore to use his position as chair of an
investigative subcommittee to highlight problems [regarding transplantation] and
develop a federal government solution., 179 Now, "after being sent a brochure
from a New England company that offered to register donors, offering them the
potential of a $10,000 payment if one of their organs was used in a transplant,"
Gore sought to ensure that the legislation developing under his watch would
quash this emerging industry.'
1 80
174. S. Res. 251, 129th Cong. (1983).
175. The article quotes Representative Gore as stating that, "putting organs on a market
basis ... seems to be something inconsistent with our view of humanity .... Prostitution is illegal
for reasons that are similar. So is slavery." See Engel, supra note 169. The analogy has been
sharply questioned in recent scholarship, which suggests that the defining moral failing of slavery
was not property rights in human tissue, but rather whom was allowed to own and alienate whom.
See, e.g., MICHELE GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS: THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF BODY PARTS 198
(2006) (noting that "many slaves were given away as gifts," including the African-American
Harriet Jacobs, who was inherited by a three-year-old). At a minimum, the theory implicit in the
analogy needs more explication if it is to survive. After all, discourses about diversity and
affirmative action that characterize people of color or their labor as valuable in a global market
have not engendered the same degree of outrage from the same critical positions. But see Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(criticizing law schools' racialized conception of student body diversity as an "aesthetic"
sensibility).
176. Rettig, supra note 134, at 199.
177. Keith J. Mueller, The National Organ Transplant Act of 1984: Congressional Response to
Changing Technology, 8 POL'Y STUD. REv. 346, 346 (1989).
178. Id. at 347.
179. Id. Note that this source consistently misspells Genel's name as "Ganel."
180. Engel, supra note 169. See also Victor Cohn, New Federal Help for Transplants Pressed
VIII: 1 (2008)
36
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 8 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol8/iss1/4
E PLURIBUS UNOS
In July and October 1983, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce's
Subcommittee on Health and the Environment held further hearings on transplant
policy. Under the direction of Subcommittee Chairman Henry Waxman of
California, the hearings brought together two legislators who shared an unusually
deep familiarity with transplantation. Waxman first attempted to improve the
accessibility of transplantation as a member of the California State Senate.' 8 ' At
the hearings, Thomas Starzl recalled speaking with Waxman around 1981 about
the implications of improved immunosuppression for the ESRD program.
82
Representative Gore, though not a member of Waxman's Subcommittee, played
a leading role in its hearings by providing extensive testimony about the
challenges of organ allocation and transplant financing.' 83 Gore's Oversight
Subcommittee continued its inquiry in November 1983,184 and over the next year,
hearings concerning organ transplantation were held by the Senate Committee on
Labor and Human Resources in Oklahoma City, with Oklahoma Senator Don
Nickles presiding as Acting Chair of the Committee, 85 and the House Ways and
Means Committee's Subcommittee on Health. 186 In contrast to Gore's
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, these bodies had the authority to
enact legislation and appropriate funds. 1
87
The institutional preconditions for this series of hearings had been set in the
1970s, when the "proliferation of [congressional] subcommittees" enlarged the
opportunities for legislators with relatively little seniority to emerge as policy
"entrepreneurs."'' 88 As the news media and the White House took an interest in
transplantation, often focusing on individual cases, the subject became a logical
candidate for this kind of policy entrepreneurship. Indeed, some critics "[spoke]
by Gore, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 1983, at A17 (reporting that Gore described his effort to ban
commerce in human organs as "a response ... to two new efforts-one in Reston [i.e., Barry
Jacobs's Virginia plan] and one in Maine").
181. Energy and Commerce Hearing, supra note 147, at 301-02 (statement of Oscar K.
Salvatierra, M.D., President, American Society of Transplant Surgeons).
182. Id. at 225 (statement of Thomas E. Starzl, M.D., Ph.D., Professor of Surgery, University of
Pittsburgh).
183. See id. at 7-11 (statement of Rep. Albert Gore, Jr.).
184. Science and Technology Hearing, supra note 170.
185. See, e.g., Organ Transplantation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources, 98th Cong. (1983) [hereinafter Human Resources Hearing].
186. National Organ Transplant Act: Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on Health of
the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong. (1984) [hereinafter Ways and Means Hearing].
187. See Mueller, supra note 177, at 348 (describing the oversight subcommittee as "non-
legislative"). Jacobs's business plan probably provided some of the impetus for legislating,
transforming "Oversight" questions into "Commerce" and "Labor and Human Resources"
problems.
188. Id. at 347-48.
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wearily of politicians using mortally ill children to enhance their public images."
When Gore began promoting legislative intervention in transplant policy, his
favored legislation was labeled "the Gore for Senate bill."' 89 Coast-to-coast
media coverage, as well as the way that actors closer to the scene framed the
problem as one of "piecemeal aid [that] must be replaced by a national policy,"' 
90
gave the policy discussion a certain tenor: Members of transplant families stood
as representatives of a grand problem implicating moral precepts and the interests
of the public at large. To the extent that politicians self-consciously played to a
nationwide public audience, they accentuated this timbre. By Gore's account,
"individuals and families" were "get[ting] a very human response and some
help" from the Executive Branch, but "there [was] an inability to see the national
dimension of the problem."' 9' Presumably, congressional hearings, mustering the
testimony of transplant families, health care workers, public officials, and
professional moral philosophers, would bring this dimension to light.
Interested members of Congress, in mapping the terrain, explored the
problem from many vantage points. The issues that emereged ranged from blood
pressure rates of living related kidney donors 92 to the amounts of HCFA kidney
retrieval reimbursements that were passed on to lenders as interest payments.193
Several major challenges to the transplant enterprise, however, emerged as focal
points of the hearings. As bioethicist Roger Evans testified before members of
the House, with the introduction of cyclosporine, "the lack of two vital
resources[,] money and donor organs," was "likely to limit the number of persons
who w[ould] benefit from organ transplantation."' 94 Also missing was the
organizational infrastructure needed to coordinate organ transfer efficiently, lest
the organs and dollars that were available be wasted. 95 Where the organs and
dollars would come from, and how to organize the sharing of organs and
information, were at the heart of the matter. Concerns about differential access to
189. Elizabeth Wehr, Dying Children Prompt Legislation: National Health Policy Sought for
Organ Transplant Surgery, CONG. Q. WKLY., Feb. 25, 1984, at 453.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Science and Technology Hearing, supra note 170, at 338 (statement of Barry Brenner,
M.D., Harvard University Medical School, Brigham and Women's Hospital).
193. Energy and Commerce Hearing, supra note 147, at 120 (statement of Rep. Albert Gore,
Jr.).
194. Id. at 56 (statement of Roger W. Evans, Research Scientist, Health and Population Study
Center, Battelle Human Affairs Research Centers).
195. In a statement to the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, North Carolina
Governor James Hunt elaborated a similar tripartite analysis, identifying "three very serious
obstacles" to liver transfer: the absence of a "reliable system for rapid, standby transportation" of
organs and recipients, the spottiness of insurance coverage, and the lack of a "national computer
network" to match organs with recipients. Human Resources Hearing, supra note 185, at 247.
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transplant surgery and distributive justice also surfaced repeatedly as legislators
probed the problems of procurement, financing, and organization.
B. Organs
Because solid organs are part and parcel to the human body (unlike dialysis
machines) and non-renewable (unlike blood), the means of procuring organs
presented a conundrum, as did the problem of choosing a method of allocation.
Given the unprecedented nature of this problem and the Cold War political
climate, public discussion of the options turned less on empirical data than on
notions of what kind of system was most consistent with "American" values. For
Barry Jacobs, laissez-faire market exchange was the American way of allocating
goods, and rules prohibiting market alienation were tantamount to state
ownership. In a USA Today guest column, Jacobs wrote that "[c]ompensating the
donor for blood or a kidney is the American way.... When it comes to deciding
what to do with our bodies, Congress is not a better judge than the individual....
Only in the Soviet Union do human organs belong to the State."'1 96 Others relied
on notions of equality or dessert. "Any millionaire with cirrhosis of the liver will
gladly pay a half million dollars," stated one opponent of organ sales. "That's not
considered to be the American way."
197
Opponents of this approach pointed to the geopolitical significance of the
American way of obtaining and allocating organs. A Red Cross official who
previously headed the American Association of Tissue Banks called the
commercialization of organ procurement "immensely damaging."' 198 It threatened
not only the status and reputation of transplant professionals, but also America's
image in the world. As bioethicist Samuel Gorovitz asserted:
At a time when we urgently need to nurture good relations with the nations of
the third world, our international credibility would be dealt a severe blow by
our tolerance of a plan according to which the poor in underdeveloped
countries were exploited as a source of spare parts for rich Americans. Our
antagonists behind the iron curtain would love such a public relations
windfall-and they would be right. 1
99
On a purely descriptive level, opponents of commercialization correctly
196. H. Barry Jacobs, Guest Column, Let Consenting Adults Sell Their Kidneys, USA TODAY,
Sept. 27, 1983, at 8A.
197. Engel, supra note 169 (quoting Dr. Harold Meryman).
198. Id.
199. Energy and Commerce Hearing, supra note 147, at 282 (statement of Samuel Gorovitz,
Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park). See also Nicholas Wade, The
Crisis in Human Spare Parts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1983, at A26 (noting that some critics claimed
the Jacobs plan incorporated "the worst features of... colonialism").
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understood that some Americans clearly were donating organs altruistically. In
the hearings, speaker after speaker emphasized that introducing payment could
undermine the existing system before its full potential was realized. "The
realization of profit from the retrieval and sharing of donated organs and tissues,"
Keith Johnson of the Association of Independent Organ Procurement Agencies
testified, "could very rapidly turn off public acceptance of the concept of organ
donation.,,200 In contrast, although for-profit firms were volunteering corporate
jets and beepers in service of transplantation,2°' there was little precedent for
commercialized organ procurement. References to Richard Titmuss's research on
paid blood donation, with its attendant health risks, presented words of caution.20 2
Thus, anyone seeking to supplement or substitute a new mode of organ
procurement for organized voluntarism would have faced an uphill battle since
hopes and careers were thoroughly invested in a strategy based on public
confidence and altruistic donation.
Jacobs's business plan was sufficiently unusual and sufficiently advanced
that it demanded attention in the hearings. However, the focus on this hasty
scheme and the man himself-who was prone to jarring and offensive comments
as a witness203-may have distracted policy makers from their erstwhile
emphasis on broad questions of system design. Public inquiry into the facts of
organ procurement and allocation was motivated by the potential for abuses and
improprieties in these processes. Robin Cook's 1977 fiction bestseller Coma,
adapted to film by Michael Crichton, had publicly linked this potential for abuse
to organ sales; this speculative literary insight was duly noted in congressional
204testimony.
Yet, "[s]cenarios contemplating the instrumentalization" of human organs
frequently raise moral and existential questions about coercion, exploitation,
200. Energy and Commerce Hearing, supra note 147, at 224 (statement of Keith Johnson,
President, Association of Independent Organ Procurement Agencies).
201. See Ways and Means Hearing, supra note 186, at 39.
202. See, e.g., Science and Technology Hearing, supra note 170, at 345 (statement of Robert M.
Veatch, Ph.D., Professor of Medical Ethics, Georgetown University Kennedy Institute of Ethics).
The outbreak of the AIDS epidemic heightened this concern. See id. at 355 (statement of Arthur L.
Caplan, Associate for the Humanities, Hastings Center) ("Plasmapheresis centers, the major
purchasers of blood in this country today, are now enormously and ... publicly concerned about
the incentive payment gives to donors to conceal facts about their sexual practices, practices which
may be implicated in the transmission of various viral diseases through blood transfusion.").
203. For example, Jacobs, prompted by Representative Gore, toyed with the idea of taking a
Boeing 747 airplane and "fill[ing] it full of Bangladesh [sic] people," presumably to serve as living
donors. Id. at 297-98.
204. See Energy and Commerce Hearing, supra note 147, at 288 (statement of Bernard Towers,
Co-Director, UCLA Program in Medicine, Law, and Human Values; and Robert B. Ettenger,
President, American Society of Transplant Physicians).
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justice, risk, and trauma in the absence of any quid pro quo payment for
organs. 20 5 Jacobs represented transplantation out of control, and anxieties about
the misuse of medical power latched onto him, his business plan, and the entire
notion of putting a monetary value on organs.20 6 A 1983 law review comment
called for "[a]dditional legislative guidelines" constructing a market for human
organs, arguing that because this commerce would raise "issues not involved in
the transfer of ordinary fungible goods, some specific standards .. .must be
defined.,2 0 7 Non-market approaches to organ allocation, of course, provoked
much the same sentiment. Ironically, one aspect of Jacobs's congressional
testimony that triggered intense opposition was his insistence that all living
kidney donors, whether paid or not, should be required to pass a psychiatric
examination. "Do I have to make what I consider a humanitarian decision, then
208defend that before a psychiatrist or psychologist?" asked one Congressman.
Since the start of the hearings, donor awareness (of transplantation) and
medical professionals' awareness of donors were on the policy agenda. In
October 1983, one journalist spoke of the potential for a "federally led effort to
increase life-saving organ transplants by 5,000 or more a year" through
mechanisms such as upgrading organ-matching infrastructure.2 0 9 New Mexico
Republican Representative Joe Skeen spoke about how his sister had died of a
kidney disease as a young adult, and how his niece received a kidney transplant
at about the same age. "I know we need a broader effort," he remarked at a news
conference with colleagues from across the aisle.21 °
Innovative approaches to organ procurement pressed Americans to identify
points where efforts to enlarge the donor pool bumped into other human values.
Many were uneasy about what looked like a new form of flesh peddling.211 Some
205. Jed Adam Gross, Gray Not Red: The Hue of Neoconservative Bioethics, AM. J. BIOETHICS,
Oct. 2007, at 24.
206. See, e.g., Ways and Means Hearing, supra note 186, at 26 (statement of Rep. Henry
Waxman) (discussing the prospect of commercialization and asserting that "[h]uman organs should
not be treated like fenders in an auto junkyard").
207. David E. Chapman, Comment, Retailing Human Organs Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 16 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 393, 408 (1983).
208. Energy and Commerce Hearing, supra note 147, at 244 (statement of Rep. Howard C.
Nielson).
209. Cohn, supra note 180.
210. Id. (quoting Rep. Skeen).
211. See, e.g., Energy and Commerce Hearing, supra note 147, at 246 (quoting Rep. Gore
asking Barry Jacobs, "could they put up their kidney as a collateral on a loan of some kind?").
Within a few years, a prominent policy-oriented scholar proposed government financing of
transplant surgery through a combination of loans and grants. "A share of [the] private benefits [of
receiving a transplant]-perhaps calibrated according to an age- or income-related sliding scale-
arguably should be returned to the public whose investment made them possible." Schuck, supra
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were also skeptical that a new, efficient bureaucracy could eliminate the
frustrations of the old system of informal, personal contacts without introducing
new bases for mistrust. Initially, members of the Senate spoke enthusiastically
about the need for "a national registry for those who are waiting for organs and
those who are suitable donors" or "an organ procurement and transplantation
registry. '21 2 After receiving input, from transplant professionals, however,
Representative Gore pointed out that some strongly opposed such a registry,
quoting a letter from the American Society of Transplant Physicians that warned
that "our experience has been that maintenance of a 'living bank' adds nothing to
organ and tissue retrieval, is expensive, and can actually obstruct obtaining
organs and tissue if there is a requirement to consult the registry before acting on
available donors. 21 3 Whereas the surgeons were interested in obtaining quick
and legally reliable consent to remove organs, would-be donors were likely more
concerned about who had access to their medical information (if it could still be
called theirs) and for what purposes. Within the House, there was substantial
support for a carefully controlled, small-scale trial registry of potential bone
marrow donors, which was understood to be a practical necessity for unrelated
bone marrow transplantation. 1 4 Supporters of the trial registry spoke to the
importance of "safeguards to protect the confidentiality of those who have agreed
to become donors, so that they retain their right to decide in each case whether
they still want to donate and so they are protected from unfair coercion., 215 As
for a policy of presumed consent for cadaveric organ removal, "the idea [had] no
champions in Congress. Americans," observed one journalist, "[had] read enough
MAN, DEAD SIX HOURS, SITS UP stories to be squeamish about opening a body
while the organs are still fresh., 216 As with marketization proposals, the
movement to increase the organ supply through population surveillance ran into
different points of resistance, but in the latter case, legislators were able to adapt
the approach to these limits.
More generally, once the moral complexities and tensions between
competing aims were recognized, legislators could work out compromises while
tending to the concerns of affected interest groups. A major zone of negotiation
was the interface between organ procurement and allocation, on the one hand,
and transplant support services, on the other. After getting wind of the movement
to ban payment for organs, the President of the Arizona Kidney Foundation,
note 138, at 185.
212. 130 CONG. REC. 30,724 (1984) (statements of Sen. Don Nickles and Sen. Mark Andrews).
213. Id. at 17,656 (1984).
214. Id. at 17,650 (1984) (statement of Rep. Henry Waxman).
215. See, e.g., id. at 17,651 (statement of Rep. Albert Gore, Jr.). See also Head v. Colloton, 331
N.W.2d 870 (Iowa 1983) (rejecting a public right of access to bone marrow registry information
under Iowa's public records statute).
216. Bill Keller, Gut Issues, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 19, 1984, at 15, 16.
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James F. Pfenning, wrote to Arizona Representative John McCain, expressing
concern that a tight restriction on the transfer of private funds might hamper
ongoing activities that facilitated transplantation or "penalize" organ donors and
recipients.217 "Reimbursement should be allowed for those costs associated with
removal, storage and transplant of human organs. In addition, legislation should
allow for individual and/or nonprofit organizations to cover reasonable costs of
travel, housing, lost wages and other direct or indirect expenses incurred by a
living donor and/or recipient. 218 These services, which more or less directly
aided patients and transplant programs, would lack economic value in the
absence of transplantable organs, hence the difficulty of disentangling payment
for the services and payment for organs. Conversely, donated organs would lose
much of their use-value to the broader public without these labor-intensive
services, hence the impulse toward compensation.
Transplant professionals responded to incentives, including market
incentives. Aligning these incentives with the interest of patients and the general
public remained a challenge. Barry Jacobs's bold market proposition showed one
place that these incentives could lead, but in arguing that the clinical
management of organ failure needed an injection of entrepreneurship, he also
hinted at what state subsidization could solidify: "The kidney specialists in this
country, the nephrologists, control the flow of $2 billion of their private dialysis
centers .... They have a reason to maintain the status quo. 219 On this point,
Gore and Jacobs were unusually of one mind: After hearing testimony that "[t]he
transplant list should be three times as large as it is," Gore pressed Dr. Ira
Griefer, medical director of the National Kidney Foundation, as to the
"troubling" possibility that "people who should be on the transplant list are not
being listed because their doctors-in this case, nephrologists-are not that eager
to surrender control of their patients to a specialty that will actively consider a
transplant strategy as the treatment for those patients., 220 So long as Congress
was committed to supporting biomedical dynamism while maintaining a mixed
system of voluntary organ donation, a workforce of paid professionals, and
limited federal financial support, the impulse to ban organ purchases would have
to work itself into rules directing the flow of money, prohibiting self-dealing, and
possibly even setting a just price.
C. Dollars
The price of extrarenal transplant surgery in 1983 was high: by one estimate,
217. Ways and Means Hearing, supra note 186, at 178.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 250 (statement of Barry Jacobs, M.D., Medical Director, International Kidney
Exchange, Ltd.).
220. Science and Technology Hearing, supra note 170, at 251.
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liver transplants cost between $54,600 and $238,000, while heart transplants cost
between $37,000 and $110,000.221 For patients in need of a transplant, these
dollars were nearly as vital as organs. As a source of financing, insurance
arrangements, sometimes negotiated under intense pressures, were augmented
with bake sales, "Shop and Share" days at local supermarkets, and the occasional
church spaghetti dinner. 22 In 1983, after the first round of congressional
hearings, the NIH conference organized by Surgeon General Koop offered its
"qualified statement of support" for liver transplantation.223 By February 1984,
Medicare coverage was theoretically available to pediatric liver patients if they
met an arduous set of medical criteria and insurance eligibility requirements, but
since this decision did not lead to actual reimbursements, "the basic financing
question [remained] largely unresolved., 224 As momentum built for expanding
the federal role in organizing and financing extrarenal transplantation, friction
would arise in questions about cost, parity in public insurance coverage, and
governmental entanglement in the practice of medicine.
In a climate of federal fiscal restraint, reformers, including Gore, tried not to
set their sights too high. Gore's approach was "not exactly socialized medicine,"
noted the New Republic-indeed, he was not proposing a new ESRD-like
program to support solid organ transplantation. 225 By seeking to support and
streamline the loose existing matrix of transplant institutions, while "slightly
broaden[ing] the federal insurance coverage of transplant surgery," Gore
envisioned a congressional intervention that might win over "policymakers
haunted by the memory of the kidney dialysis program, which started small and
grew into a $2 billion a year drain on Medicare's troubled trust fund., 226
As the spectral presence of the ESRD precedent hinted, the problems
broached by dialysis and kidney transplantation were not entirely dissimilar to
those now arising in the extrarenal fields. To the extent that livers were
available-and effectively declared priceless-the fates of sympathetic patients
who might get a new lease on life but for want of the full down payment were
psychologically gripping, even amid anxieties that expanding the federal health
care financing commitments would prove to be budget-busting. 7 In the
221. Mueller, supra note 177, at 347.
222. See Fundraisers to Benefit 3-Year-Old Aurora Girl, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 14, 1983, at SD14.
223. Rettig, supra note 134, at 203.
224. See id. at 204 ("[T]he child.., would have to have worked, contributed to Social Security
for a minimum of six quarters, and then lived another two years, unable to work because of his
disability.").
225. Keller, supra note 216, at 15-17.
226. Id. at 17.
227. Public appeals for charitable donations by families of pediatric patients evidently found
both private financial support and public political support. See Ledford, supra note 148; Frank
Thorsberg, Domestic News, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Apr. 13, 1983 ("Mrs. Hall said she had no way to
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extrarenal context, the interaction between disease manifestations and cultural
values took a different turn than in the Seattle dialysis committee protocol. As the
medical need was simultaneously associated with vulnerable infants and adult
alcoholism, the allocation process hinged on collateralizing the steep cost of the
therapy. An Illinois legislator testified that two constituents "faced $100,000 liver
transplant bills that their insurance companies would not pay," and, she ruefully
claimed, they were not "'cute and cuddly' enough for the fund raising campaigns
sparked by very young transplant patients. ' 28 Members of Congress struggled
with the ethics of making sure their constituents got a fair try when so many
others were similarly situated, but this undertaking was draining, and dogged by
a suspicion that devotion to individual patients might be counterproductive social
policy.2 2 9 "This is not the job of politicians," insisted Arkansas Senator Dale
Bumpers.2 3°
Congressional reformers contemplated two strategies for rationalizing and
potentially expanding coverage and access to extrarenal transplantation. The first
was to grant Medicare, which made coverage determinations for medical
procedures on an "all-or-nothing" basis, the authority to designate certain
provider institutions-and perhaps specific health conditions-as eligible for
reimbursement of "transplants [and] other sophisticated procedures., 231 Several
considerations argued for a conditional or incremental approach. Treatment
options, technical capabilities, and risk did vary by center within a system that
tolerated and encouraged surgical innovation on the individual and institutional
level.232 At the same time, selective coverage was responsive to concerns that
government subsidization would induce a proliferation of "glamorous, high-tech
medicine" regardless of financial wisdom or patient safety.233 The "centers of
excellence" approach gave a new twist to the liminal concept of an experimental
procedure invoked by insurers: Costs could be controlled by curbing
inappropriate utilization.
The American Society of Transplant Surgeons, which represented a broad
finance the complex operation until a small religious radio station in her hometown began a
campaign that raised $80,000.").
228. Wehr, supra note 189.
229. Elizabeth Wehr, System Manipulated to Get Transplants for Kids, CONG. Q. WKLY., Feb.
25, 1984, at 455. See also 130 CONG. REc. 29,980 (1984) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
230. Wehr, supra note 229.
231. Compromise Organ Transplant Bill Passed, 1984 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 476, 477.
232. To cite an extreme example that occurred after the NOTA debate, pharmaceutical
company Fujisawa's immunosuppressant drug FK-506 was initially available for clinical use only
at the University of Pittsburgh, which was actively involved in the drug's development from the
basic research stage and eventually obtained FDA permission for human trials. See WERTH, supra
note 81, at 52-53.
233. See Keller, supra note 216, at 17.
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cross-section of transplant surgeons, endorsed this strategy. Oscar Salvatierra, the
Stanford transplant suregon who was president of the society, explained its
publicly minded logic: "We are very optimistic, at this time, that our success with
organ transplantation at relatively few centers can be expanded to more centers.
However, we are mindful of the need for planned and managed expansion that
makes the most of economies of scale and enhances quality .... We perceive this
to be... without the risk of excessive cost that would be incurred by [an ESRD-
like] program .... ,,234 Lurking within the designation system was the implicit
threat of high-stakes, government-promoted competition based on price as well
as quality. In the short run, however, it did not take a brain surgeon to get a sense
of whose finances and prestige were most likely to be strengthened by
government certification. Chairman Waxman, whose district included Beverly
Hills, introduced one panel of witnesses as "a virtual Who's Who in the field of
organ transplantation. We have four of California's, if not the Nation's, most
prominent and experienced authorities in this emerging area of medicine. 235
Whereas established centers and elite surgeons were poised to accrue the
financial and reputational gains of a center of excellence designation, the
conceivable burdens of increased federal involvement in the medical market
threatened physicians generally. The American Medical Association (AMA),
which represented these diffuse and diverse practitioners, stridently expressed its
opposition to federal certification.236 Dr. James E. Davis, speaking for the AMA,
vividly described the extended implications of shifting control of professional
standards to political actors: "It would authorize the 'cookbook' approach to
medical practice, with chapter and verse written by the secretary of HHS. 237 By
speaking to the continuous refinement of medical technologies and practices, the
AMA offered an antidote to claims-perhaps exaggerated-that high-tech
surgery introduced unprecedented moral and political problems, necessitating a
radical break with conventional financing and technology policy. The AMA
warned that had such a policy been in place, "the existing widespread benefits of
the CAT scanner might not be available today and its cost effective diagnostic
benefits might have been denied to patients across the country. 238
Although the centers-of-excellence strategy would have increased the power
and fiscal discretion of the Executive Branch, the Reagan Administration resisted
234. Energy and Commerce Hearing, supra note 147, at 195 (statement of Oscar K. Salvatierra,
M.D., President, American Society of Transplant Surgeons).
235. Id. at 301 (statement of Rep. Henry Waxman).
236. See J.K. Iglehart, The Politics of Transplantation, 310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 864, 868 (1984).
237. Id.




Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 8 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol8/iss1/4
E PLURIBUS UNOS
239this opportunity for aggrandizement. Carolyne K. Davis of HCFA expressed a
general concern about undertaking a major policy shift when Medicare's hospital
fund was in a precarious state. 240 Assistant Secretary of Health Edward N. Brandt
expressed principled opposition on much the same grounds as the AMA; his own
views were bolstered by "the volume of ... correspondence" on the certification
241issue.
Of course, government was not only regulating access to organ transplants
but also subsidizing them. Private insurers that looked to Medicare for signals
about the appropriateness of reimbursements also provided feedback about
federal policies. "The Health Insurance Association of America ... and the Blue
Cross-Blue Shield Association . . .both adopted positions that favor[ed] the
limitation of sites for organ transplantation ....,242 Without sufficiently stringent
means of monitoring and regulating how tax dollars would be spent, the case for
federal financing remained enveloped in the hazy dread of bottomless outlays.
Alternatively, state agencies, which were already pressured to finance
extrarenal transplants in high-profile cases, might take on this challenge
systematically, setting consistent financing policies. One option, proposed by
Gore, was to "[r]equire state Medicaid programs to adopt written policies" with
respect to transplant coverage; 243 those that failed to do so would be compelled to
follow Medicare's policies.244 This measure had the virtues (and vices) of
transparency and consistency. In the glare surrounding coverage decisions, the
measure was also aligned with the ambitions of those advocating increased
insurance coverage of extrarenal transplants. At the state level, where transplant
financing was evidently spotty, agitation for greater support brought transplant
financing into direct competition with other social priorities. Michigan's Director
of Social Services, Dr. Agnes Mansour, was disinclined to disperse funds for
$200,000 liver transplants "until the hard-pressed state restore[d] its many recent
cuts in welfare payments. 245 Whether Congress could or should attempt to tilt
this balance was an open but complex question.
A related financial dilemma confronting policymakers was whether the
federal government should reimburse the cost of immunosuppressive drugs,
"break[ing] with Medicare's policy of not funding drugs for outpatients. 2 46
239. See Iglehart, supra note 236, at 867.
240. Id.
241. Ways and Means Hearing, supra note 186, at 41 (statement of Edward N. Brandt, Jr.,
M.D., Assistant Secretary for Health, Department of Health and Human Services).
242. Iglehart, supra note 236, at 868.
243. Wehr, supra note 189.
244. See Ways and Means Hearing, supra note 186, at 73 (statement of Carolyne K. Davis,
Ph.D., Administrator, Health Care Financing Administration).
245. Wehr, supra note 189.
246. Elizabeth Wehr, House Panel OKs Transplant Measure, CONG. Q. WKLY., March 10,
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Immunosuppression improved transplant outcomes, and-so long as the vast
majority of transplant recipients were kidney patients eligible for the ESRD
program-the increased volume of clinically successful transplants would save
the public fisc. Testimony from the Executive Branch confirmed that, against the
baseline Medicare outlay of $2 billion to provide dialysis for 70,000 patients in
1982,247 renal transplantation represented a net reduction in entitlement
expenditures. Although the initial cost of a kidney transplant was about
$30,000,248 Dr. Oscar Salvatierra, President of the American Society of
Transplant Surgeons, estimated that 10,000 kidney transplants would save $500
million over four years. 249 The anticipated cost savings did not merely reflect the
difference between the cost of immunosuppression and the cost of maintaining
dialysis patients' health; research indicated that only 39% of kidney transplant
recipients collected income support from the federal government, as compared to
60% of the dialysis patients.25°
In the context of an ESRD program that would become increasingly oriented
toward transplantation, reimbursing the costs of surgery but not the $5000 annual
bill for cyclosporine had troubling social implications. Such a policy would
provide for the welfare of the financially secure, but the remaining financial
requirement might effectively screen low-income patients off the transplant list.
Alternatively, low-income patients might get on the transplant list only to
experience the ravages of histological rejection because of inadequate follow-up.
Gore cited a Congressional Budget Office study finding that a program
reimbursing cyclosporine for three years post-transplant would yield net savings,
"because it cuts way down on rehospitalization and repeat procedures., 251 Repeat
procedures, of course, presented a different spectre-not the waste of dollars, but
the waste of scarce organs. The personal and fiscal impact of reimbursement
policies for cost-saving technological innovations had already been demonstrated
by "the ESRD program's ... policy of reimbursing for center-based therapy,...
but not for the cheaper but no less effective home dialysis," which was rectified
in 1978.252 As transplantation became a therapy of choice, reimbursing outpatient
immunosupression seemed to be the next logical step. Less optimistically
1984, at 564.
247. See Ways and Means Hearing, supra note 186, at 84 (Rep. Charles B. Rangel).
248. Energy and Commerce Hearing, supra note 147, at 60 (statement of Roger W. Evans,
Research Scientist, Health and Population Study Center, Battelle Human Affairs Research
Centers); id. at 74-75 (estimating cost of kidney transplant at $25,000 and $35,000).
249. Id. at 28 (statement of Oscar K. Salvatierra, M.D., President, American Society of
Transplant Surgeons).
250. Id. at 66 (statement of Roger W. Evans, Research Scientist, Health and Population Study
Center, Battelle Human Affairs Research Centers).
251. Ways and Means Hearing, supra note 186, at 35 (statement of Rep. Albert Gore, Jr.).
252. Schuck, supra note 138, at 185 n.48.
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officials at HHS's Health Care Financing Authority (HCFA), responsible for
administering Medicare and Medicaid, and spokespeople at the Health Insurance
Association of America warned of the burgeoning potential cost of financing
cyclosporine therapy for extrarenal transplants. Although transplant surgeon
Folkert 0. Belzer conjectured that extrarenal transplantation would be
253
appropriate for a relatively modest number of patients over the next five years,
HCFA administrator Carolyne K. Davis projected the total cost of the proposed
cyclosporine coverage to reach $80 million in the 1989 fiscal year.254
Regardless of the exact cost, the prominence of kidney transplants in
examinations of immunosuppression was striking against a backdrop of concern
about extrarenal transplants, partly triggered by the impact of cyclosporine on
these therapies. While kidney operations were expected to remain a staple of
transplant medicine (and hence drive the need for immunosuppression),
discursive shifts and elisions between renal and extrarenal transplantation may
have reflected a strategic manipulation of the public analysis.25 5 The proposed
Medicare outpatient immunosuppression program "was recommended to the
[Energy and Commerce C]ommittee by Representative Douglas Walgren, a
Democrat whose constituency include[d] the University of Pittsburgh," the
nucleus of liver transplantation in America.256 Nonetheless, since the expanding
range of transplantable organs implicated many common technical, economic,
and moral issues, there was a principled basis for contriving to build support for
comprehensive policies.
Comprehensiveness, however, would prove to be a relative concept.
Congressional resistance to reimbursing immunosuppression ultimately stemmed
less from the costs or risks associated with cyclosporine than from the broad
challenges posed by venturing into outpatient drug reimbursement. On the Senate
floor, Indiana Senator Dan Quayle "objected to the creation of a disease-specific
program because he could not justify 'singling out immunosuppressive drugs
when there are other expensive drugs needed by many individuals with life-
threatening illness. ,,257 Even if the decision could be justified philosophically, it
might stimulate further demands on the budget as other interest groups demanded
no less. Representative Henson Moore of Louisiana asserted that "lobbyists for
the elderly" were seeking funding for a different list of "lifesaving drugs" on an
253. Energy and Commerce Hearing, supra note 147, at 42 (statement of Folkert 0. Belzer,
M.D.) (conjecturing that 4,000 patients per year might receive liver transplants in 1988, and that the
number of medically appropriate heart transplants would not be "astronomical").
254. Wehr, supra note 189.
255. See Energy and Commerce Hearing, supra note 147, at 41 (statement of Folkert 0. Belzer,
M.D.).
256. Iglehart, supra note 236, at 866.
257. Blumstein, supra note 10, at 6 n.I (quoting Quayle in 134 CONG. REc. 15,088 (1988)).
49
Gross: E Pluribus UNOS
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2008
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
outpatient basis.258 Viewed in this light, the problem was the same as that
confronting state-level agencies: deciding where transplant-related expenditures
should fit within an overarching fiscal framework.
When Gore's subcommittee first turned its oversight powers toward
transplantation, existing federal arrangements for financing transplants were
flush with ironies. Because the Medicare ESRD program entitled kidney patients
to full Medicare coverage (and not just reimbursement for dialysis and renal
transplantation), patients with end stage renal disease were eligible for Medicare-
financed heart transplants on the basis of their kidney disease. Patients who
merely experienced heart failure, on the other hand, were not categorically
eligible for heart transplants.259 Further, public insurance programs, such as the
Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS),
which provided health care to civilian family members of military personnel,
were not forthcoming with funds for liver transplantation "on the grounds that the
procedure was still experimental., 260 The irony here was that highly experimental
transplant surgery had received at least some funding as scientific research;
patients were turning to ordinary health insurance as the procedure was moving
beyond the experimental stage and into a new coverage gap. 261 Finally,
institutions dedicated to the serving the public often pursued these ends by
seeking to capitalize on other parties' resources. The Battelle and NIH studies,
for example, were prospective evaluations for the purpose of Medicare coverage
eligibility, but they were also "retrospective review[s]" of completed surgeries
that had received funding from somewhere.262 A starker example of
resourcefulness by an institution that was itself expected to be a resource could
be seen in what one legislator would decry as the "bizarre spectacle of the
Defense Department providing public relations guidance to mount public
fundraising drives for the children of . military personnel [in] need [of
transplants]. 263 The ultimate irony of transplant provisioning was that Congress
picked up the same soft tools favored by the White House, using its political
clout and cultural status to spotlight the need for organs and to pressure insurance
programs to cover extrarenal transplants. A further similarity lies in the
envisioned center certification apparatus, which was frequently compared to
governmental policies toward clinical research and the experimental use of drugs
258. Wehr, supra note 246.
259. See Rettig, supra note 134, at 198.
260. Id. at 199.
261. See TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 128, at 109-10.
262. Id. at 108-09 (noting that rapid technological change could "render [exhaustive
evaluations] essentially moot").
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and devices.264 Congress's engagement with transplant financing differed from
the Executive Branch's in one important respect, though. While the
Administration induced reimbursements for select individual cases while
maintaining restrictive federal reimbursement guidelines, congressional action
pressured payors-including federal programs-to make coverage available on a
policy level.265
The relationship between the focal point of these proposals-the need for
organs-and the corresponding need for financial resources was complex. For
extrarenal transplantation, so long as organs remained scarce, this constraint on
surgical volume kept costs in check and kept the need for organs in the spotlight.
But if the public could be persuaded to donate more cadaveric livers (which had
few uses aside from transplantation), would health care budget outlays (which
were more fungible) simply become the next highly visible tragic choice?266
Although directly converting dollars into organs was taboo, constraints on the
availability of either of these resources could bottleneck organ transfer,
increasing the practical and symbolic importance of each relatively scarce input.
Congressional examination of another set of relationships-those between
American transplant institutions and patients from abroad-shed light on the
roles of different sources of funding, and the values attaching to them.
Gore's oversight committee, not surprisingly, found that individual
transplant centers took radically different stances on extending access to non-
resident aliens. In a professional society's survey, seventy of the eighty-two
responding transplant centers reported giving some "priority" to U.S. citizens;
Louisiana State University at Shreveport refused to accept nonresident aliens as a
matter of policy. 267 In contrast, fifteen of Washington Hospital Center's thirty-
five transplants had gone to nonimmigrant aliens so far in 1983-and all the
nonimmigrant aliens were from Saudi Arabia. 68 Also not surprisingly, referral
patterns and agreements often originated in personal contacts. Dr. George E.
Schreiner, director of nephrology at Georgetown, recalled how a pioneering
Greek nephrologist held a fellowship at Georgetown, and while Schreiner was
264. See, e.g., Wehr, supra note 246.
265. See Mueller, supra note 177, at 347 ("The means of getting Congressional attention was
quite common; the difference with Gore was that he was in a position to push for general
legislation, not merely to resolve a single case.").
266. See Henry Hansmann, The Ethics and Economics of Markets for Human Organs, in
BLUMSTEIN & SLOAN, supra note 8, at 57-85.
267. Science and Technology Hearing, supra note 170, at 71 (statement of Nicholas J. Feduska,
M.D., Chairman, American Society of Transplant Surgeons Committee on Organ Sharing and
Preservation); Id. at 83 (statement of John C. McDonald, President, South-Eastern Organ
Procurement Foundation).
268. Id. at 201 (statement of Jimmy Light, M.D., Director, Organ Procurement and
Transplantation, Washington Hospital Center).
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president of the International Society of Nephrology, it convened in Athens.
When the Greek Ministry of Health approached Schreiner's program,
Georgetown reached an agreement to treat suitable kidney transplant candidates
sent (and apparently funded) by the Greek government. These patients, who were
"not given any preferences and [might] wait a very long time," especially if they
had type 0 blood, were hosted by local Greek Orthodox Churches. 269 Greek-
American community organizations were also viewed as a potential source of
donor organs.27 °
The relationship between citizenship and participation in America's
transplant system may have been empirically complex, but it was susceptible to
analysis and organization according to rational principles. In 1983, Georgetown
professor of bioethics Warren Reich submitted testimony on the moral
implications of allocating organs as "citizens of a global community." In his
accompanying oral remarks, Reich distinguished between the ethical issues posed
by "the financially capable alien, whom I will call the wealthy alien," and those
posed by "the poor alien" or "the destitute alien., 271 The former group of patients
needed surgery and had the wherewithal to pay for it; the latter group needed
financial support to gain access to surgery. The ability of wealthy patients-
whether aliens or U.S. residents-to finance their own transplants exposed the
tension between notions of egalitarian access and notions of financial self-
sufficiency. Treating patients eligible for Medicare ESRD coverage alongside
patients whose kidney transplants could be financed out-of-pocket or by foreign
governments implicated a set of tradeoffs governing the movement of dollars and
organs. Because Medicare was a large and reliable payer, kidney transplant
centers had an incentive to accept Medicare's partial reimbursements of surgical
fees as payment in full. But if a center did this, then the center could collect
higher payments from patients outside the ESRD program, creating an incentive
to shift organs toward these patients.272 These financially-independent patients,
however, did not truly constitute a self-sustaining pool, because they depended
on the general population for cadaveric donor organs, just as ESRD program
beneficiaries did.
From a financing standpoint, dollars represented contribution, but so long as
financial contributions were crucial, dollars also represented allocational control.
A "differential fee structure" could be defended in terms of contributory fairness:
269. Id. at 213 (statement of George E. Schreiner, M.D., Director, Nephrology Division,
Georgetown University Hospital).
270. Id. at 65-66 (statement of Warren T. Reich, Director, Division of Health and the
Humanities, Georgetown University).
271. Id. at 26, 29 (statement of Warren T. Reich, Director, Division of Health and the
Humanities, Georgetown University).
272. See id. at 202 (providing a discussion of reimbursement policies).
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compared to permanent U.S. residents, non-residents did not make the same
"contribut[ion] through the payment of taxes or in other ways to the costs of
research and development that made it possible for U.S. institutions to develop
[transplant] technology., 73 The financial risk to transplant programs was
delinquent debt and the "abuse of ESRD funds., 274 From an allocational
standpoint, however, "[t]his argument would seem to suggest that surgeons may,
without authorization, collect funds on behalf of the republic and then perhaps
appropriate" these funds according to their own prerogatives. 275 Increased organ
procurement would help solve this issue by making organs less dear in America
and abroad; 276 increasing Medicare reimbursement rates would tilt the incentive
structure in favor of American patients at the expense of American taxpayers.
One proposed structural reform that would have an immediate impact-using
"profits" from transplants to "foreign nationals who are able to pay" surgical
expenses to finance organ procurement activities for the benefit of "poor foreign
nationals"-revealed the extent to which the expenditure of money was
integrated into the moral and political economy of organ procurement in spite of
the International Kidney Exchange uproar. 277
D. Coordination
The White House's charismatic, individualized involvement in transplant
awareness and financing suited a "presidency dedicated to revitalizing the
sacrificial center of American society.' '278 In civic rhetoric, such as speeches
acknowledging the destruction of the space shuttle Challenger or
commemorating the Allied taking of Normandy, Reagan mythologized America
273. Id. at 27 (statement of Warren T. Reich, Director, Division of Health and the Humanities,
Georgetown University).
274. Id. at 99 (statement of Paul I. Terasaki, Director, Southern California Regional Organ
Procurement Agency).
275. Id. at 27 (statement of Warren T. Reich, Director, Division of Health and the Humanities,
Georgetown University).
276. See, e.g., id. at 99 (statement of Paul I. Terasaki, Director, Southern California Regional
Organ Procurement Agency) (noting that after kidneys were shipped from the U.S. to Japan,
"cadaver donor donations from the Japanese population... increased [by] 100%").
277. Id. at 54 (statement of Warren T. Reich, Director, Division of Health and the Humanities,
Georgetown University) (emphasis omitted). See also id. at 306 (statement of George J. Annas,
Professor of Public Health, Boston University) (cautioning that banning the sale of organs under
the Constitution's interstate commerce clause "seems to concede ... that organs can properly be
viewed as commercial commodities").
278. David Chidester, Saving the Children by Killing Them: Redemptive Sacrifice in the
Ideologies of Jim Jones and Ronald Reagan, I RELIGION & AM. CULTURE 177, 179 (1991).
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as a "giant country prepared to make so many sacrifices., 27 9 Attributing
redemptive power to the ultimate "sacrifice of the body, the physical, or the
material," Reagan celebrated the quotidian generosity of "voluntary gifts" when
organ transplantation was offering grieving families new ways to experience the
meaning of giving. 280 "'Do this one for the Gipper,' [Reagan] told Air Force
officials when they resisted his plea to transport a boy to Tennessee for liver
surgery.
281
No matter how bracing such moments were, Normandy had been an
operation that fit a broader war plan, whereas White House aide Michael Batten
candidly acknowledged with respect to transplantation, "'[w]e're looking at
events in search of a policy.' ' 282 A fundamental difference between the
Administration and reformers was over precisely how to characterize this policy
vacuum. Dr. Brandt of HHS and Dr. Davis of HCFA emphasized the complexity
of coordinating organ procurement, the value of ongoing study to identify best
practices, and the importance of "utiliz[ing] the most recent information., 283 Gore
relentlessly barraged the Administration officials with accusations of paralysis by
analysis: "You have had studies; you have had recommendations on how to deal
with transplants .... Are you studying [a previous] study? ... [W]hen [the most
recent] study is completed, you would be reluctant to act on it, because the most
relevant one would then be the one you started next .... [Y]our whole approach
has been to wait and wait and drag your feet and hope that the problem will solve
itself. ,
284
One theme running through the hearings, made more powerful because it
was readily explicable by market and public policy dynamics, was the private
sector's lack of initiative in procuring and sharing organs other than kidneys. As
extrarenal transplants that involved these other organs became more effective
from a therapeutic standpoint, patients pressured federal, state, and private
insurers to cover extrarenal transplantation. But federal support for an organ
sharing infrastructure remained focused on kidney allocation.285 Transplant
centers themselves, which had initiated kidney sharing arrangements, were stuck
279. Id. at 186, (citing Reagan's 1981 commencement address at the University of Notre Dame,
in which Reagan quotes Australian Prime Minister John Gorton's characterization of the United
States. RONALD REAGAN, THE QUEST FOR PEACE, THE CAUSE OF FREEDOM: SELECTED SPEECHES ON
THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD 45 (1988)).
280. Id. at 184.
281. Keller, supra note 216, at 17.
282. Eugene L. Meyer, Tax Money for Transplant Operations: Who Pays?, WASH. POST, Sept.
12, 1984, at CI (quoting Michael Batton).
283. Energy and Commerce Hearing, supra note 147, at 183 (statement of Carolyn K. Davis,
Ph.D., Administrator, Health Care Financing Administration; and Edward N. Brandt, Jr., M.D.,
Assistant Secretary for Health, Department of Health and Human Services).
284. Id. at 182-83 (statement of Rep. Albert Gore, Jr.).
285. Id. at 182 (statements of Rep. Albert Gore, Jr. and Carolyne K. Davis, Ph.D.,
Administrator, Health Care Financing Administration).
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in a Catch-22: Until liver transplantation became both larger in scale and more
lucrative, there were few incentives to invest in infrastructure for allocating
livers, and this lack on infrastructure hindered liver transplantation. Moreover,
the growth of independent organizations dedicated to kidney procurement and
allocation activities rendered the direct involvement of transplant centers in these
activities institutionally out of place. Pittsburgh surgeon Thomas Starzl insisted
that "[t]he procurement agencies cannot be little cottage industries devoted to
only the kidney transplant programs. There is only one set of donors for all the
needed organs and the organs are a resource of the entire United States. This
concept has to be built into the system.,
286
Indeed, the existing system for allocating kidneys was in a state of flux,
lacking an overarching design and, in the view of close observers, suffering from
disorganization. The basic contours of the system were clear: "approximately 140
hospitals operate[d] some aspect of an organ procurement system," and procured
organs ultimately made their way to 157 Medicare-recognized transplant
centers. 287 By one count, an additional thirty-six independent organ procurement
agencies removed kidneys in the hospital setting, participated in computerized
kidney matching systems, and preserved and transported the organs. All of these
independent agencies, as well as independent tissue typing laboratories, used a
single financial intermediary, Aetna Life and Casualty, to process claims.
2 88
Much as the establishment of independent procurement agencies began to
separate procurement activities from hospital organizations, the apparatus of
organ matching was increasingly removed from transplant and procurement
programs. SEOPF, the regional organ sharing program that originated in
arrangements among transplant centers with in-house procurement programs in
the southeastern United States, moved in this direction in 1977 when it made its
UNOS computer matching system accessible to transplant programs nationwide.
The network, which reportedly served 144 transplant centers by the time
Congress intervened, was organized into regions including SEOPF itself.
289
Thus, UNOS had evolved into a tool for locating organs, with "some loose
guidelines for sharing" built in. UNOS was functionally and geographically
distinguishable from SEOPF's regional procurement efforts, despite being
operated by SEOPF 9 °
Gaps, redundancies, and bottlenecks within this loose system were obvious.
Brandeis University researcher Jeffrey M. Prottas, whose evaluation of organ
286. Id. at 228.
287. Id. at 152 (statement of Carolyne K. Davis, Ph.D., Administrator, Health Care Financing
Administration).
288. See id.
289. See id. at 212-13.
290. Id. at 213 (statement of Gene Pierce, Executive Director, South-Eastern Organ
Procurement Foundation).
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procurement activities was cited approvingly by Gore and Waxman, 9' found that
"[w]hile some regions [were] underserved [by organ procurement agencies],
others [had] several competing agencies., 2 92 Some of these agencies may have
"grown too large to effectively service their catchment areas," while "many...
[were] too small to do so. ' '293 As for the sharing of organs among agencies,
SEOPF Executive Director Gene Pierce reported in a written statement that
although articles of incorporation and bylaws for UNOS were being drafted,
"[t]here [were] currently no funds to officially establish ... UNOS" as a distinct
29
organization.  Despite federal support for these services' involvement in kidney
allocation, federal officials did not seem to have a grip on how these funds were
being utilized. Prottas reported that in 1982, "the Federal Government spent
about $40 million on kidney acquisition, yet most organ procurement agencies
receive neither direction nor assistance from the funding agency [HCFA]. 295 The
hearings gave federal officials an opportunity to gather basic information about
the problems of organ sharing from interested professionals in the field. As
Congress contemplated authorizing additional funding to enhance procurement
activities, representatives of SEOPF pointed out that "[t]he amount of funds
appropriated seems excessive in light of the revenue that will be generated from
the procurement of organs within the first year., 296 The organization's vice
president provided an assessment of how much funding an independent
procurement organization would need during its first two years for "capitalization
items and operating expenses" to become self-sustaining.297
If the memes of waste, lack-of-coordination, and lack-of-public-
accountability became a permanent part of the public's conventional wisdom,
they could affect donation rates. After the Los Angeles Times ran an article titled
"Donor Organs Lost through Inefficiency" in 1982, one reader wrote to the editor
that she signed an organ donor card "believ[ing] . . . that there was a system in
which the donor organ would reach the transplant patient .... I am sure glad that
my mother, who chose to donate her kidney to aid in the survival of her brother,
291. Ways and Means Hearing, supra note 186, at 21 (statement of Rep. Albert Gore, Jr.);
Energy and Commerce Hearing, supra note 147, at 181 (statement of Rep. Henry Waxman).
292. Energy and Commerce Hearing, supra note 147, at 47 (statement of Jeffrey M. Prottas,
M.D., Senior Research Associate, Brandeis University).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 47 (statement of of Jeffrey M. Prottas, M.D., Senior Research Associate, Brandeis
University). Gore estimated that the 1983 federal expenditure to finance kidney procurement was
"almost $70 million." Ways and Means Hearing, supra note 186, at 21 (statement of Rep. Albert
Gore, Jr.).
296. Energy and Commerce Hearing, supra note 147, at 216.
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did so in person or he may have never received it."'2 98 While the funding of
extrarenal transplants by government insurance programs remained controversial,
horror stories about the lack of coordination in allocating available livers put
pressure on Congress to organize a national, multi-organ network for matching
donated organs and recipients, facilitating extrarenal transplantation and perhaps
priming it for expansion. 99
The most visible non-legislative response to these concerns was the
American Council on Transplantation (ACT), which developed in response to the
recommendations of a Surgeon General's workshop and received start-up
funding from HHS.3 °° Some members of ACT were appointed by the
Administration, and others were chosen by constituent private organizations; 3
0 1
orthopedic surgeon Gary Friedlaender, the president of the American Association
of Tissue Banks, had been elected interim president of ACT by its
membership.3 °2 The Council's steering committee set out a list of goals
"includ[ing] ensuring equitable access to available donated organs; promoting
effective use of multiple organ donations; improving donor identification and
referral; and motivating the public to donate organs., 30 3 Almost as soon as the
ACT was created, it was riven by internal disagreements. Transplant surgeons
"questioned the motives of the administration in pressing the interests of a private
organization so hard, wondering whether ACT [was] serving mostly as a
stalking-horse to head off legislation. 3 °4 The American Society of Transplant
Surgeons (ASTS) would not join ACT, and ASTS president Oscar Salvatierra
"resigned from ACT's interim executive committee," citing the appearance of
partisanship in its opposition to legislative intervention. 30 5 Of course, changing
prospects for extrarenal transplant financing gave surgeons a monetary interest in
ensuring that an industry council would not supplant government involvement in
transplant policy.
30 6
298. Laura L. Johnson, Letter to the Editor, Donor Organ Inefficiency, L.A. TIMES , Dec. 24,
1982, at B4.
299. See Energy and Commerce Hearing, supra note 147, at 74.
300. Phil Gunby, Organ Transplant Group Formed, 250 JAMA 2103, 2103 (1983); Keller,
supra note 216, at 17.
301. See Energy and Commerce Hearing, supra note 147, at 267.
302. Id.; Gunby, supra note 300, at 2103.
303. Gunby, supra note 300, at 2103.
304. Iglehart, supra note 236, at 867.
305. Id.
306. In October, 1983, four members of Stanford's transplant program wrote a letter to
Salvatierra in anticipation of his testimony before the House of Representatives, asserting that
"comparable therapeutic results" for kidney and extrarenal transplantation "amply justified" an
"evenhanded approach" and specifically calling for "reimbursement ... on an equal basis." Energy
and Commerce Hearing, supra note 147, at 236 (quoting Letter from Dr. Edward B. Stinson,
Professor, Department of Cardiovascular Surgery, Stanford University et al. to Dr. Oscar
Salvatierra, President, American Society of Transplant Surgeons (Oct. 13, 1983)).
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Nonetheless, disaffection and dissatisfaction with ACT reflected broader
policy concerns than surgeons' narrow economic interests or legislators'
ambitions to seize the mantle of progress. ACT's industry-council structure and
its stated agenda, focusing on operational difficulties, lacked the architectural
vision that some reformers felt was sorely needed. Not only was ACT in disarray,
but constituencies that were only tangentially related to solid organ
transplantation, such as tissue banks, seemed to be holding the center. 30 7 The
Council's leadership sought to pattern ACT after a similar entity, the American
Blood Commission, 3° a questionable model at a time when blood banks were
stressed-though perhaps not stressed enough-by the social and medical
implications of HIV transmission and identification. 30 9 The interim status of
ACT's initial leadership did not project solidity, either: Friedlaender stated
forthrightly that he did not desire to "remain at this task full time beyond
[ACT's] next meeting. '310 Thus, strategic considerations of policy, and not just
tactical calculations, contributed to the prevailing assumption that congressional
reformers would be working around the Council, rather than with it.
Elected officials, in contrast, were well-positioned to coordinate health care
financing, which did not require the construction of new procurement agencies to
raise revenue and allocate funds on the spur of the moment. In a system where
many patients traveled out of state for extrarenal transplants, fiscal considerations
not only posed a direct challenge for transplant financing; differential
reimbursement rates among the states, and the mistrust and resentments they
spawned, could trap covered patients in a logistical nightmare, even though
transplant centers approved for federal Medicare funding were already required
"to accept [state-aided] Medicaid patients. '" 311 Members of the House sought to
align reimbursement policies and procedures with this commitment to therapeutic
access by requiring state Medicaid programs that financed transplants to cover
them at the Medicare rate. "The purpose of this [initiative was] to avoid
unnecessary disputes over reimbursement levels between States and facilities that
might compromise the access of Medicaid eligibles to these life-sustaining
procedures. 312
Organizing the sprawling web of institutions involved in the transfer of
307. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 136, at 187 (noting that four organizations
representing "the blood banking community" were eligible to submit director nominations for
ACT).
308. Energy and Commerce Hearing, supra note 147, at 259 (statement of Gary E. Friedlaender,
M.D., Interim President, American Council of Transplantation).
309. See Ann Cooper, The High-Stakes Race Is On To Develop Blood Test To Detect AIDS
Virus, NAT'L J., Aug. 4, 1984, at 1470-71.
310. Energy and Commerce Hearing, supra note 147, at 268 (statement of Gary E. Friedlaender,
M.D., Interim President, American Council on Transportation).
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human organs was another matter. In the congressional spotlight, egregious
instances of poor coordination in the existing system made for easy targets. Gore
asserted that in Pittsburgh, "[t]here were 300 livers that could not be used and
were disposed of principally because . . . the transplant teams were otherwise
occupied when the liver became available, or they were exhausted .... [T]here
was great difficulty in getting them to the right place in the proper time.'
313
Another Congressman alleged, "even though [pediatric liver patient Ashley
Bailey] was on the Minneapolis University Hospital priority list, and had two
previous mentions by the President of the United States, [she] was not included
on one of the main computer donor lists until just about two weeks ago. 314 Some
of the testimony emphasized the difficulty any one patient or family would have
coordinating the elements necessary for a successful transplant-funding for
hospitalization, funding for immunosupression, and the surgery itself.
Congressman Dan Glickman suggested a "bill to direct the NIH to establish
within a set timeframe at least a Federal information network along the lines of
what Congress directed the Justice Department to do with regard to missing
children," '315 reinforcing the sense that organs were being lost.
Astonishment and anger over glaring inefficiencies, as well as broad and
potent opposition to the commercialization of organ donation, may have
temporarily masked tensions between competing allocational values that were
implicit in congressional testimony. Patient organizations, formed around a
common medical condition rather than the interests of an economic class,
adamantly opposed the sale of organs, which threatened to divide these
associations' constituencies. These advocacy groups, however, did not
necessarily share a common philosophy of distributive justice. "What happened
to equal opportunity when the rich can live and the poor must die?" asked Gail
Rempell of the American Liver Foundation. 316 David Ogden of the National
Kidney Foundation discussed the Foundation's support for a system that
distributed organs "based on medical need and criteria without discrimination
based on race, sex, social, or economic status., 3 17 Participants in the hearings did
not naively believe that allocation based on medical criteria would always result
in equal opportunity, but there remained a hope that these two ideals could be
reconciled by eliminating waste and addressing collective action problems to
increase the supply of organs. Gore observed in reference to the earlier decision
313. Ways and Means Hearing, supra note 186, at 33 (statement of Rep. Albert Gore, Jr.).
314. Energy and Commerce Hearing, supra note 147, at 74 (statement of Rep. Charles W.
Stenholm).
315. Id. at 74-75 (statement of Rep. Dan Glickman).
316. Ways and Means Hearing, supra note 186, at 119 (statement of Gail Rempell, Board of
Directors, American Liver Foundation) (emphasis added).
317. Energy and Commerce Hearing, supra note 147, at 360 (statement of David A. Ogden,
M.D., President, National Kidney Foundation) (emphasis added).
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to fund kidney transplants,
[t]wo things happened to the patient mix once the government became involved
in treating end-stage renal disease .... First, the availability of care became
more equitable. This is demonstrated by a patient mix that more closely
parallels the incidence of kidney disease within the general population. Second,
doctors abandoned the use of medical practice standards that ... had been in
place prior to government intervention.... [P]atients who were once medically
deemed unsuitable for this type of treatment were now being treated. 318
In this way, proponents implied that public support and private resourcefulness
might obviate the allocation dilemmas made pressing by the scarcity of donated
organs.
The consensus commitment to a system based on voluntary donation pointed
toward a certain differentiation of labor within the emerging public-private
partnership. Persistent, hortatory activities to persuade the public to donate
organs more naturally fell to non-governmental community organizations, while
policy questions about the organization and regulation of the private sector fell
within government's recognized powers to regulate commerce and protect public
health and safety. Organ sharing policies, which reflected judgments about
feasibility and fairness, logically fell somewhere between policy-level
architectural decisions and procurement strategies in local communities. This
mezzanine-level activity of developing a working allocation network also
demanded logistical expertise. Dr. Henry Krakauer of the NIH Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Diseases observed that SEOPF, the New England Organ
Bank, the United Kingdom Transplant Service, and Euro-transplant gave
different weight to factors such as "medical urgency" and antigen matching.319
Describing this lack of "consensus" in technical terms, Kraukauer highlighted the
degree of "medical uncertainty about utility"-a concept that is apparently also
subject to great moral uncertainty. 32
While critics may not have agreed-or even formed definite opinions-
about how organs should be shared, legislative reformers did see a need for the
consistent application of principles. Thus, when immunologist Paul Terasaki
described the regionalized approach to organ matching in Southern California,
Gore interjected, "You can't tell me that these scientific criteria are useful for
purposes of assigning priorities within the region, but they're meaningless when
it comes to deciding outside the region.",311 Of course, the optimal geographic
318. Ways and Means Hearing, supra note 186, at 25 (statement of Rep. Albert Gore, Jr.).
319. Science and Technology Hearing, supra note 170, at 101 (statement of Dr. Henry Krakauer,
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health).
320. Id. at 102.
321. Id. at 120 (statement of Rep. Albert Gore, Jr.).
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organization of organ sharing was a function of socio-technical factors such as
the improvements in match quality that could be gained by enlarging the network
and the diffusion of self-reliance and transparency that resulted from the same
enlargement. Less certain was whether the existing (and evolving) political
economy of organ sharing was facilitating optimization based on these factors.
Questions of public morality pressed hard on officials making policy at the
architectural level, and logistical challenges pressed hard on regional organ
sharing programs developing allocation networks at the infrastructure level. At
the level of direct interaction with potential donors, institutional politics pressed
hard on those attempting to organize procurement activities. Transplant
professionals, dissatisfied with the White House's ad hoc encouragement of
organ donation and transplant financing, also recognized that one-shot policy-
level interventions and "national TV exposure" would not substitute for the day-
to-day work of cultivating donations from grieving families.32 2 "We need people
in the grassroots talking to the constituents, if you will, of your areas that can
encourage people to donate. It is a people-to-people problem. It is not something
that can be handled at upper levels. ' 323 While there was no substitute for hard
work on the personal level, hard work could lead to radically different outcomes,
especially if some procurement efforts were working against each other.
Jeffrey Prottas, reporting his findings on progress in organ procurement,
emphasized the need to identify and replicate the best organizational structures
and practices for obtaining donations. "If the entire Nation were served as well as
the most effective [procurement] organizations serve their own regions, the
number of available organs would double. 324 Because this seemingly
uncontroversial prescription had an organizational dimension, however,
institutional politics and localism meant that it would be difficult to put into
practice. Not only had the private sector failed to organize itself along efficient
lines, but state and national political structures were also organized in a way that
only gave voice to local interests. When Representative Waxman asked Prottas
how the federal government could "encourage the establishment of stronger local
procurement agencies," Prottas responded that attempting to strengthen all of the
1 10 agencies presently receiving reimbursement for kidney procurement would
not necessarily improve the effectiveness and accountability of the system.325
The possibility of a governmental role in selecting among agencies or
322. Energy and Commerce Hearing, supra note 147, at 229 (statement of Charles Carter, M.D.,
Vice President, South-Eastern Organ Procurement Foundation).
323. Id.
324. Id. at 46 (statement of of Jeffrey M. Prottas, M.D., Senior Research Associate, Brandeis
University).
325. Id. at 69 (statements of Rep. Henry Waxman and of Jeffrey M. Prottas, M.D., Senior
Research Associate, Brandeis University).
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pressuring them to consolidate revisited the issue underlying the centers-of-
excellence question that arose in connection with surgical reimbursements, in a
slightly different cultural and political context. Dr. Charles R. Baxter, President
of the American Association of Tissue Banks, and Ellen Heck, who oversaw the
organ procurement program at the University of Texas at Dallas, submitted a
prepared statement urging Congress not to "ignore" or "usurp" the existing
procurement and standards-setting roles of voluntary organizations. The activities
they highlighted ran the gamut from the UNOS kidney matching system to "the
,,326ham radio net for eye tissue placement.
Compared with the medical profession or organizations such as the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, traditions of
professional autonomy and self-regulation were less established in the field of
organ procurement. Dr. Keith Johnson, President of the Association of
Independent Organ Procurement Agencies, urged Congress not to "disrupt the
existing structure" of the independent agencies by stipulating organizational
structures that would minimize providers' involvement in the agencies'
procurement policies.327 Additionally, Johnson argued that procurement efforts
by "individuals and organizations whose primary motive is entrepreneurial" were
inconsistent with the strategy of procurement by "donation," perhaps alluding to
Barry Jacobs's International Kidney Exchange, and perhaps recognizing that
fewer people would participate in a purely altruistic donation system if
procurement agencies were exploiting their altruistic donations for private
gain.328 On the issue of structural organization, however, Johnson was vague. He
stated that bringing organ retrieval expertise to every acute care hospital in the
country "may require the establishment of new organ retrieval organizations
where none currently exist or the consolidation of ineffective organizations into a
single effective one"-without clearly delineating who should carry out this
reorganization or how.329
Legislatively requiring organ retrieval efforts in sparsely populated areas or
demanding the consolidation of existing agencies would have disrupted the civic
voluntarism that Johnson assumed to undergird organ retrieval. Setting goals and
rules for procurement activities, or authorizing HHS to develop criteria for
designating certain procurement organizations for federal financing, could
potentially give private sector efforts clearer direction toward the public good.33 °
326. Ways and Means Hearing, supra note 186, at 140 (statement of Charles R. Baxter, M.D.,
President Burn Association; and Ellen Heck, University of Texas Health Science Center at Dallas).
327. Energy and Commerce Hearing, supra note 147, at 222, 225 (statement of President,
Association of Independent Organ Procurement Agencies).
328. Id. at 224.
329. Id. at 223.
330. Ways and Means Hearing, supra note 186, at 82 (speculating about whether procurement
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Indeed, many of the reformers' goals-improved coordination with other
procurement agencies, hospitals, and the distribution apparatus-were horizontal
and relational in nature and perhaps less attainable through a unipolar, top-down
approach to implementation. Prottas had argued that the "cooperation of medical
professionals" in hospitals without a transplant program was vital to increasing
organ procurement, and that large procurement agencies that were "operationally
independent" of any transplant program were most easily oriented toward this
goal.331 A national strategy, whether developed and implemented by the public or
the private sector, would transcend the collective action problems associated with
localism. But even a concerted effort to replace the procurement patchwork with
a coordinated network of "independent" procurement agencies would not obviate
delicate questions of who was accountable to whom for what.332 These questions
intersected with the overarching debate playing out in the Capitol regarding how
the federal government should intervene to increase the efficiency and
effectiveness of organ transfer. After all, even the private-sector council
established by HHS adopted the acronym "ACT."
E. Legislative Process (and Product)
Policymakers committed to reforming the organ transfer system approached
the task of drafting legislation with a set of foregone conclusions and a set of
unanswered technical and political questions. Members of the 98th Congress
(1983-1984) introduced a series of bills reflecting consensus principles that
included a crackdown on commercialization, fiscal restraint in insurance
coverage, and the use of seed money to expand extrarenal organ procurement. As
for the points of uncertainty, legislative proposals frequently relied on two
strategies. One, addressing logistical issues, was to empower some kind of
national agency or private contractor to effectively manage and coordinate organ
procurement organizations' activities, much as SEOPF's UNOS system managed
organ sharing among transplant centers. The other strategy was to convene a task
force that would develop organ transfer policies on a temporary or permanent
basis by drawing on multidisciplinary expertise. To the extent that these
judgments concerned moral or policy decisions, as opposed to complex scientific
questions, this legislative delegation to unelected authorities arguably entailed
some passing the buck. Nonetheless, elected officials would remain responsible
for deciding whether to implement the panel's recommendations, and some
organizations that did not receive federal support would, in the words of Rep. Charles B. Rangel,
"go out of business").
331. Energy and Commerce Hearing, supra note 147, at 48 (statement of Jeffrey M. Prottas,
M.D., Senior Research Associate, Brandeis University).
332. Id. at 48 ("Organ procurement agencies do not work for their local hospital or surgeon.
They work for a national program designed to serve a national need.").
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insulation from the ordinary political process could be justified on pragmatic
grounds. Further, members of Congress were incessantly tugged by a wide range
of social, economic, and military issues, but a task force could devote its material
and intellectual resources to one area of policymaking. Both of these strategies
bore some resemblance to ACT's approach, but the coordinating body would be
responsible for actively managing the network, and the task force would be
charged with the broader goal of making architectural recommendations in the
public interest and structured to represent a broader array of stakeholders. The
end result of the legislative process, NOTA, would reflect an amalgamation of
decisive and delegatory elements distilled from the contending proposals.
Perhaps the first transplant-related bill introduced in the 98th Congress,
before the kidney purchasing schemes provoked outrage, was "[t]o amend the
Internal Revenue Code . . . to provide income and estate tax deductions for
decedents who donate organs for use as transplants. 333 Representative Philip
Crane of Illinois introduced this proposal, H.R. 540, which could be
characterized as an incentive or a reward, along with twenty other tax provisions,
generally aiming to provide a measure of tax relief.334 Numerous subsequent
bills, of varying degrees of comprehensiveness, were more clearly propelled by
arguments that resonated in the hearings.
In August, 1983, a bipartisan group of Senators, including two Democrats
from Massachusetts and two Republicans from Pennsylvania, sponsored
legislation, S. 1728, that would "provide for the establishment of a National Task
Force on Organ Procurement and Transplant Reimbursement., 335 The Task Force
would meet for six months to evaluate procurement and allocation efforts, and it
would "develop a plan for a permanent body to make recommendations"
regarding insurance coverage.336 Pennsylvania Republican Don Ritter introduced
a corresponding bill, H.R. 3977, in the House the following month.337 During the
next two months, October and November of 1983-as the hearings continued-
legislators diverged on the scope of federal intervention.
On October 5, 1983, Gore introduced H.R. 4080 as the "National Organ
Transplant Act."338 Title I of this bill authorized grants to organ procurement
organizations that met specified "eligibility criteria;" established a SEOPF-like
333. [2 98th Cong.] Cong. Index (CCH) 28,181 (Jan. 6, 1983) (describing H.R. 540, introduced
by Rep. Philip Crane). See also discussion infra Sections III.A & III.B.
334. Id. at 28,180.
335. Id. at 14,235 (Aug. 2, 1983). As Massachusetts and Pennsylvania were both homes of
pioneering transplant programs, public officials in these states may have had an especially acute
awareness of the political economy of transplantation.
336. 129 CONG. REc. 29,564 (1983) (statement of Sen. Ted Kennedy, describing S. 1728).
337. [2 98th Cong.] Cong. Index (CCH) 28,374 (Sept. 22, 1983).
338. 129 CONG. REc. 27,395 (1983).
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"United States Transplantation Network" that would maintain a registry of
transplant candidates and coordinate organ sharing using a "national computer
system;" and created a "National Center for Organ Transplantation . . within
[HHS] to administer" the grant program, oversee the organ sharing network, and
promote organ donation.339 In congressional testimony, Gore had previously
called for a "National Center for Human Organ Acquisition;, 340 this more
"acquisitive" approach was evidently softened as his initial proposal developed
into a comprehensive bill with cosponsors. Title II contained a number of
measures designed to facilitate the financing of transplantation. It exempted
procurement activities from Medicare's diagnosis-based cost containment
strategy, required state Medicaid programs to develop reimbursement policies
and to work with transplant centers designated by the Federal Medicare program,
and required transplant programs to accept Medicaid patients. Title III
criminalized the purchase of human organs.34' Officials representing procurement
organizations and SEOPF, surgeons including professional leader Oscar
Salvatierra, and social scientists Jeffrey Prottas and Roger Evans collaborated
342with Gore and his aide Jerold Mande in putting together legislation.
Later that month, Republican Representative David Daniel Marriott of Utah
introduced a fiscally modest alternative, H.R. 4180, authorizing the establishment
of patient registry and a "Task Force of Organ Procurement and
Transplantation. 343 In contrast to the designation of the original task force
proposal, this one contained no express reference to reimbursement or financing.
Meanwhile, a bipartisan cadre of four Senators including Sen. Kennedy of
Massachusetts and Sen. Heinz of Pennsylvania supplemented the previous Senate
task force proposal with S. 2018, which Heinz described as "the Senate version"
of Gore's bill.344 Heinz asserted his belief that the bill would provide vital
support to the private sector without "unnecessary regulation" or ballooning
federal expenditures, citing the strong endorsement of transplant surgeons,
including Thomas Starzl, from his home state.345 A few days later, on November
3, 1983, five Republican Senators introduced S. 2048, which paralleled
Marriott's House bill, "provid[ing] for the establishment of a Task Force on
Organ Procurement and Transplantation and an Organ Procurement and
339. Id. at 27,394-95.
340. Energy and Commerce Hearing, supra note 147, at 9.
341. 129 CONG. REC. 27,395-97 (1983) (providing a summary of bill).
342. Mueller, supra note 177, at 351; Dena Bunis, Lions Club Thwarted Tissue Safety Standards,
ORANGE COUNTY REG., Apr. 19, 2000, at A10; Marianne Costantinou, Miracle Workers, S.F.
CHRON., June 1, 2003, (Magazine), at 12.
343. [2 98th Cong.] Congressional Index (CCH) 28,386 (Oct. 20, 1983).
344. 129 CONG. REC. 29,565 (1983).
345. Id.
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Transplantation Registry. 3 46 Although inattentive to questions of "resource
allocations," this bill did stretch further than Kennedy's original Task Force
proposal, S. 1728, in a few respects: It "add[ed] provisions for the establishment
of a transplant registry, assistance for organ procurement activities and a
prohibition on organ purchases," while adding a narrow bioethical dimension to
the Task Force's ambit.347
The following day, Representative Marriott again introduced a task force
and registry bill, H.R. 4320, this time joined by three House colleagues.348
Members of the House were effectively greeted with a menu of options;
Republican Representative Edward R. Madigan of Illinois ended up sponsoring
Marriott's task force and registry proposal as well as an initiative authorizing
financing for organ procurement later introduced by Gore, H.R. 4474.349
Reportedly, "he became a supporter of Gore's broader proposal during its
consideration by the [House] Energy and Commerce Committee. 3 50
In a series of convoluted machinations, a streamlined version of Gore's
comprehensive proposal gained momentum through a combination of popular
support and procedural maneuvering. Gore's original National Organ Transplant
Act, referred out of its originating subcommittee in amended form on November
8, 1983, garnered the approval of the House Energy and Commerce Committee
on November 17, with ninety co-sponsors: 351 Pennsylvania Representative Doug
Walgren's call for coverage of outpatient immunosuppression had been
incorporated into this bill through an amendment authorizing it within the
existing Medicare inpatient drug reimbursement framework.352 Because the
comprehensive legislation "affect[ed] Medicare financing," however, it would
also have to get through the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate
Finance Committee to be enacted into law. These committees, which had not
participated in the initial Congressional inquiry into transplant policy, would
introduce "new and unsympathetic actors into the deliberations. 353
Representative W. Henson Moore, ranking Republican on the Ways and Means
Subcommittee on Health, was seen as an opponent of NOTA, but "the leading
346. [2 9 8th Cong.] Congressional Index (CCH) 14,253 (Nov. 3, 1983) (describing of S. 2048).
347. Howard S. Schwartz, Bioethical and Legal Considerations in Increasing the Supply of
Transplantable Organs: From UAGA to "Baby Fae", 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 397, 415 (1985).
348. [2 98th Cong.] Cong. Index (CCH) 28,394 (Nov. 4, 1983).
349. Id. at 28,394 & 28,403.
350. Iglehart, supra note 236, at 866.
351. See id. at 865 (erroneously stating that the committee approved the bill by voice vote on
November 18); Wehr, supra note 189 (stating that the voice vote actually occurred on November
17). See also H.R. RE'. No. 98-575, at 24 (1983) (tracing the history of the bill in detail and stating
that the voice vote occurred on November 17).
352. H.R. REP. No. 98-575, at 22 (1983).
353. Mueller, supra note 177, at 352.
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candidate to fashion a compromise." 4 On March 6, 1984, the Ways and Means
Subcommittee rejected Moore's gesture toward a task force and registry-only
approach, instead waving Gore's bill on to the full Ways and Means
Committee-minus the outpatient immunosuppression coverage.355
Advocates of immunosuppression coverage, apparently ranking this priority
high in relation to the other proposed changes to the Medicare program, were not
content with this compromise. The day after the comprehensive bill had been
approved by the Energy and Commerce Committee, Gore, perhaps sensing what
was coming, had introduced a pared-down alternative to his own bill. This bill,
H.R. 4474, "authoriz[ing] financial assistance to organ procurement
organizations," eliminated the controversial centers-of-excellence designation
system and the attempt to direct state Medicaid policymaking.356 It also
represented an ingenious end run around by the Finance and Ways and Means
Committees: By deleting these provisions and by shifting the outpatient drug
financing from the Medicare program to the HHS Secretary's office, the
revisions cast the remaining provisions outside the jurisdiction of these budget-
sensitive committees.357
In the months that followed, the Senate and House both passed transplant
bills. The Senate's "Organ Procurement and Transplantation Act," S. 2048,
closely identified with Utah Republican Orrin Hatch, developed through a
process of engagement across the aisle. Massachusetts Democrat Ted Kennedy's
reimbursement-oriented task force bill, S. 1728, had been the basis for the Labor
and Human Resources hearings that led to the introduction of S. 2048, originally
a task force and registry bill.358 As reported out of committee, the Hatch Bill
authorized limited direct government assistance to organ procurement and
sharing initiatives, in addition to fashioning a strategic planning Task Force and a
registry of potential organ donors and recipients. This version was evidently
acceptable to Kennedy, who gave it his backing before the decisive Senate voice
vote on April 11, 1984. In the House, a clean copy of Gore's streamlined bill,
re-introduced as H.R. 5580, left the House Energy and Commerce Committee
just days after the Ways and Means Committee approved the other Gore bill
354. Iglehart, supra note 236, at 868.
355. See Wehr, supra note 246.
356. [2 Cong. 98th] Cong. Index (CCH) 29,403 (Nov. 18, 1983) (describing H.R. 4474);
Meuller, supra note 177, at 352. The move to designate certain transplant centers for
reimbursement was met by an "increasing number of academic medical centers ... announcing
their plans to develop transplantation programs. With each such announcement, the prospect [grew]
increasingly remote that Congress [would] enact-in the short run-a policy that would limit
which of these centers would be eligible" for reimbursement. Iglehart, supra note 236, at 868.
357. Mueller, supra note 177, at 352-53.
358. 130 CONG. REc. 8740-43 (1984) (reading the full text of the bill into the record).
359. Id.
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360without drug coverage. On June 21, 1984, the House approved an amended
version of H.R. 5580, which had bypassed the Ways and Means Committee, by a
lopsided vote of 396 to 6, with 31 representatives not voting.361
Representative Skeen, a co-sponsor of the House bill, called transplantation
"a totally bipartisan issue that transcends politics, '362 but the impulse to "do
something" followed slightly different channels in the Capitol's two chambers.363
Apart from the Task Force and procurement seed money provisions, both bills
banned organ purchases, directed the HHS Secretary to contract with the private
sector to improve organ matching and sharing, mandated the maintenance of a
master list of transplant patients, and required the HHS Secretary to report
annually "on the scientific and clinical status of organ transplantation. 3 64 On the
whole, however, the Senate bill implied a smaller federal role in transplantation,
a less hierarchical approach to governance of the transplant enterprise, and more
policy involvement by identifiable stakeholders among the general public. 365 The
most obvious difference was the inclusion of an immunosuppression
reimbursement program in the House bill alone. In another sign of fiscal restraint,
the Senate bill capped government assistance to procurement organizations at
$15 million over three years for start up activities, while the House bill
authorized expenditures of up to $40 million over four years for start-up and
expansion financing.
366
Subtle structural variations also operationalized different ideas about who
should be organizing, coordinating, and regulating the organ transfer system. The
House bill, unlike the Senate's, imposed detailed structural and staffing
requirements on procurement agencies as a condition for federal grants,
apparently to promote cooperation among stakeholders and ensure
360. [2 Cong. 98th] Cong. Index (CCH) 34,553 (1984) (summarizing H.R. 5580).
361. 130 CONG. REc. 17,668 (1984).
362. 129 CONG. REC. 27,396 (1983).
363. See 130 CONG. REC. 29,982 (1984) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (urging that "[s]omething
must be done" about transplant availability).
364. Compare id. at 8740-42 (reading S. 2048 into the record) (bill of Sen. Orrin Hatch) with id.
at 17,648-50 (reading H.R. 5580 into the record) (bill of Rep. Albert Gore, Jr.).
365. Not every difference between the House and Senate bills was consistent with this pattern;
some differences suggested that the House bill was the product of a more thorough drafting
process. For example, it provided a larger express safe harbor from the ban on commerce in human
organs, allowing reasonable reimbursement of donor expenses such as lost wages, as well as
"reasonable payments associated with the removal, transportation, implantation, processing,
preservation, quality control, and storage of a human organ." See id. at 17,670 (reading Title II of
H.R. 5580 into the record).
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communication with the general public.367 Similarly, the House bill called for the
appointment of a twenty-two member Task Force to examine questions of
financing and access, consisting of sixteen specialists in organ procurement,
histocompatibility, and transplant medicine; four "people who are not physicians
or scientists and who as a group have expertise in the fields of law, theology,
ethics, health care financing, and the social and behavioral sciences" (a role that
could have been designed for the burgeoning bioethics community); and three
"members of the general public. 368 In contrast, the Senate bill contemplated a
nineteen member Task Force largely comprised of professionals with relevant
expertise and individuals representing various constituencies, such as patient
advocates and insurers. 369 For reasons that were not transparent, the House bill
would decommission the Task Force a full year after it was to report its findings,
but the Senate bill provided only one month until the Task Force would
disband.37° While the House moved slightly away from creating a named
government center to administer organ procurement and allocation policies, the
House bill nonetheless required HHS to "maintain an identifiable administrative
unit" within the Public Health Service to oversee the government's new role in
organ procurement and allocation.371 In contrast, the Senate continued to envision
federal support performing a largely informational function. The Senate bill
described the network as an "Organ Procurement and Transplantation Registry,"
suggesting that its central feature was to maintain and verify information about
prospective donors who were willing to be listed and about potential transplant
recipients.372
When combined with the Registry's obligations to promote donation
awareness and develop a national matching system, these charges gave the
Registry an active role in increasing the availability of organs for transplantation.
Other variations, though, suggested that the Senate's system would not go so far
in imposing centralized external coordination of organ allocation. The Registry
was not required to have representatives of the general public on its board of
directors, as was the House's "United States Transplantation Network." While
the House bill required the network to "coordinate, as appropriate, the
transportation" of donated organs,373 the Senate bill somewhat less directly
required the network to "promote the coordination, as appropriate," of organ
transport.
374
367. Id. at 17,670.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 8740-41.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 17,649.
372. Id. at 8741.
373. Id. at 17,669.
374. Id. at 8741.
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In several respects, the Senate bill reflected a greater degree of neutrality and
openness, while the House bill reflected a greater degree of decisiveness and
demand for execution. Thus, the Senate simply required "private sector"
operation of the network, while the House required that a single, nonprofit
private entity fulfill this role. 375 The House bill alone directed the network to
distribute sera for tissue typing. Similarly, the Senate bill called on the Task
Force to examine a broad array of cultural, technical, logistical, and economic
issues, while the House gave the Task Force a more focused set of charges.
While both bills required the HHS Secretary to publish annual reports on "the
scientific and clinical status of organ transplantation," the House's reporting
requirement was clearly drafted with an eye toward reimbursement. 376 It directed
the Secretary to "make the report and other related information available to"
payors such as health insurance companies and "service benefit plans., 377 In
contrast, the Senate bill did not order the delivery of the report to any specific
person or entity, making the purpose of this reporting requirement opaque.
In both houses, legislative debate was succinct and generally supportive.
Texas Republican Representative Ron Paul, known for his iconoclastic
libertarianism, took a stand against the conventional wisdom by arguing for a
market-based approach to organ allocation, ostensibly speaking "as a
physician. ''378 In the end, the maverick's appeal to professional authority did little
to enhance his argument, which largely drew on economic philosophy, rather
than medical expertise. When confronted with transplant surgeons' active support
for NOTA, Paul responded that "there are physicians who do not understand
economic allocation. 379  More commonly, purported deficiencies and
improvements in the proposed legislation were framed as constructive criticism.
The House bill, which arrived ten weeks after the Senate's despite
Waxman's and Gore's urgent shepherding, emerged after more thorough review
and revision on the public record. The House bill's structure for delivering
outpatient immunosuppressants exposed strains between the aspiration of
bringing transplantation under the control of centralized, national management
and a political system predicated on the representation and accommodation of
states and localities. Perhaps in order to differentiate this program from a general
outpatient drug benefit, the bill as drafted authorized HHS to furnish
immunosuppression through facilities that performed twenty-five or more
transplants per fiscal year. As Republican Representatives from Maine and
Vermont pointed out, transplant centers in those two states, as well as Arkansas,
Hawaii, New Mexico, Vermont, and Puerto Rico, were performing at least fifteen
375. Id.
376. Id. at 8742; id. at 17,670.
377. Id. at 17,670.
378. Id. at 17,663.
379. Id. (responding to Rep. Albert Gore, Jr.).
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transplants per year, but no center in these jurisdictions reached the threshold of
twenty-five. Vermont Representative James Jeffords noted that HHS had adopted
a volume criterion of fifteen transplants per year "as one factor in determining
eligibility" for federal reimbursement of renal transplant surgery.38° Maine
Representative Olympia Snowe explained the foreseeable effect of this
inconsistency on patients from the liminal jurisdictions: "[they would] be forced
to either absorb the very sizable expense of these medications or assume the
added financial and emotional burden of traveling to other centers where the
drugs are available. 38' Maine Representative John McKernan, Jr.'s proposal to
lower the immunosuppression reimbursement threshold to fifteen transplants per
year was approved with Chairman Waxman's endorsement. The influential
California Democratic stated that the criterion was not intended to "impact
disproportionately... rural States that only have a single transplant center. 382
The need to build a broad political coalition was not the same as all-
inclusiveness, as evidenced by the implications of any volume requirement for
incipient transplant programs. Maryland Democrat Representative Parren
Mitchell expressed concern about the bill's impact on "small, progressively
expanding medical transplant centers that are located in predominantly black and
lower income communities., 383 Because African-American patients experienced
a relatively high incidence of post-operative complications and the cost of
medication was especially burdensome for low-income patients, coverage that
left out communities with these demographics would ill serve some of the
patients most in need of affordable immunosuppression. Representative
Mitchell's analysis, however, focused on the policy's implications for hospitals,
especially the District of Columbia's Howard University Medical Center, which
had averaged just over fourteen transplants per year over a ten-year period.3 84 If
the paramount purpose of the immunosuppression program was ensuring
patients' access, Mitchell's arguments were only indirectly apposite.385
Congress did manage to develop strategies for reordering the scattershot
organ procurement arrangements without reigniting apprehensions about the
political, equitable, and health consequences of creating a transplant
establishment or privileging a medical elite. H.R. 5580's eligibility criteria
promoted coordination and consolidation by requiring procurement agencies to
include sufficient geographical territory, a sufficient donor population, and a
380. Id. at 17,651.
381. Id. at 17,651.
382. Id. at 17,651-52.
383. Id. at 17,660.
384. Id.
385. Although numerous high-volume transplant programs were located in economically
struggling urban centers, Howard may have been exceptional in its commitment to serving "high
risk, generally low-income patients." See id.
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sufficient percentage of the medical institutions within their service areas. By
forbidding the HHS Secretary from disbursing grants to procurement
organizations "serv[ing]" the same geographical area, the bill clearly disfavored
redundancy while creating a space for market-like forces to sort out the
institutional map. 86 The Senate bill took a different step toward dividing the
network into (theoretically non-exclusive) catchment areas. By prohibiting
funded procurement organizations from operating in "part" of a metropolitan
area, the bill prepared the way for coordinated metropolitan procurement
programs, but created a risk of leaving entire areas uncovered.387
Another point of agitation was the relationship between Congress's efforts to
organize solid organ transfer and the clinical use of other human tissue. After the
House distanced itself from the disputed strategy of tracking potential organ
donors, but before the vote on H.R. 5580, Waxman successfully introduced an
amendment instituting, on a demonstration basis, the confidential volunteer
registry needed for unrelated bone marrow transplantation.388 Waxman credited
Maryland Democratic Representative Barbara Mikulski, reportedly unable to be
present, as the amendment's "catalyst., 389 This innovation apparently also
reflected the initiative of an able and highly motivated constituent of Mikulski's.
Attorney Bart Fisher, whose seven-year-old son needed a bone marrow transplant
from an unrelated donor, learned of Gore's foray into transplant policy a month
after the boy was diagnosed with aplastic anemia. Fisher, who knew of a marrow
registry in England but found none in America, sought out Mikulski,
accompanied by four of his son's doctors from Johns Hopkins in Baltimore.
Fisher also met with members of Gore and Waxman's staff and, by his
uncontroverted account, played a role in drafting the legislation.390 The House
bill, as passed, provided for the distribution of outpatient immunosuppression
through transplant centers with a greater sensitivity to the circumstances of states
where renal transplantation was being carried out on a small scale. The bill also
directed HHS officials to establish, oversee, monitor, and report on the bone
marrow registry.
Integrating organ procurement and allocation initiatives into the larger
ecology of anatomical gifts had the effect of winnowing down immediate
congressional ambitions as well as augmenting them. Preliminary plans to set
standards for organ and tissue transplantation in the same bill provoked vigorous
resistance from tissue banking organizations, which were wary of government
386. See id. at 17,648 (reading H.R. 5580 into the record).
387. Id. at 8742 (reading S. 2048 into the record).
388. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
389. 130 CONG. REc. 17,650 (1984) (statement of Rep. Henry Waxman).
390. Bart S. Fisher, Letter to the Editor, The National Marrow Donor Program with Emphasis
on the Early Years, 47 TPANSFUSION 1101 (2007).
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intervention in their established industry. After the Lions Club, a public service
organization that promoted corneal transplantation, began a nationwide letter-
writing campaign, Gore narrowed the bill's focus to organ transplantation, the
more pressing concern, and the Club relinquished its objection. 39 This separation
of tissue and solid organ policy raised a disturbing prospect, which Gore
acknowledged. "There would be nothing worse for both organ and tissue
retrieval," he said, "than to have a situation where the family of a potential donor
is approached by a long line of individuals each seeking a different organ or
tissue. 3 92 Different classes of anatomical gifts presented different logistical
issues, but cooperation would be essential to humane procurement. H.R. 5580, as
passed, required qualified organ procurement organizations to make
arrangements with their counterparts in the tissue banking field as appropriate,
but not every member of Congress was convinced that the bill adequately
addressed "the need for coordination and cooperation between these two
efforts. 393 This concern was one manifestation of a larger problem: Although the
process of putting together the House bill evinced and incorporated tremendous
collective knowledge of the issues at hand, the bill itself seemed hastily put
together. The bill's structure pointed to the same conclusion as the "Prohibition
of Organ Puchases" stood distinct from the rest of the bill as Title II. All the
other provisions, intended to solidify and bolster the emerging public-private
organ transfer system, were lumped together as Title 1, and not necessarily in the
most logical order.
394
Movement toward an enanctable consenus began even before the House
passed its bill. The day before the House enacted H.R. 5580, California
Republican Representative William Dannemeyer proposed an amendment that
was tantamount to a substitute bill.395 By reducing the amount of money available
to procurement organizations from $40 million to $15 million over three years
and eliminating the immunosuppression financing program, Dannemeyer's
amendment "would have brought the measure in line with [the] leaner transplant
bill . . .approved April 11 by the Senate., 396 Dannemeyer's substitute adopted
the Senate bill's language, referring to an "organ transplant registry" rather than a
national transplant network, but he argued for the amendment in terms of fiscal
responsibility and program flexibility rather than legislative harmonization-in
the process, providing perhaps the most detailed rationale for the Senate's
391. Bunis, supra note 342.
392. 130 CONG. REc. 17,662 (1984) (statement of Rep. Albert Gore, Jr.).
393. Id. at 17,661 (statement of Rep. Bruce Morrison).
394. Id. at 17,668-70 (reading S. 2048 into the record).
395. Id. at 17,340.
396. Janet Hook, Drug Funds Authorized: House Passes Bill To Improve Organ Transplant
Network, CONG. Q. WKLY., June 23, 1984, at 1491.
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approach.397
The House was evidently not persuaded, and the day the House passed its
Organ Transplant Act, H.R. 5580, Representative Waxman proceeded along a
different path toward reconciliation: emptying the Senate's old bottle and
refilling it with the House's new wine. He moved, without objection, to strike the
entire text of the Senate's Organ Procurement and Transplantation Act, and
replace it with the text of H.R. 5580. Waxman requested a bicameral conference
on the legislation, and the House members appointed to the conference
committee included the major participants in crafting NOTA-not only Waxman
and Gore, but also Mikulski, Walgren, and Dannemeyer.398 Eight days later, on
June 29, 1984, the Senate rejected the House "amendments" and "agree[d] to the
conference." The Senators meeting with future Vice President Gore at the
conference would include future Vice President Dan Quayle, former presidential
candidate Ted Kennedy, and future presidential aspirant Orrin Hatch.399
As summer turned to fall and the end of the legislative session marched
toward its conclusion, "the drug-funding issue held up agreement on the bill."
400
State legislatures, on guard against fledgling commercial adventurism, had
already begun enacting statutes that would exclude such dubious business from
their jurisdictions.40 1 The most innovative of these approaches was probably an
addition to the California Penal Code. In 1984, California's governor signed an
act that partially tracked the language of the Federal House and Senate bills,
declaring "it . . . unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, sell,
promote the transfer of, or otherwise transfer any human organ, for purposes of
transplantation, for valuable consideration. 4 2 In contrast to the proposed federal
legislation, however, the California Act contained a safe harbor disclaiming the
Act's applicability "to the person from whom the organ is removed, . . . the
person who receives the transplant, [and] those persons' next of kin who assisted
in obtaining the organ for purposes of transplantation., 40 3 Legal scholarship has
interpreted the statute consistently with its plain meaning, as "criminalizing
brokering" but not direct sales from the person giving up the organ to the
397. 130 CONG. REC. 17,340 (1984).
398. Id. at 17,668-71.
399. Id. at 20,059.
400. Compromise Organ Transplant Bill Passed, supra note 231, at 476.
401. See Susan Hanklin Denise, Note, Regulating the Sale of Human Organs, 71 VA. L. REV.
1015, 1026-29 (1985).
402. CAL. PENAL CODE § 367f (West 1999). The federal bills, as passed, stated, "[i]t shall be
unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer for valuable
consideration any human organ for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interest
commerce." 130 CONG. REc. 8742 (1984) (Senate bill); Id. at 17,670 (House bill).
403. CAL. PENAL CODE § 367f(e) (West 1999).
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That September, medical events again began to drive the movement toward
federal legislation. "The New England Journal of Medicine reported that
cyclosporine had caused fatal kidney failure in two heart transplant patients,"
reviving attention to ongoing medical assessment of the drug's "relative benefits
and risks" and highlighting the perils of crystallizing public policy in a dynamic
field. The article strengthened the Senate position and "Gore agreed to drop the
drug funding" in a compromise that designated medical and policy questions
surrounding immunosuppression as the envisioned Task Force's "top priority.
' '4 5
The National Organ and Transplant Act reported out of the conference
committee on October 2, 1984, was neatly organized into four Titles. Title I
called on the HHS Secretary to commission a twenty-five member Task Force on
Organ Transplantation within ninety days. The qualifications for the twenty-one
people comprising the Task Force's appointed membership reflected the House's
interest in public participation and humanistic input and the Senate's interest in
payor representation. Additionally, the Surgeon General, the NIH Director, the
FDA Commissioner, and the HCFA Administrator were given ex officio seats on
the Task Force in a move that strengthened its connections to the relevant
agencies. Agency personnel, in turn, were assured reimbursement for assisting
the Task Force, and the HHS Secretary was made director to provide it with
necessary "administrative and support services." Its charges were broad,
including "comprehensive examinations of the medical, legal, ethical, economic,
and social issues presented by human organ procurement and transplantation."4
6
Lingering unresolved issues such as the economic consequences of funding
immunosuppression, reimbursement of transplant surgery, the desirability of
registering prospective organ donors, and the coordination of tissue procurement
were expressly handed to the Task Force for "assessment" and "analysis. ' 407 The
Task Force was charged with formulating recommendations on other matters
such as educating professionals and the general public about organ procurement
and "assuring equitable access by patients," perhaps reflecting consensus on
these matters at a high enough level of abstraction. 40 8 The Task Force would
report on immunosuppression within seven months and produce its general final
report within twelve months, but it would remain commissioned for three months
after the final report, leaving a window for expanding its inquiry.409
Title II amended the Public Health Service Act to authorize "Assistance for
404. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849,1924 n.261 (1987).
405. Compromise Organ Transplant Bill Passed, supra note 231, at 476.
406. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 98-1127, at 1-4 (1984).
407. Id. at 1-2.
408. Id. at 2-3.
409. Id. at 5.
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Organ Procurement Organizations," to create the "Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network" (OPTN) and a "Scientific Registry," and to require a
unit of the Public Health Service to administer such support. The bill authorized a
total of $25 million in grants for organ procurement organizations' start up and
expansion expenses over three years. It employed an abundance of enticements
and pressures to increase the efficiency of procurement activities through
processes of coordination, consolidation, and selection. Organ procurement
organizations were required to coordinate with tissue banks "as may be
appropriate to assure that all useable tissues are obtained from potential donors."
At the same time, HHS would wield a degree of power vis-d.-vis tissue banks
because the bill authorized the Secretary to bring any organs or tissue except eyes
and corneas into the organ procurement financing structure. The grant eligibility
requirements assured that qualifying organ procurement organizations would be
actively involved in professional education, arrangements for tissue typing and
organ transport, and self-evaluation, suggesting a means for implementing
national objectives on a decentralized basis. By requiring these organizations to
include transplant professionals on their board of directors or advisory board, the
bill also offered a way to draw on professional expertise while aligning it with a
410public interest larger than loyalties to individual transplant programs.
NOTA similarly required representation of "procurement organizations,...
transplant centers, voluntary health organizations, and the general public" on the
OPTN's board of directors. Although NOTA did not foreclose the possibility that
the OPTN would maintained through multiple, simultaneous contracts, and it
allowed the OPTN to operate "through regional centers," the conference
committee unequivocally called for OPTN to be operated by a single "private
nonprofit entity which is not in any activity unrelated to organ procurement. 411
The OPTN was to match organs "in accordance with established medical
criteria. 41 2 Beyond this requirement, the language of Title II reflected a few
specific ethical aims, such as tending to the needs of patients "whose immune
system makes it difficult for them to receive organs" by distributing blood sera
samples.41 3 The provision establishing the OPTN was otherwise silent, however,
as to whether the OPTN would properly articulate normative commitments or
implement them in its organ distribution practices.
The Scientific Registry required by the conference committee was a registry
of "patients and procedures" to aid in "ongoing evaluation of the scientific and
clinical status of organ transplantation. 41 4 By thus distinguishing the registry
410. Id.
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from the allocation network, the Act achieved greater consistency with
established data collection practices in the field of clinical transplantation.
NOTA's Title III, prohibiting purchases or paid transfers of human organs
and non-renewable tissues for transplantation, was apparently not a source of
tension between the two chambers. Enacted under Congress's authority to
regulate interstate commerce, the provision was enforceable with fines up to
$50,000 and up to five years imprisonment.41 5 The final language tracked the
House bill, broadly excluding "reasonable payments" for technical and logistical
support and reimbursements for costs incurred by donors from the forbidden
"valuable consideration., 41 6 Although the conference committee report spoke of
"prohibiting the sale... of human organs," the plain language of the ban focused
on buyers and recipients of organs, without explicitly referring to people who
would part with their own organs for money. Congress may have been reluctant
to impose criminal penalties on the latter class, viewing them as potential victims
of organ commerce, who could be suffering ill effects (and could be located
overseas). The move to ban organ purchases likely originated in visceral
reactions against commodification or at least commercialization without adequate
safeguards. The resulting regulatory framework governing anatomical gifts
reflected desires to create a fair and functional organ allocation system by
structuring incentives and disincentives (including exposure to liability)
beneficently.
Title IV of NOTA directed HHS personnel to create the bone marrow
registry if a conference convened by the Secretary found the plan "feasible" and
"likely to be effective." This provision required the Secretary to report back to
specific congressional committees within two years of establishing the registry
on issues such as the need for a permanent bone marrow registry and the
"implementation of. . . informed consent and confidentiality requirements."
4 17
Implicit in this arrangement was an expectation of continued congressional
oversight of anatomical gifts.
On October 3 and 4, just days before the 98th Congress would adjourn on
October 12, the two chambers agreed to the Conference Report.41 8 Fifteen days
later, President Ronald Reagan signed NOTA into law. Once support for
transplantation became identified with the Act, Reagan may have had little
choice. As Hatch had remarked at the opening of the Senate hearings, "[i]f
anyone were to oppose transplants, they would quickly earn the title of 'Scrooge
of the Year."'' 4 19 In 1984, this title might have been inflated to "Scrooge of the
415. Id. at 9.
416. Id.
417. Id. at 10.
418. See id. at 29,475 (recording the House vote); id. at 29,982 (recording the Senate vote).
419. Human Resources Hearing, supra note 185, at 2.
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Presidential Election Year." Despite misgivings about federal intervention, the
President was not an avowed opponent of transplants. Perhaps attempting to put a
small government gloss on the Act, he described it in a signing statement as
legislation that would support and enhance the ongoing work of the private
sector.420 When the Reagan Administration failed to follow through with the
expected budgetary support after the signing, politicians and patients' advocates
kept the hot lights on the Executive Branch.42' In 1986, HHS would finally award
UNOS a $379,200 grant to organize a national Organ Procurement and
Transplant Network (OPTN).422
III. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS
By the time UNOS won the contract to operate the OPTN, subsequent
political developments had given NOTA a gloss of their own. In a values conflict
engendered by scarcity, policymakers' desire to incorporate private enterprise
into the transplant system would collide with a nationalistic moral fervor. The
result-a bureaucratic allocation network maintained by centralized
governmental power-was not precluded by the letter of the law, but nonetheless
might have startled the more conservative of NOTA's framers.
A. The Pittsburgh Controversy and the Crisis of Public Confidence
In a statement to members of Congress in 1983, David Ogden of the Kidney
Foundation expressed his desire to discuss briefly an issue not directly addressed
in the proposed legislation. "The National Kidney Foundation," Ogden asserted,
"believes that.., organs donated by deceased American citizens or their next of
kin are inherently intended by the donor to benefit a fellow American citizen, if a
suitable recipient can be identified by the matching program in effect at the
time." If such a recipient could not be found, Ogden reasoned, donors would not
want usable organs to go to waste, so "transplantation to a foreign national"
would be "entirely appropriate. ',423 The privileges and obligations of citizenship
with respect to transplantation had been a recurring subtext of the NOTA
420. See Statement on Signing the National Organ Transplant Act, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1578, 1579
(Oct. 19, 1984).
421. See, e.g., Backers of Organ Gifts Criticize Reagan Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1987, at C9.
422. U.S. Establishes National Organ Donor Network in Virginia, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1986, at
A24. The only serious threat to UNOS's responsibility for the OPTN came from the RAND
Corporation in 1999 and was short-lived. See Rand Informs Government It Will Not Bid on
Contracts to Administer OPTN, SRTR, TRANSPLANT NEWS, Nov. 30, 1999, available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m0YUG/is 22_9/ai-nl 8609209.
423. Energy and Commerce Hearing, supra note 147, at 361 (statement of David A. Ogden,
M.D., President, National Kidney Foundation).
VIII: 1 (2008)
78
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 8 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol8/iss1/4
E PLURIBUS UNOS
hearings. As a social, ethical, and pragmatic problem, it fit squarely within the
ambit of the Task Force. Now, publicity surrounding foreign nationals' access to
donated organs at American transplant centers would galvanize the movement
toward an organ allocation system that was not only organized according to
revealed public preferences, but also publicly accountable.
In May 1985, the Pittsburgh Press revealed the results of "a three month
investigation," indicating that Pittsburgh doctors "bypassed hospital policy that
set[] transplant priority" in order to expedite foreign patients' operations. "In at
least 27 cases, blood samples from Americans and foreigners were examined and
while suitable cross-matches for the organs were confirmed among the
Americans the kidneys went to foreigners., 424 The chief of surgery at
Presbyterian University Hospital, Dr. Henry Bahnson, explained that the usual
policy could be waived "for 'compassionate' reasons," such as when a patient
was "running short on money to stay in Pittsburgh, or [was] a doctor or the
children of doctors or members of the Saudi royal family.
425
In a series of related articles, the Press combined detailed records of blood
type and cross-match results with human interest stories juxtaposing the
transplant experiences of foreign and American families. A relative of a North
Carolina car accident victim traced the victim's kidneys to Pittsburgh, where they
were "transplanted into" a Saudi national and an Egyptian doctor's son, "both of
whom were told to report to the hospital before the lab work on... three
Americans had been completed." Reportedly, the latter recipient had only been
waiting for twenty-four days "and had not been on dialysis," whereas a suitable
American recipient had been on the waitlist for three years and "was running out
of... sites on her body where doctors [could] connect the dialysis machine. 426
Evidence quickly accumulated that many of the foreign patients obtaining organs
at Pittsburgh were wealthy, powerful, or well-connected, included a princess and
the wife of a royal financial advisor to Saudi Arabia's King Fahd.427 The basic
contentions of the series resonated beyond Pittsburgh, and the Washington Post
similarly found that a high percentage of D.C. area transplants benefited foreign
nationals.42 8 About the same time, news that "some kidneys were being shipped
to Japan for transplants" prompted some California donors to write the words
424. Andrew Schneider & Mary Pat Flaherty, Favoritism Shrouds Presby Transplants,
PITTSBURGH PRESS, May 12, 1985, at Al.
425. Id.
426. Andrew Schneider & Mary Pat Flaherty, Woman Passed Over After 3-Year Wait,
PITTSBURGH PRESS, May 12, 1985, at A10.
427. Saudi Received 2 Kidney Operations After Presby Set Its Transplant Ban, PITTSBURGH
PRESS, June 30, 1985, at Al.
428. Margaret Engel, Foreigners Got High Percentage of Kidney Transplants, WASH. POST,
June 10, 1985, at Cl.
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"resident only" on their driver's licenses. 429
The media also implicitly linked transplants to foreign nationals with the
high representation of African-Americans on the transplant waitlist, perhaps
appealing to a broad societal recognition that the burdens of social inequalities in
America often fell especially heavily on blacks. For example, a Washington Post
article titled "Foreigners Got High Percentage of Kidney Transplants" noted that
"[a]bout 150 D.C. residents, mostly blacks, are waiting for kidneys., 430 Thus,
international patients' access to transplants in urban centers, including the
nation's capital, was perceived as compounding the ongoing challenge of
ensuring equitable access for minority patients in American society. Read
cynically, such reporting implied that representatives of the (predominantly
white) transplant officialdom cared more about foreigners and their money than
about minority citizens of their own country, though the situation was more
complicated than it superficially appeared. Wealthy foreigners made a convenient
scapegoat for a difficult problem, which was tied to African-Americans'
reluctance to sign up as organ donors, the high incidence of kidney disease in the
African-American community, and the political and economic legacies of
racism. 43' The federal government's conscious policy of funding transplants for
ESRD patients through public transplantation, while expecting patients and
insurers to pick up the steady stream of bills for immunosuppressive drugs
further marginalized Americans of limited means.
The Pittsburgh controversy was the direct outgrowth of an allocation logic
embedded in a nationalistic political culture based on local enterprise with a
global orientation. The inclusion of diplomatic considerations among the grounds
for compassionate exceptions to protocol was wholly consistent with a Cold War
belief that providing compassionate care to foreign nationals would build
international confidence in America, but in a challenging geopolitical climate,
diplomatic considerations threatened to swallow the "compassionate" intent of
the policy.432 The Pittsburgh Press eventually discovered that the hospital and
Pittsburgh surgeons materially benefited from accepting foreign transplant
patients, who paid surgical fees four times higher than the average rate charged to
American patients. Additionally, the Saudi royal family had donated $650,000 to
the university for transplant research.433 The ideals underpinning organ
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. See Laura A. Siminoff & Robert Arnold, Increasing Organ Donation in the Africa-
American Community: Altruism in the Face of an Untrustworthy System, 130 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 607 (1999); Nat'l Kidney Disease Educ. Program, Fact Sheet. African Americans & Kidney
Disease (Aug. 2004), http://www.nkdep.nih.gov/news/campaign/african-americans-508.pdf.
432. Schneider & Flaherty, supra note 424 (quoting Thomas Starzl).
433. Andrew Schneider & Mary Pat Flaherty, Foreigners Paid Extra for Kidney Transplants,
PITTSBURGH PRESS, June 30, 1985, at Al.
VIII:I1 (2008)
80
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 8 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol8/iss1/4
E PLURIBUS UNOS
donation-gift giving and reciprocity-now appeared to be warped into improper
kickbacks.
Perks, however, are not necessarily motivations, and reputational
considerations almost certainly influenced the Pittsburgh program's stance
regarding international patients more than the "four-foot, gold-plated ceremonial
sword" 435 that Starzl acknowledged receiving from Saudis. "Presby's position as
an international center creat[ed] pressure to accept foreign transplant candidates,"
not only because transplant expertise was highly concentrated in the United
States, but also "because the presence of foreigners enhance[d] the university's
prestige. 436 Prestige, in turn, could "draw additional patients, research funding
and top-flight medical talent.,
437
Exactly which word in the phrase "Saudi royal" generated more pique was
unclear, but the backlash was swift. Previously majoritarian nationalism and free
enterprise conspired against egalitarianism, but now egalitarianism and
majoritarian nationalism militated against transplant institutions' internationally-
oriented enterprise. Some egalitarian critics emphasized that they objected not to
the presence of foreign patients on American waitlists, but to an allocation
system that favored the wealthy and the well connected. "If people from other
countries need a transplant to live, they should have a chance to get it, but their
chance shouldn't be any greater than those of us also waiting," stated one U.S.
kidney patient. 438 "It's not American organs going to foreign recipients that is
unfair," one reader wrote to the Pittsburgh Press. "It's donated organs going to
the best paying customers, be they foreign or American, that is grossly unjust and
scandalous. 439 Other reports, however, suggested that the allegations of
preferential treatment for international patients inflamed stridently nationalistic
and xenophobic sentiments: an HHS acting director, Dr. Edward Martin, said that
donors "are writing that I didn't sign my donor card to give to a foreign kid. I'm
going to tear up my card. 440 "There are countless stories of people saying count
me out, if you count foreigners in," added Ronald L. Dreffer, the transplant
coordinator at the University of Cincinnati Medical Center. "[I]t's that national
434. For a discussion of how the reciprocity instinct can lead to inappropriate favoritism, see
Tom Susman, Op-Ed, Reciprocity Underlies Lobbying Scandals, HILL, June 28, 2006, available at
http://thehill.com/op-eds/reciprocity-underlies-lobbying-scandals-2006-06-28.html.
435. Siminoff& Arnold, supra note 431.
436. Schneider & Flaherty, supra note 424.
437. Id.
438. Andrew Schneider, Presbyterian To Revise Kidney Transplant Rule, PITTSBURGH PRESS,
May 20, 1985, at Al.
439. Linda Berry, Letter to the Editor, Capitalism Blamed, PITTSBURGH PRESS, May 19, 1985, at
B4.
440. Lindsey Gruson, Some Doctors Move To Bar Transplants to Foreign Patients, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 10, 1985, at Al.
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spirit., 441 In an oft-quoted comment, an immunologist on a federal
transplantation task force remarked, "[i]t's not like we're getting a cross section
of foreign nationals. [The economic skew in the foreign patient pool is] not
especially fair, so I don't see why we have to be. When they start sending over
their shepherds with their bankers, come back and we'll talk., 442 As transplant
surgeon Clive Callendar pointed out, however, such rhetoric about foreign
inequalities conveniently overlooked substantial disparities closer to home.443
Indeed, to the extent that the country's Cold War political leadership sought to
demonstrate America's "generosity" on the stage of world affairs,444 the needed
sacrifice may have been disproportionately extracted from citizens who were less
welloff.
445
Egalitarian principles could cut in another direction, too: Restricting
foreigners' access to American transplant institutions would give American
citizens privileged access to transplant surgery. But the revelations about foreign
patients leaving the United States with Americans' organs tapped into larger
patterns of suspicion, indignation, and resentment. Between the early Cold War
and the Pittsburgh controversy, a series of events-including Japan's juggernaut
economic recovery, America's growing trade deficit, American casualties in
Vietnam, a retaliatory oil embargo by the Organization of Arab Petroleum
Exporting Countries, American deaths in airline hijackings, terrorist bombings of
U.S. embassies in Lebanon and Kuwait, and the hostage crisis in Iran-likely
fostered a sense that American society was under siege by foreign nationals who
would take advantage of Americans' good will. In 1984, Sherry Clifton, whose
fifty-year-old gospel singer husband Hardie Clifton received a Medicaid-financed
441. Id.
442. Mary Pat Flaherty, Organ Network Gives Foreigners Lowest Priority, PITTSBURGH PRESS,
May 23, 1985, at Al.
443. Gayle McCracken, Transplant Rules for Foreign Patients Debated, PITTSBURGH PRESS,
June 18, 1985, at Al.
444. See, e.g., Kennedy, Inaugural Address, supra note 67 (asserting to the world "that we shall
pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to
assure the survival and the success of liberty"). See also Ronald Reagan, Acceptance of the
Republican Nomination for President (July 17, 1980) (casually characterizing "the American
people" as "the most generous on earth"), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/reagan/
filmmore/reference/primary/acceptance.html. For a discussion of this theme in Reagan's rhetoric,
see Chidester, supra note 279 at 179 ("Ronald Reagan... spoke of winning through sacrifice.
America had won and would continue to win in the struggle for freedom (under the rule of law)
only because America's sons and daughters paid the highest price, gave the greatest gift, made the
supreme sacrifice.").
445. For an examination of the class demographics and social experiences of enlisted military
personnel serving in the Vietnam conflict, see CHRISTIAN G. APPY, WORKING CLASS WAR:
AMERICAN COMBAT SOLDIERS AND VIETNAM (1993).
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heart transplant after she called the White House and explained her frustration
with the reimbursement bureaucracy:
I'm an American citizen. I see what's going on in America, how the United
States takes it upon itself to help everybody-all the postwar things we did for
Japan, and the Vietnamese refugees-and I'm calling agency after agency, and
everybody's saying, 'We don't do this,' and I'm saying, 'Where am I? Am I
still in America or off in the twilight zone?'
446
Much as ongoing public financial support for dialysis had given taxpayers a
stake in the NOTA hearings, taxpayer support for organ transplants and
transplant institutions now provided a plausible jurisdictional nexus for the
public's concern about how organs were allocated. The Pittsburgh Press argued
that "patients suffering from severe kidney disease are included in federal
payment programs. Virtually all costs of treatment and replacement surgery are
covered. So the public has a direct financial involvement in transplant decisions
and policies."'447 By August 1985, numerous medical centers had reportedly
instituted quotas limiting the availability of organs to "foreigners. 4 48 Some
activist officials may have anxiously leapt to action on the basis of anecdotal
evidence of public offense, or seized on the prospect of an impending backlash to
bolster the case for nationalistic policies they already personally supported. The
apprehension was that otherwise, members of the public would reduce the overall
supply by refusing to donate.
B. Structural Impact
Today, nonresident aliens' access to cadaver transplants at U.S. hospitals is
effectively governed by UNOS policies. These policies allow non-resident aliens
to obtain up to five percent of donated cadaveric organs at each transplant center
"on equal footing with U.S. residents., 449 Historically nationwide transplants to
non-residents aliens have not reached this quota. However, if it is exceeded for
any type of organ at any given transplant center, UNOS will conduct an
450 tinvestigation. Clearly, the 1985 scandal influenced the policies of UNOS
member institutions and influenced how UNOS communicates with the public to
446. Meyer, supra note 282.
447. Editorial, Transplant Line-Jumping, PITrSBURGH PRESS, May 19, 1985, at B2.
448. Gruson, supra note 440.
449. Katrina A. Bramstedt, Supporting Organ Transplantation in Non-resident Aliens Within
Limits, ETHICS & MED., Summer 2006, at 39.
450. See id. See also Letter from Senate Finance Committee Chairman Charles Grassley to
Elizabeth M. Duke, Administrator of Health Resources and Services Administration (Nov. 29,
2005); Shankar Vendantam, U.S. Citizens Get More Organs Than They Give, WASH. POST, Mar. 3,
2003, at A03.
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maintain confidence in America's organ allocation system. A 2003 USA Today
article, noting that an undocumented immigrant teenager was included on Duke
University's transplant waitlist in contravention of a UNOS rule "requir[ing] that
non-resident organ recipients be in the country legally," highlighted the
divergence between this story and the earlier scandal. "[UNOS] officials have no
plans to reprimand Duke for treating Jesica, 17," reporter Tim Friend noted. "The
network says limits on transplants to non-resident aliens are designed mainly to
ensure that the USA doesn't become a transplant mecca for rich foreigners.
451
The privileged international patient controversy undoubtedly shaped how the
transplant community built public trust, but it likely also had a deeper effect,
shaping the allocation system's very structure-how its rules were made and
enforced-in the years following the passage of NOTA. In April 1986, the
NOTA Task Force on Organ Transplantation released its comprehensive report,
titled Organ Transplantation: Issues and Recommendations. Consistent with
NOTA, the Task Force, convened by HHS Secretary Margaret Heckler and
chaired by Illinois surgeon Olga Jonasson, included medical professionals, social
and behavioral scientists, a legal scholar, an ethicist with a background in
religious studies, representatives of the public and private insurance sectors, and
representatives of the general public.452
The Task Force's report, totaling more than 200 pages, evaluated existing
organ procurement efforts and made recommendations for increasing public
awareness, assuring equitable access to organs, and coordinating the organ
matching process. 453 Some of the Task Force's analysis revisited issues already
raised by Congress, such as the coordination of organ and tissue procurement and
the balance between market forces and government certification. The value of a
second look at the political feasibility of renegotiating these issues was debatable.
In other cases, the Task Force process allowed procurement and allocation
practices to be organized at different levels of government. For example, the
Task Force urged HHS to implement a set of certification guidelines developed
by the Association of Independent Organ Procurement Agencies, including a
requirement that procurement organizations have "a defined exclusive service
area."454 This criterion was subsequently embraced by UNOS, giving it great
organizational power even in the absence of HHS adoption.455
Quite possibly, the recommendation with the greatest impact was the Task
Force's proposal that "transplantation procedures should not be reimbursed under
451. Tim Friend, Duke Didn't Follow the Rules in Jesica's Transplant, USA TODAY, Mar. 4,
2003, at ID.
452. TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 128, at xiii-xv.
453. Id. at xv.
454. Id. at 60, 222.
455. See Blumstein, supra note 10, at 25.
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Medicare, Medicaid,... and other public payers, unless the transplant center
meets payment, organ sharing, reporting, and other guidelines to be established
by the [OPTN] or another agency administratively responsible for the
development of such guidelines. ''456 In the Sixth Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act (SOBRA), enacted in 1986, Congress would go even further, threatening to
cut off all Medicare reimbursements for hospitals that did not comply with
UNOS's rules or obtain a valid waiver.4 7 Transplant centers already had a strong
incentive to comply with the guidelines: They relied on the network for access to
matched organs from outside their immediate geographical areas. After SOBRA,
the cost of noncompliance became so high that the guidelines would effectively
function as binding policies on hospitals that operated transplant programs.
This practically important recommendation was not in the chapter of the
report concerning organ sharing, as one might suppose. Tellingly, the
recommendation was contained in the section of the report called "Non-
Immigrant Aliens." Following the Pittsburgh revelations, the Task Force added
the problem of nationality and access to its agenda and heard testimony on the
issue from various transplant professionals. The hearing did not lead to a
consensus for the allocation policy, 458 nor did a subsequent HHS investigation
result in a uniform binding policy. 459 Nonetheless, the Task Force's final report
spoke to a widely perceived need for control over allocation practices that was
removed from transplant programs' immediate interests. The report detailed how
"evidence that giving non-immigrant aliens priority on a waiting list" threatened
America's "voluntary, cooperative system of organ procurement., 460 It further
noted that money may be "the real reason for assigning priority to non-immigrant
aliens," but in any case, favoritism was unjustified.461 Counterintuitively, the
Task Force, composed largely of transplant professionals, adopted a more
stridently populist line than even elected legislators had articulated before the
Pittsburgh uproar. 462
456. TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 128, at 95.
457. Ian Ayres et al., Unequal Racial Access to Kidney Transplantation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 805,
814 (1993) (citing Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1874 (1986)). For a more detailed account of how
the Task Force operated and how Congress responded to its report, see Laurel R. Siegel, Comment,
Re-engineering the Laws of Organ Transplantation, 49 EMORY L.J. 917, 936 (discussing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320b-8(a)(1)(B)(1994)).
458. Supra note 440.
459. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE ACCESS OF
FOREIGN NATIONALS TO U.S. CADAVER ORGANS (1986).
460. TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 128, at 93.
461. Id.
462. The Pittsburgh Press reported that its articles prompted the Task Force's examination of
the intersection of nationality and access to transplantation, which led to several points of
consensus about patient recruitment and billing. See McCracken, supra note 443.
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Insofar as NOTA itself was ambiguous or multivalent, the Pittsburgh
controversy tipped the law's implementation toward greater direct federal
oversight. The concern that privileged access for international patients would
undermine the entire system was so prominent that elected and appointed
policymakers summoned the power of the public purse to enforce ostensibly
voluntary guidelines developed by a private, non-profit agency.463 This move,
though heavy-handed, fit into a policy vision that had been foreshadowed in the
congressional hearings leading to NOTA. Under this vision, transplant
institutions were not just trustees acting on behalf of individual organ donors (as
the UAGA implied), but were also entrusted by a broad voting and taxpaying
public to impose uniform, accountable rules on all organ transfers.
C. The Refining Scalpel of Litigation
Remaining details of the NOTA system would be worked out in the network,
the Executive Branch, federal and state legislatures, and the courtroom, while
legal scholars would wrestle with the system's perplexities and complications.
HHS regulations and UNOS rules, which were increasingly intertwined, would
govern, coordinate, and regularize the logistics of organ sharing. Moreover, the
close nexus between the federal government and the facilities engaged in
transplantation spurred the nationalization of transplant policy developments.
Thus, as the movement to require health care providers to present the option of
organ donation gathered steam, the principle of "routine inquiry" was fixed in a
new Medicare requirement, as well as model state legislation.46 On occasion,
Congress directly interceded to alter financing policies or other aspects of the
transplant enterprise. The 1986 budget reconciliation legislation, which
strengthened UNOS's hand vis-A-vis individual transplant centers, also
authorized Medicare to reimburse immunosuppressive drugs for a finite period
following transplant surgery.465 Although this about-face may have reflected the
Democratic Party's takeover of the Senate in 1986, it also responded to evidence
of the financial pressures hypothesized during the NOTA debate. Republican
Senator Orrin G. Hatch, who had become an advocate of financing
immunosuppression, and Democratic Senator Edward M. Kennedy "estimated
that . . . 2,000 patients per year [became] medically eligible for transplant
surgery, but [could not] afford the $5,000 to $7,000 annual cost of
Cyclosporine. 466 Proposals by various Senators to finance immunosuppression
463. Id.
464. See Kathleen S. Anderson & Daniel M. Fox, The Impact of Routine Inquiry Laws on Organ
Donation, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1998, at 65.
465. See Major Provisions of the Fiscal 1987 Reconciliation Bill, CONG. Q. WKLY., Nov. 1,
1986, at 2795.
466. Julie Rovner, Administration Draws Criticism: Senate Panel Votes Grants for Post-
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with block grants or according to state determinations of need, which differed
from the national approach favored by the Task Force, demonstrated that the
Task Force was indeed playing an advisory role, with Congress maintaining its
legislative authority.467 In 1988, NOTA was amended to explicitly require that
procurement organizations "have a system to allocate donated organs equitably
among transplant patients according to established medical criteria.
468
Political actors' attempts to control or steer the sharing of organs within the
OPTN-among Organ Procurement Organizations (OPOs) and across state
lines-generated especially tense and expansive controversy. The issue arose
early in the implementation of NOTA, when New Jersey's Health Commissioner
attempted to use the state's Certificate of Need process governing the operation
of health care facilities to consolidate the state's OPOs. In 1987, after two of the
state's three OPOs merged, "the combined organization ... received a Certificate
of Need ... conditioned on its filing an application to become the sole statewide
OPA., 4 69 The remaining OPO was soon absorbed and, after limited opportunity
for public comment, the Commissioner certified the consolidated organization,
dubbed the New Jersey Organ and Tissue Network, to act as an independently
organized "statewide organ retrieval agency for the state. 470 To the Delaware
Valley Transplant Program (DVTP), a Philadelphia-based organized that for
thirteen years had procured organs in eastern Pennsylvania, southern New Jersey,
and Delaware, this state-centric consolidation and coordination represented a
disruption of longstanding relationships among medical institutions in the tri-
471state area.
DVTP brought suit, alleging inter alia that New Jersey was trampling on the
federal government's exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce merely to
ensure that the nationwide process of consolidation would not divide the state
into a northern territory tended by a metropolitan New York procurement agency,
and a southern territory served by a metropolitan Philadelphia procurement
agency.472 New Jersey justifyied its policy toward in-state OPOs in terms of
efficiency, but eventually acknowledged that DVTP was free to continue its
activities in the state, and the New Jersey Network's claims of unfair competition
transplant Drugs, CONG. Q. WKLY., June 28, 1986, at 1482.
467. Id.
468. 42 U.S.C. § 273(b)(3)(E) (2000) (emphasis added).
469. Del. Valley Transplant Program v. Coye (Delaware Valley I1), 722 F. Supp. 1188, 1190
(D.N.J. 1989). In litigation spanning two years, the court first granted DVTP's petition for a
Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the Commissioner's decision, Del. Valley Transplant
Program v. Coye (Delaware Valley 1) 678 F. Supp. 479 (D.N.J. 1988), and subsequently granted
partial summary judgment in favor of DVTP, Delaware Valley II, 722 F.Supp. at 1188.
470. Id. at 1190.
471. Delaware Valley I, 678 F. Supp. at 480.
472. Delaware Valley II, 722 F. Supp. at 1191; Delaware Valley I, 678 F. Supp. at 481.
87
Gross: E Pluribus UNOS
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2008
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
and tortuous interference by DVTP were dismissed.473
The reorganization at issue in the Delaware Valley litigation, though
apparently driven by the state's health department, was carried out in the context
of a NOTA-like process. In 1986, the New Jersey Health Commissioner
organized a state Task Force "to assure that retrieved organs are distributed fairly
and efficiently, so [as] to avoid the public perception that organ donating unfairly
benefits those outside the community. ' 474 Although many of the points of
contention in the Delaware Valley litigation had also arisen-and would continue
to arise-on a national scale, the pronounced federalism analysis may have had
the immediate effect of strengthening NOTA's conception of transplant policy as
a national prerogative.
Changes in the structure and technology of organ allocation prompted
questions of territoriality, like the NOTA debate itself During the Delaware
Valley litigation, southern New Jersey's only certified transplant program was
limited to kidney transplants, whereas Philadelphia institutions were performing
single- and multi-organ transplants involving the liver, heart, lungs, and
pancreas.475 By the late 1980s, numerous surgeons trained at the University of
Pittsburgh Medical Center were establishing "liver transplant programs in areas
of the country that previously did not have them., 476 Dissemination of surgical
expertise meant that livers that would have been "exported . . . to major
transplant centers were now kept for local use. 4 7 7 With financing issues now
largely off the table, a new tension developed between transplant centers with
established national reputations and those that primarily served local
communities with shorter wait times. The centers-of-excellence question was
effectively being decided by individual patients who were mobile and resourceful
enough to get listed outside their local region and vote with their feet.
At the same time, improvements in liver preservation technology allowed
the organs to be shipped over longer distances, leaving professionals affiliated
with major centers acutely aware that the substantial disparities in liver wait
times were a social artifact, rather than a clinical necessity.478 Since UNOS data
showed that higher-volume transplant facilities obtained lower mortality rates,
arguments for greater organ sharing rested on expected clinical outcomes, as well
473. Delaware Valley 11, 722 F. Supp. at 1200 & n.15; Id. at 1203.
474. Delaware Valley I, 678 F. Supp. at 480.
475. Id. at 480-81.
476. David L. Wiemar, Public and Private Regulation of Organ Transplantation: Liver
Allocation and the Final Rule, 32 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 9, 23 (2007).
477. Id.
478. See id. See also Rosamond Rhodes, Justice in Organ Allocation, in A DEATH RETOLD,
supra note 20, at 158, 168-69.
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as equity among patients. 479 Rationales for localism included the therapeutic (the
importance of local transplant centers in providing postoperative care), the
equitable (ensuring access to patients too sick to travel far) and the pragmatic
(procurement efforts were likely to be more than perfunctory if local patients
depended on them).480 UNOS and HHS began tinkering with the liver allocation
criteria, seeking to gradually increase inter-regional sharing. During the Bill
Clinton Administration, these plans ignited latent conflicts of interest between
small and large centers, between patients with chronic and acute conditions,
between states with high and low procurement rates, and between enthusiasts of
private regulation and advocates of government rulemaking.48s
Facing prospects of prolonged litigation and congressional arbitration of the
showdown,482 UNOS and HHS hammered out a set of compromises that
emphasized reciprocity and enhanced the network's ability to prevent gaming of
the system, which depended on trust in anonymous procedures.48 3 The conflict
between UNOS, which formed policy positions on the basis of one vote per
transplant center,484 and authorities structured along other lines pressured UNOS
to more clearly articulate the OPTN's domain of expertise. 48' At times, appeals to
authorities outside the OPTN, including an Institute of Medicine panel that did
not include any "active liver transplants surgeons, 486 gave the entire strategy of
delegation a confoundingly iterative twist. Nonetheless, the basic questions
raised in the liver sharing debate were ultimately negotiated by OPTN
stakeholders in a manner consistent with NOTA's commitments to equity and
efficacy.
In contrast, persons whose contacts with the OPTN are more sporadic have
found the courts to be an accessible forum to adjudicate the interaction between
NOTA and external sources of authority, producing a steady trickle of OPTN-
related litigation. However, direct legal challenges to NOTA and the system it
created have thus far been rare and generally ineffectual. In Calon v. Apfel, a
1999 case in the Tenth Circuit, a pro se plaintiff asked for protection from state
479. Wiemar, supra note 476, at 23-24.
480. See id. at 24.
481. Seeid.
482. See Dulcinea A. Grantham, Transforming Transplantation: The Effect of the Health and
Human Services Final Rule on the Organ Allocation System, 35 U.S.F. L. REv. 751, 759-65 (2001);
Wiemar, supra note 476, at 32-36.
483. See Neal R. Barshes et al., Justice, Administrative Law, and the Transplant Clinician: The
Ethical and Legislative Basis of a National Policy on Donor Liver Allocation, 23 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 200, 224-25 (2007); Wiemar, supra note 476, at 37-41.
484. See Rhodes, supra note 478, at 169.
485. Wiemar, supra note 476, at 44.
486. Id. at 34.
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or federal interference with his contemplated assisted suicide.487 By this time, the
U.S. Supreme Court had already held in Vacco v. Quil 488 and Washington v.
Glucksberg489 that state prohibitions on assisted suicide did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause or the substantive liberty
protected by its Due Process Clause, so the Tenth Circuit summarily dismissed
almost all of the plaintiff's claims. On appeal, the plaintiff "[f]or the first time"
also challenged NOTA, alleging that the Act's prohibition on organ purchases
"prevent[ed] him from selling his organs to pay for his euthanasia., 490 The court
did not respond to this claim except to note that it "generally will not address
issues raised for the first time on appeal."49'
Thus, the Calon plaintiff directly contested the ban on organ sales, but his
claim-dismissed as untimely-is best understood as an applied challenge, rather
than a facial challenge to the Act. The gravamen of his complaint was that the
prohibition impermissibly interfered with his right to kill himself. Somewhat
differently, some scholarly literature argues against the ban on selling one's own
organs on the ground that it violates a constitutional right of bodily autonomy,
reflected in the Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence concerning abortion
and heroic measures at the end-of-life.492 Clearly, the Court does not currently
recognize a general right to bodily autonomy. One need merely consider the
assisted suicide cases or restrictions on the use of prescription and illicit drugs. In
Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, suggested that moral
repugnance alone may be inadequate to trump the liberty interest contained in the
Due Process Clause.493 However, repugnance about commodifying the body is
not the only factor rationale for banning organ sales. Protecting would-be organ
sellers against the physical risk of bodily harm or death during surgery, for
example, could be asserted as a state interest. While this concern was not
explicitly mentioned in the congressional debate over NOTA, it has been
prominent in public and scholarly discussion of organ procurement since the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1968.494
Another case, Wheat v. Mass, arising in the Fifth Circuit, might be regarded
as a challenge to the UNOS system on antitrust grounds.495 The decedent in
Wheat was placed on the liver transplant waitlist after the Louisiana state
487. Calon v. Apfel, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 7955, at *2-3, *5 (10th Cir. Apr. 26, 1999).
488. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
489. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
490. Calon 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS at *9-10.
491. Id. at *10.
492. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, My Body, My Property, HASTINGS CENTER REP., OCt. 1986, at
28.
493. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
494. See Sanders & Dukeminier, supra note 109, at 388-390.
495. Wheat v. Mass, 994 F.2d 273, 275 (5th Cir. 1993).
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government confirmed that it might pay for the transplant. However, the woman
died before such transplant could be arranged.496 Her surviving family members
alleged that two medical institutions and various doctors had discriminated
against their deceased relative "on the basis of age, sex, and poverty." In addition
to these claims, which the circuit court rejected for lack of evidentiary support,
the relatives reportedly "argue[d] that they [were] entitled to show that IJNOS
and its members such as Ochsner [Hospital] maintain a monopoly on organ
transplants and create market harm by restricting the availability of such services
and charging prohibitively high prices in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act., 4 97 The court called these claims "frivolous," noting:
Appellants have failed to state a claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act because
they have failed to allege any effect on interstate commerce, and have failed to
show Ochsner's requisite market power or intent to monopolize the market.
Appellants have also failed to state a claim under § 2 of the Sherman Act
because they have not shown an agreement between two or more economic
entities, a specific intent to monopolize, or any overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy.
Importantly, although the circuit court's account of the antitrust claim
mentioned UNOS as well as Ochsner Hospital, UNOS, unlike the hospital, was
never named as a defendant in the suit. Presumably for this reason, scholarly
articles discussing Wheat (including the antitrust claim) have invariably
described it as a case about a hospital, rather than about the entire UNOS
network. 499 Nonetheless, should a judge find that the network's member hospitals
violate the Sherman Act by following its uniform rules, the network as it
presently functions would effectively be dismantled.
In contrast, scholarly articles questioning whether UNOS could survive
antitrust scrutiny have largely focused on the network itself, rather than on
specific member institutions. This focus makes sense under the Sherman Act
criteria enumerated by the Wheat court. While it questionable whether any
individual hospital or organ procurement organization has the market power to
dominate a large geographical region, anticompetitive behavior can also consist
of an agreement between two or more entities-as in network policies. The
antitrust scholarship suggests that liability for illegal'restraint of trade could
496. Id.
497. Id. at 277.
498. Id.
499. See, e.g., Charles K. Hawley, Antitrust Problems and Solutions To Meet the Demand for
Transplantable Organs, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 1101; Benjamin Mintz, Analyzing the OPTN under
the State Action Doctrine-Can UNOS's Organ Allocation Criteria Survive Strict Scrutiny?, 28
COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 339, 367 n.145 (1995).
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theoretically arise from either "horizontal" collaboration among the network's
member institutions or "vertical" collaboration between member institutions and
UNOS.5 °° In practice, UNOS member institutions do not make horizontal
agreements with each other to restrain trade, but vertical market restraints have
been documented. Specifically-and controversially-UNOS developed
membership rules that would ensure territorial exclusivity among its constituent
regional organ procurement organizations, and UNOS policies favored the
expansion of services at "established transplant program[s]" over similar
expansion of new or small-scale programsi 0 As a "private standard-setting
organization," UNOS would be subject to especially rigorous scrutiny because it
actively enforces its rules rather than merely issuing guidelines regarding how
member institutions should share organs with other network members. °2
Vertically-enforced rules or regulations will ordinarily escape antitrust liability if
they tend to "regulate[]" or "promote[] competition," rather than "suppress[ing]
or destroy[ing]" it. 50 3
This is a high hurdle for UNOS, given the all-embracing nature of its rules,
but it might be overcome by the argument that strict regulation across transplant
institutions is necessary to maintain public confidence in organ donation. While
member institutions do not directly compete against each other by bidding for
organs, they can compete for recipient patients-for example, by advertising
their surgical success rates. Moreover, in the context of health care delivery,
courts have tended to interpret the competitiveness criterion flexibly, with an eye
toward efficiency and clinical outcomes.50 4 Conceivably, the limited mode of
structured competition allowed by UNOS optimizes the delivery of transplant
medicine within the bounds of the OPTN's public service ethos.
Similarly, because under NOTA a single contractor (UNOS) is given
managerial control over the OPTN, UNOS could potentially run afoul of antitrust
law's "essential facilities" doctrine. Under this doctrine, if a single entity controls
a unique resource (such as all the railroad terminals in a major city-or perhaps
donated organs), it may have a legal obligation not to "exclude or disadvantage
customers arbitrarily or invidiously. 50 5 The primary concern raised from this
standpoint is that UNOS only shares information and organs among transplant
500. See Hawley, supra note 499, at 1115-18.
501. Blumstein, supra note 10, at 26.
502. See Hawley, supra note 499, at 1112-13.
503. Bd. of Trade ofChi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
504. See, e.g., Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 821 (3d Cir. 1984) ("[W]ithin the scope of a
hospital's 'public service' function ... rule of reason analysis ... would control .... [Ilt seems
obvious that by restricting staff privileges to doctors who have achieved a predetermined level of
medical competence, a hospital will enhance its reputation and the quality of the medical care that
it delivers. Thus such action is pro-competitive, and therefore, permissible ... .
505. Hawley, supra note 499, at 1118-19.
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centers that belong to the network (and subscribe to its rules).5°6 Under existing
law, UNOS could likely justify this policy on practicability grounds-allowing
transplant centers to participate in the network without any means for ensuring
that they comply with the network's organ allocation policies would undermine a
major purpose of the network, more efficient organ sharing. As a practical
matter, it is unclear who would file suit, as hospitals are unlikely to establish
transplant centers outside the network because they would be ineligible for
Medicare reimbursement. Individual patients do not directly transact with UNOS
(which is largely a standards-setting and rule-enforcing body), so they are not
potential "customers" of the network in the ordinary sense of the word.
A case can be made, however, that none of these doctrinal tests apply to
UNOS because Congress implicitly exempted the contract from antitrust
legislation when it enacted legislation governing the OPTN. As a critic of the
monopolistic aspect of the OPTN, Charles Hawley, acknowledged, "by setting up
a pervasive legislative scheme such as the NOTA, Congress arguably agrees that
'competition is [sic] an inadequate means of vindicating the public interest.' 50 7
For this reason, scholarly assessments of the Sherman Antitrust Act's
applicability to the OPTN have queried just how tightly NOTA limited UNOS's
choices regarding how to organize the network.50 8 The history of the OPTN
suggests that this attention to NOTA reflects a sort of tunnel vision in which
federal transplant policy is reduced to the 1984 Act. The stronger argument for an
implicit antitrust exemption may derive from the 1986 Medicare amendments,
which required transplant institutions to participate in the OPTN as a condition of
reimbursement. Before the amendments, NOTA contemplated that a single
contractor would operate a national "Organ Procurement and Transplant
Network," but the legislation was silent as to whether the contractor would allow
transplant centers to set their own policies (e.g., regarding who gets priority on
internal waitlists) while taking advantage of UNOS's services, such as
computerized organ matching. In contrast, the Medicare amendments, by
effectively requiring transplant centers to abide by UNOS rules, clearly
envisioned that the contractor would exercise monopolistic power over organ
allocation. If UNOS were subject to antitrust law, this requirement would be
virtually meaningless, because the very UNOS rules that Congress sought to
make binding in 1986 would be judicially invalidated as illegal restraints on
trade.
In addition to substantive due process and antitrust questions, NOTA and the
506. Seeid. at 1113-15.
507. Id. (quoting United States v. AT&T, 461 F. Supp. 1314, 1323 (D.D.C. 1978) (citing
numerous other cases)). AT&T actually reads "competition to be an inadequate means." AT&T,
461 F. Supp. at 1323.
508. See Hawley, supra note 499, at 1112-14. See also Blumstein, supra note 10.
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1986 amendments raised questions about the extent to which policy decisions
enforced by federal power could be delegated to a private, independent agency.
The underlying concern was not delegation per se, but rather the perception that
UNOS was free to make policy behind closed doors, without giving the public
notice and an opportunity to comment on proposed rules, as is required of federal
agencies under the Administrative Procedure Act.50 9 To preempt this objection,
Congress in 1988 passed an "Organ Transplant Amendments Act" clarifying that
the OPTN's policies would not be considered legally binding unless the HHS had
subjected them to the formal notice-and-comment process. 510 Despite this
development, transplant centers still operate under substantial pressure to comply
with UNOS policies that have not gone through the notice-and-comment process.
For example, violating the UNOS guideline stipulating that no more than five
percent of a transplant center's kidney transplants should be to nonresident aliens
will "trigger[] an audit of all activities pertaining to transplantation of non-
resident aliens." If a center repeatedly exceeds the guideline "without
justification or explanation, the matter will be referred to the Membership and
Professional Standards Committee. ' 1 ' Presumably, hospitals will try to avoid
such investigations of their admission policies and allocation practices, because
they run the risk of being expelled from the network, thereby losing federal
funding, if improprieties are discovered in the course of the investigation. Indeed,
a UNOS investigation itself may be a source of negative publicity in the local
media.512
The increased involvement of HHS in UNOS policymaking increases the
likelihood that UNOS would be regarded as a state actor for the purposes of anti-
discrimination law, namely the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause. One basis for finding state action-if the entity is engaged is an activity
traditionally reserved for the state-has questionable applicability to the OPTN
because transplantation, and hence organ allocation, is such a recent innovation.
A second basis-a "sufficiently" tight nexus between the action and the state-
would likely apply to UNOS's activities. While simply operating as a
government-sanctioned monopoly does not necessarily make a private entity a
509. 5 U.S.C. § 551 etseq. (2000).
510. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ORGAN TRANSPLANTS: INCREASED EFFORT NEEDED To
BOOST SUPPLY AND ENSURE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF ORGANS 30 (1993) (referring to Title IV
of the Health Omnibus Programs Extension of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-607). In at least one case, a
UNOS performance standard, considered as a matter of administrative law, was invalidated as
"arbitrary and capricious." Ark. Reg'l Organ Recovery Agency, Inc. v. Shalala, 104 F. Supp. 2d
1084 (E.D. Ark. 2000)).
511. United Network for Organ Sharing, OPTN Evaluation Plan, http://www.optn.org/content
cocuments/evalplanVII_6.0.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2007).
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state actor, specific criteria for finding a "sufficient nexus" include the degree of
public financing, the extent to which the private action is influenced by
regulatory inducements, and whether the state and the private entity function as
"interdepeden[t] ... joint participant[s]" in the activity. UNOS and HHS are
tightly intertwined through financial links, agency oversight of UNOS's
rulemaking process, and an annual reporting requirement. Finally, specific
actions taken by UNOS could be deemed state action if they are compelled by the
government.513
While the appellate court in Wheat found that a UNOS member hospital was
not a state actor, "[n]o court has considered the question of whether the OPTN is
a state actor., 51 4 UNOS deserves some of the credit for this situation. The state
actor question would be important if UNOS were accused of illicit discrimination
in allocating organs because the Equal Protection Clause is limited in its
applicability to state action and the OPTN falls outside other anti-discrimination
laws. 515 In practice, UNOS, which now includes a "Minority Affairs Committee"
as part of its internal governance structure, has been responsive to concerns that
its allocation criteria may have a disparate impact on people of color, and it
seems highly unlikely that the organization would engage in the sort of invidious
intentional discrimination-whether on the basis of race, disability, age, or some
other classification-that is prohibited under current equal protection
jurisprudence.51 6
Although courts have not had to confront the state actor problem with
respect to UNOS, it is academically interesting because it plays on an ambiguity
that has persisted since NOTA's enactment: how to characterize the mix of
"private" and "governmental" features constituting the OPTN. Another
ambiguity of the OPTN-to what extent its member institutions engage in
interstate activity by participating in the network, and to what extent they remain
discrete local actors-does have implications in the courtroom. Due process
requires that a court have personal jurisdiction over the defendant; in modem
American civil procedure, an out-of-state defendant must have had "minimum
contacts" with the state "such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' 517 Thus, in suits brought
513. See Mintz, supra note 499.
514. Id. at 367 n.145.
515. Title VI of the Civil Right Act of 1964 covers federally subsidized programs, but
government contractors are not included in this category, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 applies to actions
taken under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. 1983 (2000).
516. See Ayres et al., supra note 457; Press Release, United Network for Organ Sharing,
OPTN/UNOS Continues to Improve Accuracy in Donor/Recipient Matching (Feb. 6, 2004),
http://www.unos.org/news/newsDetail.asp?id=308.
517. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.
457, 463 (1940)).
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against UNOS members outside their home state, courts have assessed whether
the defendant's participation in the network constituted sufficient contact with
the forum to create personal jurisdiction. These inquiries tend to be highly fact-
specific and difficult to generalize. In a breach of contract suit by a Pennsylvania
energy consulting firm against a New Jersey medical center, a Pennsylvania court
found insufficient contact between the medical center and Pennsylvania, despite
the center's participation in UNOS. Even though the center was part of a three-
state regional organ sharing arrangement encompassing New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and West Virginia, the court noted that within the UNOS system,
the medical center "decides neither the origin of the organs they receive nor the
destination of the organs they donate."
' 18
Whereas the lack of discretion accorded to UNOS members under network
rules seemed to count against a finding of sufficient contact in the New Jersey-
Pennsylvania case, in other cases the predictable dynamics of organ sharing
within a UNOS region have counted in favor of finding sufficient contact. "Due
to the nature of [the] organ sharing network and the inherent necessity for
regulated serological testing established by UNOS, [an Alabama trial] court
[found] ... sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Alabama to support in
personam jurisdiction over . . ." an out-of-state laboratory accused of failing to
detect a hepatitis-infected kidney that was sent to Alabama for transplantation.519
An appellate court subsequently overturned this ruling, rejecting the trial court's
argument that human kidneys were inherently dangerous, lessening the
"showing" necessary to find sufficient contact.520 In another case, however, a
federal district court found that an organ procurement organization that sent
approximately one kidney per year to North Carolina had sufficient contact with
the state to establish personal jurisdiction where this activity was
"methodical., 521 The procurement organization "contend[ed] that its involvement
with North Carolina was simply a matter of chance. Because there was a six-
antigen match, it had no choice but to comply with UNOS's distribution
requirements and had no control whatsoever where the kidney was to be sent."
The federal court countered that the procurement organization had assumed this
chance by maintaining membership in UNOS and participating in its electronic
database over an extended period of time.522
Organ allocation is fraught with ethical, psychological, and medical
concerns. Given the short timeframe before organs deteriorate outside the body,
518. UtiliTech, Inc. v. Somerset Med. Ctr., No. 06-1232, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40126, at
*10 (E.D. Penn., June 15, 2006).
519. Exparte Hosp. Espanol de Auxilio Mutuo de P.R., Inc., 945 So. 2d 437, 441 (Ala. 2006).
520. Id. at 445.
521. Slaughter v. Life Connection of Ohio, 907 F. Supp. 929 (N.D.N.C. 1995).
522. Id. at 933.
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the number of actors involved in organ transfer, competing notions of distributive
justice, and the risk of infection to transplant recipients, the OPTN was all but
certain to be implicated in litigation. The relative paucity of cases naming UNOS
as a defendant suggests that the contractor is by-and-large fulfilling its expected
role within the NOTA system. Amid a persistent scarcity of transplantable
organs, however, members of the transplant community and outside critics are
increasingly questioning the premises of that system. Paradoxically, one of the
main factors that provided the impetus for NOTA-the need for more
transplantable organs-gave ammunition to the Act's critics following its
passage.
IV. CONCLUSION
A. Recent Policy Developments
The demand for transplant surgery can be measured in a number of ways,
but it is clearly growing. In 1996, about 18,000 people were waiting for a kidney
transplant and roughly 8000 were waiting for a liver transplant. These two organs
had the largest waitlists and the longest wait times. In 2006, the kidney waitlist
had increased to more than 29,000 people, and roughly 11,000 were waiting for a
liver. For kidneys (where transplant candidates can survive on dialysis for an
extended period of time), median time to transplant varied from year to year, but
the general trend was upward.523 Explanations for such statistics are multifold,
and the trend is likely to continue. In 1985, 2.7% of the American population had
been diagnosed with diabetes, a leading cause of kidney failure; by 2005, the
national diabetes diagnosis rate had increased to 5.5%. 524 Factors contributing to
this increase include increased obesity, the aging of the population, and changing
ethnic demographics.52 5 Certain social changes, such as the "graying" of the
population and fewer undiagnosed ailments, probably increase the number of
people placed on the waitlist for virtually every organ. Additionally, as kidney
transplantation in particular has become a routine procedure, patients are being
listed as transplant candidates who in the past would have been given less
523. U.S. ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANT NETWORK & SCIENTIFIC REGISTRY OF
TRANSPLANT RECIPIENTS, 2006 OPTN/SRTR ANNUAL REPORT: TRANSPLANT DATA 1996-2005
(2006), available at http://www.optn.org/AR2006/default.htm (follow the "Select Download
Option" hyperlink).
524. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Dep't of Health & Human Servs, Detailed Data for
Prevention of Diabetes, http://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/statistics/prev/national/tprevage.htm (last
visited Nov. 30, 2007).
525. See Karmeen D. Kulkarni, Food, Culture, and Diabetes in the United States, 22 CLINICAL
DIABETES 190 (2004).
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aggressive treatment.526
To say that the supply of organs is not keeping up with this increased
demand would be an understatement. Between 1986 and 1996, the "potential
[cadaveric] donor pool" and the number of "ideal" donors (aged sixteen to
twenty) decreased-not just relative to the donee population, but also in absolute
terms. Medical literature has attributed this decrease, to "improved safety
measures such as helmet laws, air bags, and more stringent drunk-driving laws,"
as well as greater detection of infectious diseases such as HIV and hepatitis C in
potential organ donors.527
Given the inadequacy of the supply of cadaveric organs, transplant surgeons
and patients are increasingly turning to living donors. Although some of the
earliest solid organ transplants involved close relatives going under the knife to
donate a "spare" kidney, the medical profession has historically been reluctant to
use living donors. Removing an organ from a healthy donor can arguably be
reconciled with the Hippocratic duty to "do no harm," because the donor may
derive psychological benefits from seeing the recipient survive in improved
health. However, when volunteer donors present themselves, transplant
professionals recognize that these individuals may feel coerced to donate by
family pressures or by dire financial circumstances (since there may be an illicit
payment). Potential living donors must undergo psychological screening, but
given the desperate need for organs and changing cultural norms, one critic of
living donation has suggested that the traditional anxieties it provoked among
transplant professionals seem to be attenuating.52 8 A particularly disturbing trend
involves American residents traveling overseas to obtain organ transplants from
dubious sources (including countries with poor human rights records) and then
returning to the United States for follow-up care.529 Such "back alley"
transplantation not only threatens the health of the organ providers, but also puts
recipients' health at risk.
Meanwhile, greater donor awareness (specifically, awareness of
individually-directed living donations and familiarity with individuals on the
transplant waitlist) may be heightening expectations of donor control over
cadaveric organs. In a case heard by the Second Circuit in 2005, Robert Colavito
sued Good Samaritan Hospital Medical Center and the New York Organ Donor
526. See Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Consuming Differences: Post-human Ethics, Global
(In)Justice, and the Transplant Trade in Organs, in A DEATH RETOLD, supra note 20, at 205.
527. R.J. Taylor & J.S. Engelsgjerd, Contemporary Criteria for Cadaveric Organ Donation in
Renal Transplantation: The Need for Better Selection Parameters, 14 WORLD J. UROLOGY 225,
225-29 (1996).
528. Scheper-Hughes, supra note 526, at 209.
529. Id. See also Thomas Diflo, The Transplant Surgeon's Perspective on the Bungled
Transplant, in A DEATH RETOLD, supra note 20, at 70, 77.
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Network (NYODN) over the "misdeliver[y]" of a kidney intended for him. 530
After Colavito's friend Peter Lucia died, Lucia's widow testified that she had
directed the regional network to give both of Lucia's kidneys to Colavito if
necessary to restore the friend's renal function. She also signed a form stating
that "[i]f it is not feasible for medical or logistical reasons for the donated organs
... to be used by the person to whom I direct it, the NYODN may allocate the
organs... as if I had not made a directed donation. 531 While Colavito was being
prepared for surgery in Miami, the transplant surgeon there discovery that the
kidney he had received was damaged. When the surgeon called NYODN to track
down Lucia's other kidney, he was apparently led to believe that it had been
allocated to another patient-who underwent the actual transplant days later.532
In a further wrinkle, histocompatibility tests, which can be performed even
as the patient is being prepped for surgery, purportedly indicated that the kidneys
were a devastating mismatch for Colavito's antigen makeup-a position clearly
stated in the affidavit of Dr. Robert Gaston, who had previously drawn critical
attention to the ethnic implications of antigen matching. 33 The circuit court, in
the words of Judge Sack, found it "difficult to ignore the fact that by diverting a
kidney that was in all likelihood of no use to [the plaintiff], another life was
apparently spared., 534 The court found that the NYODN official on the other end
of the line lacked the requisite knowledge about the whereabouts of the other
kidney to sustain a fraud charge.53 5 The case also presented novel questions of
state law; a New York state appellate court denied any basis for granting
Colavito relief on either a conversion theory (denying a property right to "an
incompatible kidney") or a negligence theory under the state's anatomical gift act
(because the plaintiff could not actually "benefit from either kidney").53 6 While
the case's unusual facts left the rights of donors and donees unsettled, the
interplay between UAGA's expectation of fiduciary responsibility and NOTA's
assumptions about the public good remains as a zone of friction.
Since the inception of NOTA, with its ban on organ sales, assorted critics
have advocated amending or overruling the law. For example, in 1989, Prof.
Henry Hansmann suggested the ethical concerns raised by transplantation did not
neatly reduce to side effects of organ sales. Weighing the moral hazards
associated with different policies (such as the health risks associated with living
donation, which is to some extent a substitute for cadaveric organ procurement),
530. Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 221 (2d Cir. 2006).
531. Id. at 217.
532. Id. at 218.
533. Id. at 219-20.
534. Id. at 223 n.11.
535. Id. at 222.
536. Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 860 N.E. 2d 713, 722 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2006).
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Hansmann advocated allowing a futures market for cadaveric organs.537 Public
interest in alternatives to NOTA has increased. According to one sociologist,
"media evidence shows that discussion of cash incentives for organs has
consistently increased since the late 1980s.,, 538 Further, more recent media
coverage has contained more "policy-oriented discussions of financial incentives
as a potential solution to the organ shortage, rather than news stories about organ
sales"-a remarkable statement given widespread fascination with the "human"
aspects of transplantation, as opposed to policy details.539 Another proposal that
does not rely on financial incentives, namely "presumed consent" for cadaveric
organ donation, has also received substantial attention, though the total number
of potential cadaveric organ donors is now estimated to be fewer than the number
of people receiving transplants annually and far fewer than the number on the
waitlist.5 40 Concerns about this approach range from the practical (political
backlash) to the constitutional (Takings Clause implications).541
American libertarian intellectuals took a renewed, personal interest in
transplant policy after medical writer Sally Satel, a resident scholar at the
American Enterprise Institute, obtained a needed kidney from libertarian
journalist Virginia Postrel in 2006, exposing both commentators to the
frustrations of a highly-regulated allocation system.542 In a noteworthy recent
challenge to NOTA, constitutional scholar Eugene Volokh posited a right to
537. Hansmann, supra note 266.
538. Kieran Healy, Sacred Markets and Secular Ritual in the Organ Transplant Industry, in
THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE ECONOMY 322 (Frank Dobbin ed., 2004).
539. Id. at 323. This statement should be read with a healthy measure of caution. For reasons
that are unclear, Healey apparently excluded "horror stories ... concerned with foreign reports of
organ sales" from a key graph, and it is not clear whether he likewise ignored them in his
discussion in the text of the article. Id. at 322 & fig. 12.3.
540. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Government
Reform and Oversight, 105th Cong. (Apr. 8, 1998) (statement of Claude Earl Fox, M.D., Acting
Administrator, Health Resources and Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services), available at http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t980408a.html (last visited Nov. 30,
2007).
541. See Erik S. Jaffe, She's Got Bette Davis['s] Eyes: Assessing the Nonconsensual Removal of
Cadaver Organs Under the Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 528, (1990)
(discussing when the Takings Clause would apply to the appropriation of body parts). See also
Dukeminier, supra note 43, at 833 (rejecting Takings Clause objection to presumed consent by
analogy to precedent involving the abolition of dower). The sources of frustration motivating such
proposals are relatively transparent. See, e.g., Christian Williams, Note, Combatting [sic] the
Problems of Human Rights Abuses and Inadequate Organ Supply Through Presumed Donative
Consent, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 315 (1994).
542. See, e.g., Virginia Postrel, Op-Ed, The Surgery Was Simple: The Process Is Another Story,
USA TODAY, Oct. 25, 2006, at A13; Sally Satel, Op-Ed, A Living Donor Let Me Live On, USA
TODAY, Oct. 25, 2006, at A13.
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"medical self-defense," grounded in the common law right to self-defense and a
recent case recognizing a terminally ill patient's right to "hir[e] a doctor to
administer" an experimental therapy, once it is proven safe, outside the context of
a clinical trial.543 The novel aspect of Volokh's theory is that it leads to a dying
person's right to buy a lifesaving organ (rather than a healthy person's right to
sell non-vital organs). As currently formulated, however, it is difficult to
distinguish Volokh's "medical self-defense" concept from a legal defense of
necessity. He apparently does not mean to authorize poor patients to steal
medicine from drugstores, but he does not flesh out the legal or moral basis for
this distinction. A point in favor of some such right is its resonance with broader
principles in American legal culture. In societies that recognize a right to health
care, this right is often closely associated with state protection against dangerous
or invasive pathogens.544 While state and municipal governments have
historically performed a similar public health function in the United States,
545
they never monopolized the police power: Traditions of personal self-defense and
widespread firearms ownership are deeply rooted. A right to self-preservation by
medical means could empower similarly situated individuals whose lives are
threatened by deteriorating health conditions. In a legal regime that has long
recognized self-help and is skeptical of purported social or economic rights, a
right to actively pursue better health may be the logical parallel of the right to
health care in a full-fledged welfare state.
Volokh's intellectually audacious, direct challenge to NOTA seems to be an
exception amid the current generation of policy literature. More common are less
sweeping proposals to generate additional organ donations by innovating within
the NOTA framework or interpreting the statute with a new gloss. 546 The most
noteworthy attempt to boost donation rates by altering the organ allocation
dynamic within the NOTA system is probably LifeSharers, a nonprofit network
of individuals who "promise to donate upon death, and they give fellow members
first access to their organs., 547 The arrangement takes advantage of UNOS's
543. Volokh, supra note 5, at 1814-15.
544. See, e.g., Eleanor D. Kenney & Brian Alexander Clark, Provisions for Health and Health
Care in the Constitutions of the Countries of the World, 37 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 285, 305 (2004) at
305 (quoting CONSTITUTION DE LA RtPUBLIQUE ALGERIENNE DEMOCRATIQUE ET POPULAIRE
[Constitution] ch 4, art. 54 (Alg.): "All citizens have the right to health protection. The state
assures the prevention and the right against epidemic and endemic illnesses.").
545. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1904).
546. Gradual change is a theme of Healy's scholarship on organ procurement. See KIERAN
HEALY, LAST BEST GIFTS: ALTRUISM AND THE MARKET FOR HUMAN BLOOD AND ORGANS (2006).
This scholarship draws on sociologist Viviana Zelizer's earlier work about the acceptance of life
insurance in American culture. See VIVIANA ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS: THE DEVELOPMENT
OF LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES (1976).
547. LifeSharers: Organs for Organ Donors, http://www.lifesharers.org/ (last visited Nov. 30,
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policy of allowing dying people to donate organs to specific named individuals
(directed donation), but it is constrained by the need for minimally acceptable
biological matches. In 1994, Pennsylvania developed "a pilot program for
reimbursement of funeral expenses to donor families [that] was not implemented
because the state's attorney general was cautioned by government officials that
such a program would be a violation of NOTA.' '548 Because funeral expenses are
incurred whenever someone dies and are not a byproduct of organ donation (in
contrast to, say, tissue typing expenses), paying for burials seemed tantamount to
paying for organs. Although the Pennsylvania initiative was never
operationalized, NOTA does allow "special projects designed to increase the
number of organ donors," and precisely where this provision bumps up against
NOTA's ban on remuneration remains unclear.549
Several manipulations of the directed donation exception that arguably
contravene NOTA are already uneasily tolerated. In one of these innovative
approaches, "a living donor donates a kidney to an unknown, compatible
recipient on the list for a deceased donor. The living donor's intended (but
incompatible) recipient receives in turn some priority on the deceased-donor
waiting list, and this priority may significantly shorten his waiting time., 550 In the
other variation, sometimes called Paired Exchange, incompatible pairs of living
donors and would-be recipients are matched with each other, so that in each pair,
the donor gives up a kidney and the recipient gets one, although the donations
occur in a circular fashion to circumvent incompatibilities. 551 In the first
arrangement, a person who is unable to donate a kidney to a loved one can give
the kidney to stranger in order to give the loved one priority on the waitlist
(adding one extra donation to the system). In the second arrangement, a living
donor gives the kidney to a stranger so that a loved one can get a kidney from
another stranger (creating no immediately tangible benefit for others on the
waitlist who do not likewise have a willing living donor, but reducing the size of
the list two-by-two). In either case, the motivation underpinning directed
donation (helping a loved one) is combined with the matching process
underpinning cadaveric donation to strangers. The problem, from the standpoint
of NOTA, is that the donors appear to be trading the organs for something
2007). See generally Mark S. Nadel & Carolina A. Nadel, Using Reciprocity To Motivate Organ
Donations, 5 YALE. J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHIcS 293, 316-17 (2005).
548. Robert Arnold et al., Financial Incentives for Cadaver Organ Donation: An Ethical
Reappraisal, 73 TRANSPLANTATION 1361, 1363 (2002).
549. 42 U.S.C. § 273(a)(3) (2000) (repealed 2004). Although they wrote before this flexible
provision was removed, Arnold et al., supra note 548, at 1362, assumed that NOTA would have to
be revised before a demonstration project utilizing "financial incentives" would be permissible.
550. Legality of Alternative Organ Donation Practices Under 42 U.S.C. § 274e, 31 Op. Off.
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substantial: another organ or improved standing on the waitlist. While no written
contract is signed, in a Paired Exchange two or more transplants are scheduled
simultaneously so that no one can back out.
In March 2007, the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)
sent a memorandum opinion to the General Counsel of HHS clarifying the
Justice Department's view that Paired Exchange and Living Donor/Deceased
Donor Exchange "do not violate [NOTA's] prohibition on transfers of organs for
'valuable consideration."' 5 52 The memorandum cited a number of factors
pointing to this conclusion. First, a variety of other state and federal statutory
provisions implied that "valuable consideration" was "monetary or at least has a
readily measurable pecuniary value. 553 Further, a general canon of statutory
construction holds that different provisions of a legislative scheme should be read
in a way that minimizes internal conflict, and elsewhere NOTA asserts a goal of
"increas[ing] the supply of donated organs. 554 Similarly, NOTA is predicated on
Congress's authority under the Constitution's Commerce Clause, and recent
jurisprudence has favored an "economic" conception of Congress's power to
regulate interstate commerce.555 Finally, NOTA makes organ purchases a crime,
and the principle of lenity requires that ambiguities in criminal law be resolved
"in favor of a narrower" definition of the conduct being criminalized.556
Interpreting the statute in this aggressively pragmatic way inevitably raises
questions of the "how far is too far" variety. For example, since NOTA only bans
transferring human organs for valuable consideration, would courts tolerate some
compensation for living organ donors' time and pain? If so, do courts have the
institutional capacity to limit this compensation according to rational principles
on the ground that once it reaches a certain level, it becomes tantamount to
buying an organ?
557
The most radical change that one could imagine occurring within the current
statutory language would involve re-interpreting NOTA to ban only the
involvement of "middlemen" in organ sales, as was apparently the intent of the
California statute. The corresponding wording in NOTA-prohibiting people
from "knowingly acquir[ing,] receiv[ing], or otherwise transfer[ring] any human
organ for valuable consideration"-is, without further gloss, somewhat
552. Id. at 1 (emphasis omitted).
553. Id. at 4. OLC noted that Black's Law Dictionary added the "pecuniarily measurable"
criterion to its definition of "valuable consideration" in 1999. Id. at 5.
554. 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(k) (2000).
555. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
556. Legality of Alternative Organ Donation Practices Under 42 U.S.C. § 274e, supra note 550,
at 6.
557. For a contemporary consideration of the inferential objectification of pain in legal and
administrative contexts, see Adam J. Kolber, Pain Detection and the Privacy of Subjective
Experience, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 433 (2007).
103
Gross: E Pluribus UNOS
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2008
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
ambiguous as to precisely what may not be done "for valuable consideration., 558
Is the prohibited consideration (a) compensation for the organ or (b)
compensation for the acquisition? Devoid of any context, a relatively natural
reading of the statute's language would allow a person to exchange his or her
own kidney for "valuable consideration," but would prohibit a person from
acquiring or transferring a kidney if that act would be compensated. Of course,
transplant recipients themselves would gladly "receive" organs without "valuable
consideration," so it would be illogical to interpret the statute as banning the
patients themselves from being compensated for undergoing transplant surgery-
this was not a serious concern. However, one set of actors could conceivably
"acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer" human organs and demand valuable
consideration for doing so: third parties engaged in for-profit organ
procurement.559 Such entities might have existed legally in the United States but
for NOTA. If this interpretation seems strained, it is not so as a matter of
grammar, but rather because it is inconsistent with certain aspects of the
legislative history of NOTA, such as a hostility toward commodification of
human organs, not specifically limited to transactions involving brokers. (Indeed,
Title III of NOTA was titled "Prohibition of Organ Purchases," not "Prohibition
of Compensated Organ Acquisition., 560 ) Recall, though, that the kidney
purchasing schemes that initially motivated NOTA were envisioned as business-
like enterprises. For this reason, it would not be entirely inconceivable for a court
to read the language merely to ban third parties from profiting from organ
procurement on a per-transaction basis, especially if public sentiment were to
shift dramatically in favor of allowing some sales. The fact that organ allocation
policy is evolving in the absence of formal amendments to NOTA suggests that
many policymakers believe reforms are needed, but Congress is reluctant to
revisit the statute. Unless this political environment changes, one can expect
further evolution within the NOTA system, loosely interpreted.
B. Assessment
From the legislative history of NOTA, and a historical inquiry into the
political culture in which the NOTA Task Force promulgated its
recommendations, it is possible to assess the conflicting claims that present-day
scholars and public intellectuals have made about the Act's origins and purpose.
Although President Reagan had signed NOTA before the Pittsburgh
controversy erupted, the privileged international patient scandal became a
foundational event in the transplant community's understanding of UNOS. Thus,
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prominent bioethicist Arthur Caplan has written:
In the early '80s it was not uncommon for wealthy foreigners to pay big bucks
to push their way to the head of the line for a transplant. This trade got so out of
hand that Congress insisted a national system be created to ensure that
Americans got first crack at the organs that became available and that organs be
distributed in an equitable manner (UNOS] has had Congress' [sic] mandate to
keep an eye on the distribution of organs ever since.
561
Technically, Caplan put the cart before the horse in this account. Congress's
intervention into the organ allocation system-to the extent that a "system"
existed in 1983-did represent an effort to regulate international commerce. But
the commercial angle was not that "wealthy foreigners" were buying privileged
access to transplant surgery.562 Rather, the concern was that Americans might
seek to purchase organs from desperate foreigners (or fellow citizens), harming
the country's reputation on the international stage. Allegations that affluent
international patients were purchasing privileged access to transplant surgery, on
the other hand, did not perceptibly influence public policy until after NOTA
authorized the enlistment of a private contractor to support organ allocation and
transplantation on a national basis.
Jeffrey Prottas's claim that the legislation was driven by interest-group
lobbying for public insurance coverage of immunosuppression goes further than
the evidence available in the public record.563 Transplant surgeons and centers
presumably desired reimbursement and certainly sought to leave an imprint on
transplant financing policy, but the record does not indicate that providers were
controlling the discussion of how to strengthen America's organ transfer system.
The question of whether to finance immunosuppression was subject to thoughtful
debate, as were other problems of transplant financing, and when cyclosporine
financing was put to a final vote in 1984, Congress answered in the negative.
Transplant professionals' economic self-interest-as well as their understanding
of their patients' health needs-may have stimulated their numerous public
appearances, analytic cost-benefit conjectures, detailed policy statements, and
voluminous testimony by representatives of provider organizations. Such
advocacy, however, could only be projected onto policy prescriptions through the
thorough, yet transparent, mediation of political actors speaking in the name of
the national interest.
As the arc of transplant policy bent toward ensuring American patients'
access to transplant surgery, the rigid, bureaucratic response embodied in the
"members only" reimbursement policy for transplant centers was neither
561. CAPLAN, supra note 14.
562. Id.
563. See Prottas, supra note 15.
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endorsed by NOTA, nor in direct conflict with a literal reading of the Act. James
Blumstein is doubtlessly correct that the organ allocation system as a whole
became more centralized over time, notwithstanding the counterexamples that
Frank Sloan proffers. 564  However, Blumstein's assertion that this evolution
represented a betrayal of NOTA's "market perfecting orientation relies on a too-
precise interpretation of NOTA's orientation. 565 Aside from President Reagan's
signing statement (which carries limited persuasive force), the official history of
NOTA, embodied in committee reports and the text of NOTA itself, was
ambivalent as to whether the network would ultimately resemble a voluntary
association or a command and control structure.
Much of the debate over the federal government's role focused on the
potential cost to taxpayers and the hazard of interfering with the professional
practice of medicine, rather than the potential homogenization of organ allocation
per se. Congress took pains to emphasize the non-governmental nature of the
network, for example, by calling it the "Organ Procurement and Transplantation
Network" in the final NOTA, rather than the "United States Transplantation
Network," as in the earlier House version. Yet, a centerpiece of the legislation
was the appointment of a single private contractor to manage the network.
Congress clearly envisioned that the network would have a unifying effect,
coordinating the behavior of personnel at disparate transplant institutions.
Toward this end, it first entered into a binding contract with a voluntary
organization, UNOS, that transplant centers effectively ratified through their
membership. Congress then conferred quasi-governmental powers on UNOS,
arguably equating organized voluntarism with industry self-governance. The
question of who was doing the organizing (largely, a non-governmental
organization responsive to stakeholders within the transplant community) should
not have been conflated with the question of how much organization would be
mandated.
Policymakers uniformly expected that both the public and private sectors
would play some role in coordinating and financing this new modality of organ
transfer. Individual participants in the NOTA debate, including those who were
instrumental to the bill's passage and to the creation of the NOTA system,
appreciated that both collective action problems and heavy-handed governmental
interventions could be inefficient and stultifying. When transplant programs that
had been emblems of initiative and innovation did not seem to be serving the
public well--or even faring particularly well themselves-under lax oversight,
legislators displayed a marked preference for setting some ground rules and
giving private ordering a chance. Yet, the implicit logic of this hesitation could
just as easily be characterized as incrementalism, rather than market perfection.
564. See Blumstein, supra note 10; Sloan, supra note 8.
565. Blumstein, supra note 10, at 22.
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To be sure, many market-oriented legislators may have signed onto NOTA
without fully anticipating the course of events that the hearings and legislation
would set in motion. Those members of Congress who were initially most
inclined to delegate contentious issues to a Task Force tended to be conservative,
Republican, and skeptical of large-scale federal projects. Ironically, they had
painted themselves into a corner. When the Task Force reported back to
Congress two years later, it called for greater centralization and greater
bureaucratization. To those who would pass critical judgment on NOTA's
subsequent implementation, the ambiguous legislative history of the Act itself
commends a gaze outside that history, to broad legal principles such as those of
antitrust and administrative due process.
C. Future Directions
The persistent scarcity in the existing allocation system, the cultural and
religious diversity of the American public, and patients' mobility across national
borders all intensify the pressures on a unified allocation system built on
somewhat nationalized forms of public and private confidence. These challenges
have occasionally given rise to new modalities of donor recruitment and organ
transfer--either within the UNOS framework or alongside of it-rooted in
competing or complementary theories of donor and patient confidence. Proposals
to favor organ donors when allocating organs, for example, seek to remedy a
perceived collective action problem by predicating individuals' donation
decisions on a confidence that fellow members of the allocation pool will also
donate. More tangible incentives to donate, such as those that arise in Paired
Exchange, are currently pressing the limits of the NOTA regime.
The greatest legislative homage paid to the framers of that regime has been a
series of subsequent statutes applying principles established through transplant
policy to analogous problems in other realms of health policy. A series of laws
regulating physician self-referrals 566 and updating the prohibition on soliciting or
accepting remuneration for federally-reimbursable medical purchases567 have
implicitly endorsed the logic of protecting people's health and the public fisc by
regulating the flow of payments throughout the patient referral process. In 2003,
Congress re-drew the line between financing transplant therapy and health care
financing generally by enacting a Medicare prescription drug benefit. A
provision in that legislation "direct[ed] the Secretary of [HHS] to make available
to the public the factors considered in making national coverage determinations
566. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2000) ("Stark" anti-referral statute).
567. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2000) (federal "anti-kickback" statute). This legislation
originated in 1972, predating NOTA. See Office of Inspector Gen. & Office of Pub. Affairs, Dep't
of Health & Human Servs., Fact Sheet, Federal Anti-Kickback Law and Regulatory Safe Harbors
(Nov. 1999), http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/safeharborregulations/safefs.htm.
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for coverage of Medicare benefits. 568 By attaching this requirement to a bill
increasing the availability of outpatient reimbursements, Congress inspired
another reckoning in policy circles of the connections among comprehensive
coverage, cost control, and administrative transparency.5 69 At the same time, the
peculiar dilemmas of allocating a scarce, corporeal resource have not
disappeared. Where policymakers once looked for a fresh solution, exasperated
observers now see a host of problems.
Scholarly literature concentrating on the tragic dimension of organ
substitution options, while containing sharp insights, should not be taken to mean
that public policy in this realm should or must consist of endless alternation
between tragic choices. The high social cost of system instability and the mistrust
it engenders all but require that a degree of path dependence be built into the
allocation system-if there is to be a system. This lock-in itself might be tragic,
but it has been accompanied by another force imparting some direction to organ
transfer: the development of technologies for organizing allocation and
improving outcomes. While scientific breakthroughs-especially in drug
development-are unpredictable, broad choices of what technologies to support
and what research to fund are not beyond human direction. In turn, changing
social conditions and technological capacities, as distinct from changing values,
can prompt renegotiation of the roles of sponsorship and shared security within
the system. In light of NOTA's historical entanglement with global geopolitics,
the ultimate irony may be that one approach to organ procurement now receiving
serious public and professional attention-fixed compensation to organ donors
through a government program-was pioneered in Iran and has been dubbed the
"Iranian model" of organ procurement. 70 Reconciling transplantation with some
widely shared American values has always required a good deal of political,
economic, and ideological "work., 57 1 Contemporary debate surrounding
proposals to increase the supply of organs for transplantation reminds us that this
work remains unfinished.
568. Jacqueline Fox, Medicare Should, But Cannot, Consider Cost: Legal Impediments to Sound
Policy, 53 BUFF. L. REv. 577, 579 (2005) (citing Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 731, 117 Stat. 2066, 2349 (2003)).
569. See id. See also Sandra J. Carnahan, Medicare's Coverage with Study Participation Policy:
Clinical Trials or Tribulations?, 7 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 229, 243 (2007).
570. See, e.g., Psst, Wanna Buy a Kidney?, ECONOMIST, Nov. 16, 2006, at 58. For a critical
assessment, see Alireza Bagheri, Compensated Kidney Donation: An Ethical Review of the Iranian
Model, 16 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 269 (2006).
571. For a discussion of the work needed to sustain the American organ transfer system, see
Healy, supra note 538, at 316, 326-27.
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